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I. INTRODUCTION
History was made this August 2011 in Toronto, Canada, when the
American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates voted to adopt the
ABA Model Act Governing Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect,
and Dependency Proceedings (Model Act).' Through several years of in-
tense and effective collaboration, negotiation, and education, the ABA voted
to adopt the Model Act, thus establishing a new nationally accepted standard
of practice for attorneys representing children in dependency proceedings
and a new standard of legal representation for maltreated children across
America.2
* Amy Harfeld serves as the National Policy Director and Senior Staff Attorney for the
Children's Advocacy Institute at the University of San Diego School of Law. She is the co-
author of A Child's Right to Counsel: A National Report Card on Legal Representation for
Abused & Neglected Children (2d ed. 2009). Special thanks to Meredith Kimmel Hamsher
and Christina McClurg Riehl for providing substantial support on this article.
1. HILARIE BASS, A.B.A. SECTION OF LITIG., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES I
(2011), available at http://www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/ABAResolution.pdf.
2. See generally id.
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The ABA is by no means an advocacy organization. Rather, it
represents the largest assemblage of attorneys from across the United States
from every existing practice area.3 The new standard established in the
Model Act goes far beyond what is currently required in the relevant federal
law, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), creating a
stark and troublesome dichotomy in the legal standards governing child re-
presentation that begs to be rectified. Although the Model Act does not in
itself create binding law, it should be utilized as a powerful tool to advance
state and federal legislative reform culminating in a CAPTA amendment
mandating client-directed attorney representation for children in all abuse
and neglect cases.
Over the last fifteen years, a broad national consensus has evolved
across the country that is reflected in the provisions and practice framework
of the Model Act.4 Since passage of the ABA Standards of Practice for
Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases (Standards of
Practice) in 1996,5 the notion that children in dependency hearings have the
right to client-centered traditional representation by an attorney has gained
widespread acceptance across a variety of forums. 6 Judges, state courts, aca-
demics, attorneys, and advocates nationwide have built a groundswell of
support in the right to counsel movement culminating with passage of the
Model Act.
This article will track the groundswell of standards, research, and litera-
ture that, together, created the momentum for the Model Act's passage. It
will go on to examine the federal CAPTA in more detail, explaining how it
has dealt with the issue of legal representation over time. Then, CAPTA will
3. See id. at 22.
4. See id. at 18-22.
5. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE &
NEGLECT CASES 1 (1996) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF PRACTICE].
6. See DONALD N. DUQUETTE ET AL., ADOPTION 2002: THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON
ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION
GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN ch. VII (1999), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/adopt02/index.htm; see also LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child:
Client-Directed Representation in Dependency Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605, 607-09 (2009);
PERMANENT JUDICIAL COMM'N FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, & FAMILIES, SUPREME COURT OF TEX.,
LEGAL REPRESENTATION STUDY: ASSESSMENT OF APPOINTED REPRESENTATION IN TEXAS
CHILD-PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS 41 (2011), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.
us/children/pdf/LRS.pdf (noting that there is a "clear conflict with the multitude of duties ...
suggested by the American Bar Association (ABA) and the National Association of Counsel
for Children (NACC)" when "children's attorneys [who] do not view children as 'real clients,'
and as a result, do not spend adequate time preparing and understanding the child's wishes").
7. See Andrea Khoury, ABA Adopts Model Act on Child Representation in Abuse and
Neglect Cases, 30 A.B.A. CHILD L. PRAC. 106, 106 (2011).
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be viewed in contrast to the Model Act and the discrepancies between the
two frameworks will be highlighted. Next, state statutes concerning the pro-
vision of representation to children in dependency hearings will be classified
and placed along the CAPTA to Model Act spectrum. Finally, the article
will conclude with a section on how the Model Act may be best utilized as a
tool in pursuing state and federal legislative reform resulting in a nationally
protected right to counsel for children in dependency cases.
II. TRACKING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL GROUNDSWELL OVER THE PAST
FIFTEEN YEARS
For the last fifteen years or so, there has been an increasing amount of
attention paid to the issue of child representation in abuse and neglect cases
from many disciplines and entities. In 1995, the National Council of Juve-
nile and Family Court Judges Guidelines were published. These guidelines
do not go very far in discussing the parameters of attorney representation, but
they did clearly state: "Both trained volunteers and attorneys must play a
significant role in providing GAL representation for children," indicating the
view that attorneys should have a role in representing the child in every
case.9
Shortly later, in 1996, the ABA passed the Standards of Practicelo re-
commending that "[a]ll children subject to court proceedings involving alle-
gations of child abuse and neglect ... have legal representation as long as ...
court jurisdiction continues."" The Standards of Practice did not present a
statutory model, but rather spelled out standards of representation both for
traditional child attorneys and for attorney guardians ad litem (GALs) who
represent only the child's best interests. 2 The standards clearly articulated
that only attorneys can adequately safeguard the rights of, and advocate for,
8. See generally PUBL'N DEV. COMM. ET AL., NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY
COURT JUDGES, RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT CASES (1995), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/resguid.pdf.
9. Id. at 24.
10. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 1.
11. Id.
These [s]tandards apply only to lawyers and take the position that although a lawyer may
accept appointment in the dual capacity of a "lawyer/guardian ad litem," the lawyer's primary
duty must still be focused on the protection of the legal rights of the child client. The law-
yer/guardian ad litem should therefore perform all the functions of a "child's attorney," except
as otherwise noted.
Id.
12. Id. A-2 cmt. at 2.
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the legal interests of children in the child welfare system and that children's
attorneys are much preferable to best-interest attorney GALs.13
Shortly after publication of the Standards of Practice, Fordham Law
School hosted the Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Repre-
sentation of Children.14 The primary recommendation from this gathering
was premised upon the presumption that all children must be represented by
counsel in their abuse/neglect cases and further, that their "lawyer[] should
represent the expressed wishes of their child clients rather than [what the
attorney determines to be in] their [child] clients' best interests.
Several years later, in 2001, the National Association of Counsel for
Children released its report titled, NACC Recommendations for Representa-
tion of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases.6 The foundational principle is
"that every child subject to a child protection proceeding must be provided
an independent, competent, and zealous attorney, trained in the law of child
protection and the art of trial advocacy, with adequate time and resources to
handle the case."" This established the new recommended standard of prac-
tice for children's attorneys nationwide.
Recommendations to appoint attorneys to maltreated children were is-
sued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in 2002." The
recommendations, found in the Guidelines for Public Policy and State Legis-
lation Governing Permanence for Children (Guidelines), were developed in
response to President Clinton's 2002 initiative on adoption and foster care.' 9
In relevant part, the Guidelines state:
We recommend that [s]tates guarantee that all children who are
subjects of child protection court proceedings be represented by an
independent attorney at all stages and at all hearings in the child
protection court process. The attorney owes the same duties of
13. See id. A-2 cmt. at 2; see also HOWARD DAVIDSON, A.B.A. CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE
LAW, THE CHILD'S LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN CIVIL ABUSE/NEGLECT CASES IN THE U.S.-A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE DISTINCT APPROACHES (2011) (on file with Nova Law
Review).
14. Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1301 (1996).
15. Katherine R. Kruse, Standing in Babylon, Looking Toward Zion, 6 NEV. L.J. 1315,
1315 (2006).
16. NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, NACC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 2 (2001), available at http://w
ww.naccchildlaw.org/resource/resmgr/resource-center/naccstandardsand recommend.pdf.
17. Id. at 4.
18. DUQUETIE ET AL., supra note 6, at chs. I, VII.
19. Id. at ch. I.
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competent representation and zealous advocacy to the child as are
due an adult client.20
This was a significant step forward, providing the first federal policy state-
ment in support of attorney representation for all children.
In 2005, Professor Jean Koh Peters at Yale Law School released the
first survey of legal representation of children in dependency cases by state
and juxtaposed to international law on the topic. 2 1 She broke down the re-
presentation by categorizing states that provided only lay best interest repre-
sentation, those that also required the lay GAL to communicate child's
views, those that provided attorney representation on a permissive or manda-
tory basis, and those that provided client-directed attorneys.22 This survey
permitted advocates and practitioners, as well as lawmakers, a big-picture
view into the messy hodgepodge of state laws governing representation of
children in child welfare cases.23
In 2005, the landmark case, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue,24 was de-
cided in Georgia, recognizing for the first time a state and federal constitu-
tional due process right to counsel for children in dependency cases.25 In
relevant part, the Georgia court stated, "a child's fundamental liberty inter-
ests are at stake not only in the initial deprivation hearing but also in the se-
ries of hearings and review proceedings that occur as part of a deprivation
case" and recognized that once a child is in state custody, a "special relation-
ship" is created, triggering liberty interests as well.26 This case established
valuable precedent for a child's constitutional right to counsel.27 Advocates
in several states have attempted to use this as precedent to strengthen the
right to counsel for children in their state,28 and the case will no doubt be
20. Id. at ch. VII.
21. See generally Jean Koh Peters, How Children Are Heard in Child Protective Pro-
ceedings, in the United States and Around the World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Obser-
vations, and Areas for Further Study, 6 NEV. L.J. 966 (2006); How Children's Voices Are
Heard in Child Protective Proceedings: Jurisdiction Research-50 States and Territories,
REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE, http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/amn/
usa/unitedstates/frontpage.htm (last edited Dec. 2005) [hereinafter REPRESENTING CHILDREN
WORLDWIDE].
22. Peters, supra note 21, at 1011-12; see generally REPRESENTING CHILDREN
WORLDWIDE, supra note 21.
23. Peters, supra note 21, at 1013, 1019.
24. 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
25. Id. at 1359-60.
26. Id. at 1360.
27. See id. at 1359-60.
28. Children's Joint Opening Brief at 10-11, In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., No.
84132-2 (Wash. Aug. 27, 2010).
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used as landmark precedent in this area in courts across the country until it
becomes the law of the land.
Shortly after the Kenny A. decision, The University of Nevada, Las Ve-
gas convened child law experts from around the country at the UNLV Confe-
rence on Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice
Ten Years after Fordham, releasing a law review dedicated to the issue of
right to counsel.29 The most significant outcome from this conference in-
cluded recommendations to amend CAPTA in the following ways:
1. Laws currently authorizing the appointment of a lawyer to
serve in a legal proceeding as a child's guardian ad litem should be
amended to authorize instead the appointment of a lawyer to
represent the child in the proceeding.
2. Laws that require lawyers serving on behalf of children to as-
sume responsibilities inconsistent with those of a lawyer for the
child as the client should be eliminated.30
Other UNLV Conference recommendations addressed the specific manner in
which child-directed attorney representation should be executed.3 1 Many of
these recommendations are consistent with provisions of what was to be-
come the Model Act.32
In 2007, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) adopted the Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse,
Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act (NCCUSL Act).33 NCCUSL, which
is also known as the Uniform Law Commission, is an organization made up
of attorneys from each U.S. jurisdiction that provides non-partisan legislation
"in areas of state law where uniformity is desirable and practical."3 The
2007 NCCUSL Act recognizes that a child's interest in abuse and neglect
proceedings is of fundamental importance and calls for the appointment of an
29. Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families:
Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 6 NEv. L.J. 592, 592 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Recommendations: Ten Years After Fordham].
30. Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996), reprinted in 6 Nev. L.J. 1408, 1409 (2006).
31. Recommendations: Ten Years After Fordham, supra note 29, at 592-93.
32. Compare MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE,
NEGLECT, & DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS § 3 (2011) [hereinafter MODEL ACT 2011], with Rec-
ommendations: Ten Years After Fordham, supra note 29, at 592-93.
33. See generally UNIFORM REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, &
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ACT, reprinted in NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS OF UNIF. STATE
LAWS (2007).
34. Id. at About ULC.
330 [Vol. 36
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attorney to each child involved in such proceedings 35 who may serve in a
client-directed or best-interests capacity. 36 The Act emphasizes that the at-
torney for the child must fully participate in the proceedings.3 7
While in 2005, Professor Peters provided a survey of legal representa-
tion across the states, it was not until 2007, with the publication by First
Star of a national report card grading states on their provision of attorneys to
children in abuse and neglect proceedings, that advocates and policy makers
were able to see clearly how each state's laws provided representation.39
States' policies were clearly exposed and were put in direct comparison with
other states across the country." First Star and the Children's Advocacy
Institute utilized this opportunity of direct analysis to release a second report
card in 2009, which highlighted states that had used the opportunity to im-
prove their representation practices and kept the pressure on those states who
continued policies of failing grades.4 1
In 2008, Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of Chicago
published a report entitled Expediting Permanency: Legal Representation
for Foster Children in Palm Beach County based on an evaluation of the
Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County's Foster Children's Project (FCP),
which provides client-directed attorney representation to the children it
represents.4 2 This study specifically focused on FCP's effect "on the nature
and timing of children's permanency outcomes." 43 Further, it was the first to
examine "court improvement efforts on . .. permanency" when subject child-
ren were provided with legal representation." The result was that children
represented by FCP achieved permanency at rates significantly higher than
35. See id. at 5.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 28.
38. Peters, supra note 21, at 1010.
39. FIRST STAR, A CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: FIRST STAR'S NATIONAL REPORT CARD
ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN 10-13 (1st ed. 2007) [hereinafter NATIONAL
REPORT CARD, FIRST EDITION], available at http://www.firststar.org/documents/firststarr
eportcard07.pdf.
40. Id. at 10.
41. FIRST STAR & CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INST., A CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN
8 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION], available at http://
www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/Final RTC_2ndEdition-Ir.pdf.
42. ANDREW E. ZINN & JACK SLOWRIVER, CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIV.
OF CHICAGO, EXPEDITING PERMANENCY: LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR FOSTER CHILDREN IN
PALM BEACH COUNTY 1 (2008), available at http://www.chapinhaI.org/sites/default/files
/oldjreports/428.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3.
2012] 331
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children not represented by FCP, strengthening the argument that children
involved in dependency proceedings benefit from client-directed counsel.45
On the academic front, several "right to counsel" law review articles
have been published making the case for national reform; these articles al-
lege that the GAL requirement of CAPTA is tantamount to the unauthorized
practice of law and underscores the importance of a client-directed model
with reasonable caseloads.46
The ABA sponsored a summit on the right to counsel at Northwestern
University School of Law in 2009.47 "This summit . . . allow[ed] policy
makers, practitioners, academics, and advocates from around the country to
collaborate and develop an aggressive national strategy to promote the right
to counsel for children through legislation, litigation, and public engage-
ment."4 8 The purpose of the summit was to strategize the next steps in the
"right to counsel" movement for children, including using litigation, federal
and state legislative reform, and passage of the Model Act. 49
Also in 2009, the federal government, for the first time, declared this is-
sue so important that it dedicated sparse federal dollars to determine best
practices.50 In October of that year, the U.S. Children's Bureau named Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School its partner in establishing the National Qual-
ity Improvement Center on the Representation of Children in the Child Wel-
fare System (QIC-ChildRep)."' "The QIC-ChildRep is a five-year, [five]
million dollar project to gather, develop and communicate knowledge on
child representation, promote consensus on the role of the child's legal repre-
sentative, and provide one of the first empirically-based analyses of how
legal representation for the child might best be delivered."52 Although the
outcome of the research and data of the QIC-ChildRep is not yet in, it will be
45. Id. at 14-15.
46. See, e.g., Gerard F. Glynn, The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act-
Promoting the Unauthorized Practice of low, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 53, 53-54 (2007); Erik
Pitchal, Children's Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 663, 694-95 (2006); Taylor, supra note 6, at 617-20.
47. Letter from Cathy Krebs & Rosa Hirji, Summit Organizers, A.B.A. Section of Litig.
Children's Rights Litig. Comm., on Raising Our Hands: Creating a National Strategy for
Children's Right to Education and Counsel 1 (Oct. 23, 2009) (on file with Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law); see also Summary of Notes from Right to Counsel Workshops: Rais-
ing Our Hands (Oct. 23, 2009) (on file with Nova Lw Review).
48. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 41, at 14.
49. Id. at 4-5.
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complete in time for the next CAPTA reauthorization cycle in 2015-16."
There are high hopes that the research and results published will produce
some of the evidence and data needed for further CAPTA reform on this
topic.
The passage of the Model Act represents the crest of this tidal wave of
attention, advocacy, and consensus on the topic of right to counsel for abused
and neglected children in their dependency cases. Now that the children's
legal community, judicial, court, academic and advocacy communities, and
the ABA itself have decisively concluded that all children in abuse and neg-
lect cases must have competent attorney representation, it has become even
more conspicuously shameful how far behind the curve our national legisla-
tion stagnates.
1H. EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The key piece of federal legislation addressing the representation of
children in child abuse and neglect cases is CAPTA, originally enacted in
1974.54 CAPTA provides federal funding to states in support of prevention,
assessment, investigation, prosecution, and treatment activities related to
child maltreatment.55 Although this funding usually makes up only a small
portion of states' child welfare budgets, it represents the only direct block of
federal funding for child representation, and hence, the greatest sphere of
influence over state practice in this arena.56
Within the first iteration of the law, the only provision regarding repre-
sentation required merely that a GAL be appointed to represent the child in
abuse and neglect proceedings.5 ' Although primitive, this provision actually
"represented the birth of the field of representation of children in [these] pro-
ceedings."5 That being said, there was no guidance provided regarding the
nature of this GAL's or representative's role. Certainly the issue of whether
this GAL would be an attorney and, if so, what role the attorney would play
was not addressed.
53. See id.
54. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 1, 88 Stat. 4, 4
(1974) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 5101 et seq. (2006)).
55. See id. § 2, 88 stat. at 5.
56. Howard Davidson, The CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010: What Advocates
Should Know, A.B.A. SECTION OF LITIG., (Jan. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Davidson, What Advo-
cates Should Know], http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/content/art
icles/010311-capta-reauthorization.html.
57. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, FIRST EDITION, supra note 39, at 5.
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CAPTA has been amended a number of times since 1974.59 The most
significant amendment pertaining to representation of children came in 2003
when the simple requirement of a GAL was expanded to: 1) make clear that
this representative may be an attorney-without requiring that it be so; 2)
clarify the objectives of the representation-to obtain an understanding of
the case, and to make best-interest recommendations to the court; and 3) re-
quire that the representative receive appropriate training 60 This amendment
made clear that the child did not have the right to an attorney, and whatever
representative the child had was primarily accountable to the court, not to the
child.6'
CAPTA was most recently reauthorized in 2010.62 Many organizations
including the ABA, the Children's Advocacy Institute, the National Associa-
tion of Counsel for Children, First Star, and other groups worked over sever-
al years to amend the representation provisions to specify that traditional
attorney representation be provided in accordance with the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.63 The National Child Abuse Coalition also advo-
cated for an amendment to the Act requiring that representation continue for
the entire duration of the case, even if the child remains in care past the age
of eighteen, as allowed by the Fostering Connections to Success and Increas-
ing Adoptions Act. 4 This amendment was not adopted in whole or in part. 65
59. About CAPTA: A Legislative History, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY 1 (July
2011), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/about.pdf.
60. Child Abuse Prevention Treatment Act 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2000)
(amended by Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003).
61. See id.
62. See CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-19 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010).
63. See NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 41, at 5, 10, 12, 14, 16;
see generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2011).
64. See HOWARD DAVIDSON, A.B.A. CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE L., CAPTA PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS REGARDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN (2010) [hereinafter
DAVIDSON, CAPTA PROPOSED AMENDMENTS] (on file with Nova Law Review); Fostering
Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-351, § 201,
122 Stat. 3949, 3957 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). This included
proposed amendments that would have required that: 1) "[e]very child involved in a court
case be appointed an attorney;" 2) "[t]his appointed attorney be designated 'legal counsel' for
the child, with his or her representation strictly following the [ABA] Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct;" 3) "[t]he appointed attorney have 'adequate time and resources' to properly
handle each case, defined as not having an 'excessive' caseload and receiving 'reasonable and
appropriate compensation;"' and 4) "[tihis attorney appointment continue as long as the court
maintain[s] its jurisdiction over the case, including all periods of foster care or other residen-
tial placement, as well as the process of the child's transition to adult independence." David-
son, What Advocates Should Know, supra note 56, at 1.
334 [Vol. 36
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In response to some concerns regarding the economic feasibility of
making such an amendment, an alternative was proposed to provide attorney
representation to children over the age of twelve.6 This age provision would
have significantly cut down on any expense created by this provision, yet the
Senate HELP Committee dismissed even this alternative during CAPTA
reauthorization.
There was only one addition to the 2010 CAPTA Reauthorization re-
lated to the representation of children. 68 The 2003 amendment "that every
child's court-appointed representatives have 'training appropriate to [that]
role,"' never specified what this training was to consist of.69 The 2010
amendment explicitly directs that this must include "training in early child-
hood, child, and adolescent development."o It is undoubtedly important that
whoever the child's representative is have appropriate training in this area,
but no training can substitute for a bona fide attorney who will zealously
represent and advocate for their child client.
IV. How CAPTA FALLS SHORT OF THE MODEL ACT
The Model Act provides for a model of representation for abused and
neglected children in dependency proceedings that protects their rights, pro-
vides full due process, gives them a voice in court, and ensures that their
perspective is fully heard and considered before a judge makes a ruling on
their best interest.7 1 This model of representation differs starkly from the
limited representation required under CAPTA, and this chasm should be ap-
preciated.
Under CAPTA, the limited representation provided for ensures only that
the child be appointed a properly trained GAL who may or may not be an
attorney, that the GAL obtain first-hand information about the case, and that
the GAL make best interest recommendations to the court.72 This means
that, in a state that provides only this level of representation, the child would
not have an attorney, and therefore, none of the advantages and rights that
attach to having legal counsel, and would not have his or her legal interests
or wishes communicated in court to the judge, and therefore, not considered
65. Compare DAVIDSON, CAPTA PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 64, with 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-19.
66. See DAVIDSON, CAPTA PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 64.
67. Compare id., with S. REP. No. 111-378, at 31 (2010).
68. Davidson, What Advocates Should Know, supra note 56, at 2.
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a)(6)(D).
71. See MODEL ACT 2011, supra note 32, §§ 3(a), 7(a)-(b).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii).
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in the case's adjudication.73 Essentially, CAPTA and the Model Act set the
respective ends of the spectrum of representation across America.
Following are some of the most compelling provisions under the Model
Act that go beyond this limited representation to provide the child with full,
meaningful, and appropriate legal representation during their child protective
case: Lawyers will serve in a client-directed capacity to every child in an
abuse or neglect case for the entire duration of the case 74 and will represent
children with diminished capacity pursuant to relevant rules of professional
conduct;75 counsel must abide by relevant rules of professional conduct;76
"right to counsel may not be waived;" 77 "court may appoint a best-interest
advocate"-the type required by CAPTA-in addition to the attorney to
provide best-interest recommendations; 78 lawyers must not carry a caseload
that exceeds a reasonable standard;79 specific duties of child's lawyer and the
scope of representation are spelled out in detail;80 attorney may request au-
thority from the court to pursue ancillary legal matters on behalf of the
child;8 ' requires that the child and the child's attorney receive notice of all
hearings and attorney access to all information required for optimal represen-
tation;82 grants subject children party status and "the right to attend and ...
participate in" each hearing; 3 and entitles child's counsel to reasonable com-
pensation for their representation.8 4
73. See id.
74. MODEL ACT 2011, supra note 32, § 6.
75. Id. § 7(d).
76. Id. § 3(d).
77. Id. § 3(f).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii); MODEL ACT 2011, supra note 32, § 3(b).
79. MODEL ACT2 011, supra note 32, § 4(c).
80. See id. § 7.
81. See id. § 7(b)(10).
Such ancillary matters include special education, school discipline hearings, mental health
treatment, delinquency or criminal issues, status offender matters, guardianship, adoption, pa-
ternity, probate, immigration matters, medical care coverage, SSI eligibility, youth transition-
ing out of care issues, postsecondary education opportunity qualification, and tort actions for
injury, as appropriate. The lawyer should make every effort to ensure that the child is
represented by legal counsel in all ancillary legal proceedings, either personally, when the
lawyer is competent to do so, or through referral or collaboration.
Id. § 7(b) cmt.
82. Id. § 9(b), (f)(2).
83. MODEL ACT 2011, supra note 32, §§ 2(b), 9(a).
84. See id. § 12(a).
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V. WHERE STATES FALL IN THE SPECTRUM OF REPRESENTATION
Clearly, the gap between the representation required under CAPTA and
that promoted in the Model Act is vast and has very significant implications
for the child as well as for the outcome of the case. Children in foster care
face a complicated and confusing court process that impacts their lives and
their liberty on the most fundamental level. Because of the dichotomy that
exists between the Model Act and CAPTA, children in some states find
themselves without an advocate to counsel them regarding their legal rights,
interests, and options; without an attorney to make objections, conduct dis-
covery, or file motions and appeals; and without someone to give voice to
and advocate for their position in court." Thus, the child is disempowered
throughout the process and has no vehicle to make his wishes heard and con-
sidered as his future is determined. The court is similarly negatively im-
pacted by this as the judge is denied critical information that only a child's
attorney would introduce, and cannot adequately consider the child's legal
position and wishes as she determines the best interest according to all par-
ties."
The gap between CAPTA and the Model Act on this topic has created a
cacophonous hodgepodge of state statutes across the country regarding the
representation of children in dependency hearings, practically ensuring that a
child's experience during this traumatic and critical period will be deter-
mined by her state of residence. As a condition of funding under CAPTA,
states must only provide that which is required by statute. Fortunately, the
majority of states have adopted something in between. Below is a brief
summary of where along the continuum between these two standards most
states fall.
A. Non-Attorney and Discretionary Attorney Representation
Predictably, many states have taken CAPTA's lead and have statutes
that do not entitle a child to attorney representation in their dependency hear-
85. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 607-10.
86. Id. at 608.
87. See NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 41, at 4.
88. See EMILIE STOLTZFUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., REP. No. 40899, THE CHILD ABUSE
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT ACT (CAPTA): BACKGROUND, PROGRAMS, AND FUNDING 14-16
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ings.89 In 2005, the first study of state practice in this arena by Jean Koh
Peters at Yale Law School found that well over half of states did not guaran-
tee attorney representation to children in their abuse and neglect hearings.90
As of 2009, First Star and the Children's Advocacy Institute reported that
there were fourteen such states.9 ' This trend indicates that states are shifting
away from the primitive requirements of CAPTA towards the standards es-
poused in the Model Act.
B. Best-Interest Attorney Representation
Many other states offer a model of representation which falls squarely
between what is required under CAPTA and that which the Model Act pro-
poses. 92 As of 2009, in twenty-two states, when an attorney is provided, the
attorney is not required to advocate for the child's position in court.9 3 This
might mean that the attorney represents only the "best interest" position of
the child, or that the law is vague on what role the attorney is to play, or that
the attorney may serve in a best-interest capacity at the discretion of the
court.94 Some states do not provide an attorney for the child, but provide one
for the GAL appointed to represent the child's best interest.95
89. See Peters, supra note 21, at 1013; see also Jean Koh Peters, U.S. Jurisdiction Sum-
mary Chart (2006) [hereinafter Peters, U.S. Jurisdiction Summary Chart] (on file with Yale
Law School), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rew/us-summary-chart.ppt.
90. See Peters, supra note 21, at 1013; Peters, U.S. Jurisdiction Summary Chart, supra
note 89.
91. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 41, at 26-29, 42-43, 46-47,
52-59, 68-69, 80-81, 86-89, 98-99, 126-28. Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wash-
ington State, either have no state law providing for the appointment of counsel or counsel is
provided only on a discretionary basis. Id. It is important to note that this report reflects only
the attorney representation provisions reflected in state law. Id. at 20. Some of these states
may have practices in part or all of the state that do provide attorneys for children in depen-
dency cases, but there is no statutory requirement to do so, which means that such provisions
are subject to the vagaries of state government and politics. See id. at 8.
92. See id. at 20, 22-23.
93. See NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 41, at 20, 22-23.
94. See id.
95. See, e.g., id. at 54. Idaho requires, "the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for
the child or children to serve at each stage of the proceeding and in appropriate cases shall
appoint counsel to represent the guardian, and in appropriate cases, may appoint separate
counsel for the child." Id. (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1614(1) (2011)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
[North Carolina] mandates that "when in a petition a juvenile is alleged to be abused or neg-
lected, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the juvenile .. . [i]n every case
where a non-attorney is appointed as a guardian ad litem, an attorney shall be appointed in the
case in order to assure protection of the juvenile's legal rights throughout the proceeding."
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When a child is represented by a best-interest attorney, they are denied
many advantages of the traditional attorney-client relationship.96 These
might include the right to zealous advocacy for their position and the right to
be heard in court, the benefits of attorney-client privilege, right to notice,
participation and party status, and the right to appeal if the decision goes
against the child's position.97 This model of representation is so contrary to
the traditional function that lawyers vow to serve clients in almost all other
capacities that some believe this model tantamount to forced malpractice. 98
C. Client-Directed Attorney Representation
The 2007 Report Card published by First Star and the Children's Advo-
cacy Institute reported that seventeen states required that children be ap-
pointed client-directed attorneys to children in dependency cases in almost
all instances.99 This is an impressive number of states that demonstrated
their commitment to children's due process rights and went beyond
CAPTA's requirements to a standard comporting more closely to the Model
Act. An updated version of this report card, to be released in 2012, may
demonstrate that even more states have come to the same conclusion.
VI. WHERE TO FIND THE LEAST AND MOST COMPREHENSIVE
REPRESENTATION MODELS
In analyzing the differences between the two standards espoused in
CAPTA and the Model Act respectively, it is useful to take a snapshot of the
states that represent both ends of the spectrum of representation.
A. CAPTA Model in Action: Indiana
Indiana provides the most limited representation for children in child
protective proceedings of anywhere in the United States.'" It does not re-
quire the appointment of an attorney at any point in the proceedings or dur-
ing appeal.o' When an attorney is provided, their role is unclear.102 There is
Id. at 96 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-601 (2011)).
96. See Glynn, supra note 46, at 62.
97. See id. at 6"5.
98. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2 (2011); Glynn, supra note 46, at 63-64.
99. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, FIRST EDITION, supra note 39, at 12-13.
100. See IND. CODE §§ 31-32-4-2, 31-32-3-3 (2011); see also NATIONAL REPORT CARD,
SECOND EDITION, supra note 41, at 22-23, 58-59.
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no specialized training requirement for the child's attorney when they get
one, though the GAL is required to attend training.103 And, although the
child's lawyer, when appointed, is required to follow the state rules of pro-
fessional conduct, Indiana law provides civil immunity to the GAL or attor-
ney on the case who is not acting as the child's traditional attorney.'
B. Model Act in Action: Massachusetts
Massachusetts represents the pinnacle of child legal representation in
America. It goes even beyond what the Model Act proposes in its provision
of legal protections to children involved in child protective proceedings.'05
Children in Massachusetts receive a client-directed attorney at all stages of
the case.'1 Attorneys must complete a thorough training and certification in
how to represent their child clients as well as complete continuing legal edu-
cation.' 7
Children are given express party status in the case. 08 The child's attor-
ney must at all times follow the state rules of professional conduct and does
not have civil immunity from malpractice suits.'" Most impressive, howev-
er, is that the state adopted a caseload limit of seventy-five child welfare
cases for attorneys."o This provision goes beyond what is required in the
Model Act and should serve as an example for other states to emulate."'
102. See IND. CODE § 31-32-3-3.
103. Id. § 31-9-2-50.
104. See NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 41, at 59.
105. Compare id. at 72-73, with STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 3-20.
106. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 41, at 72.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 73.
109. See id.
110. Id.
Ill. Compare MODEL ACT 2011, supra note 32, § 3, with COMM. FOR PUB. COUNSEL
SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., PERFORMANCE STANDARDS GOVERNING THE
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN & PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES ch. 4, § 1.2(b), available
at http://www.publiccounsel.net/practice areas/caflpages/civil caflindex.html (follow
"Performance Standards for CAFL Attorneys" hyperlink; then follow "CAFL Trial Panel
Performance Standards" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 26, 2012), and COMM. FOR PUB.
COUNSEL SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., ASSIGNED COUNSEL MANUAL POLICIES AND
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VII. RIGHT TO COUNSEL LANDSCAPE AND PREPARING FOR REFORM
Since 1996, an overwhelming consensus has developed across a wide
spectrum of disciplines that there must be a right to counsel for children dur-
ing their dependency hearings.'l 2 Although some difference of opinion re-
mains over the ideal form of this representation, there are few who do not
understand the basic due process implications of these proceedings to child-
ren as outlined in Kenny A."' In the process of attempting to advocate for
state and federal legislative reform to bring the country closer to the stan-
dards outlined in the Model Act, there are few left standing, after this tidal
wave of evolution on the issue, that continue to object to the premise that
children in dependency hearings need an attorney.1 4 Federal and state law-
makers are no exception."'
Advocates must now take advantage of the Model Act as a valuable
weapon in the arsenal to advance right to counsel legislation in states, and in
several years, in CAPTA. A recent decision from the Supreme Court of Col-
orado demonstrates the imminent need for state and federal policymakers to
adopt language that mirrors the Model Act.'1 6 In People v. Gabriesheski,"7
the court noted that attorney GALs are not representatives of the child, but
are merely charged with making recommendations to the court regarding the
child's best interest."' Based on this interpretation, it held that communica-
tions between the GAL and the child are not protected by the attorney-client
privilege." 9 The result of this decision is that a court may compel a GAL to
disclose communications regardless of whether the child, or even the GAL
himself or herself, would otherwise intend to disclose it. 20 Without state and
federal law that clearly articulates a child's right to counsel, courts may con-
tinue to interpret GAL representation in the same manner as this court and
persist in denying a child the right to an attorney in their dependency case.
When advocates press for legislative reform on this issue, there are sev-
eral tools available for making their case. First is justice. It is sometimes
112. See NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 41, at 10.
113. See, e.g., Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359 (N.D. Ga.
2005); Pitchal, supra note 46, at 666-67; Taylor, supra note 6, at 607; Shireen Y. Husain,
Note, A Voice for the Voiceless: A Child's Right to Legal Representation in Dependency
Proceedings, 79 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 232, 239 (2010).
114. See NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 41, at 8.
115. Taylor, supra note 6, at 610-11; Husain, supra note 113, at 246-48.
116. See People v. Gabriesheski, 262 P.3d 653, 659 (Colo. 2011) (en banc).
117. 262 P.3d 653 (Colo. 2011) (en banc).
118. See id. at 659.
119. Id.at659-60.
120. See id. at 660.
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useful to use a narrative to tell the story of a child whose court case and life
outcome was dramatically impacted either by a lack of legal representation,
or one who had a highly beneficial outcome as a result of a good attorney..
Next, it is helpful to show state lawmakers where they fall on the spectrum of
representation. Sometimes, legislators can be shamed into reform when they
realize their state is an outlier on an issue that has the potential for bad dispo-
sition in the media. The third tool that can be used to argue for reform is the
Model Act itself. Once lawmakers understand that an entity so large, main-
stream, and powerful as the ABA has concluded that the proper standard of
representation for children in these cases is a client-directed attorney, they
will pause before dismissing the idea of reform on the issue. The final tool
available is the specter of litigation. Advocates can use the example of Ken-
ny A., as well as other cases, to argue that states that fall short of nationally
accepted standards open themselves up to class action lawsuits.'2 1 Lawsuits
of this nature are expensive and embarrassing to defend, making this pros-
pect is most undesirable.
Of course not all states will be convinced by the above arguments to
amend their statutes. The primary obstacles to further reform on this subject
revolve around concern over two issues: 1) cost of implementation, and 2)
data demonstrating that attorney representation leads to improved out-
comes.122 In the current economic climate, with many states cutting back
significantly on services and personnel, it is difficult to make the argument
that any service requiring additional expense should be considered. As men-
tioned earlier, there was a powerful study published several years ago de-
monstrating that the small initial investment in providing high-quality attor-
ney representation to children in dependency hearings is incidental compared
to the longer-term cost savings to the state when the child achieves perma-
nency more quickly and the case flows through the courts in a much shorter
period of time.123 It is vital to argue this point. The main drawback of this
study, however, is that it was fairly small in scope and limited to one county
in Florida.124 We must conduct further research that will allow us to natio-
nalize the results of this study to make the case for national legislative
reform. The QIC-ChildRep project may provide some of the data necessary
for further reform, but if it does not, advocates must press for further re-
search in this area.
121. See Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355, 1361 (N.D. Ga.
2005).
122. Taylor, supra note 6, at 616; Husain, supra note 113, at 247.
123. SeeZINN & SLOWRIVER, supra note 42, at 14-15, 24-25.
124. Id. at 1.
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The passage of the Model Act represents the culmination of substantial
research, advocacy, and litigation all urging national recognition of the right
to counsel for children in dependency hearings, not only within the advocacy
community, but in the legal community at large.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As we continue to celebrate passage of the Model Act and work to max-
imize its potential, let us not forget what it symbolizes. Child advocates have
been sounding the right to counsel trumpet for decades. They have made
substantial progress within the advocacy community, but, more importantly
have made great strides across disciplines to establish a consensus on the
issue in the legal community at large. The ABA is not an advocacy organi-
zation. It represents the largest group of attorneys in every legal specialty all
across America. The passage of the Model Act represents the widest possi-
ble mainstream support for the proposition that children in abuse and neglect
cases deserve not only to be represented by a bona fide attorney, but one who
for all intents and purposes represents the child client in an almost identical
fashion as he or she would represent any other client. For children who have
already been betrayed in the most fundamental way by those who are sup-
posed to love them best, this is the least we can do to protect their rights dur-
ing these critical and confusing court proceedings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On Valentine's Day 2011, a ten-year-old girl, Nubia Barahona, was
found dead in a garbage bag in the rear flatbed of the vehicle owned by her
adoptive father, Jorge Barahona.' Victor Barahona, Nubia's twin brother,
was also found in critical condition in the truck, which was parked just off I-
95 in Palm Beach County, Florida.2 Nubia and Victor Barahona had entered
* Ron Marmer, The Kids Aren't All Right, 38 A.B.A. LITIG. MAG. 4, 4 (2011); THE
WHO, THE KIDS ARE ALRIGHT (MCA Records 1979); THE KIDS ARE ALL RIGHT (Focus Fea-
tures 2010).
** Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law Center.
*** Member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota.
1. See BLUE RIBBON PANEL, THE NUBIA REPORT: THE INVESTIGATIVE PANEL'S FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2011), available at http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/initiatives/barahona
/docs/meetings/nubias%20story.pdf; Katherine Fernandez Rundle et al., Nubia's Legacy:
Confronting the Bias of Trust and Complacency in Florida's Child Welfare System, in FINAL
REPORT OF THE MIAMI-DADE COUNTY GRAND JURY 2-3 (2010) [hereinafter MIAMI-DADE
GRAND JURY REPORT], available at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/nubiabarahonagrand
juryreport.pdf; DAVID E. WILKINS, SEC'Y OF DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, THE BARAHONA
CASE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2011) [hereinafter BARAHONA CASE FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY], available at http://www.floridaschildrenfirst.org/wpcontent
/uploads/2011/06/3-14-11 -DCF-Barahona-Case-Findings-and-Recommendations.pdf; Kate
Santich, DCF Lays Off 500 Workers, Claims Children Will Not Be Affected, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 27, 2011.
2. See Ana Valdes, DCF Names Independent Review Panel; The Agency Plans to
'Learn from This Sad Case,' Its Leader Says, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 22, 2011, at Al 0 [here-
inafter Valdes, Independent Review Panel]; Erik Pitchal, Murdered Child: Will Florida Learn
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the Florida dependency system in June 2000.' At no time since entering the
system, and until they were adopted, did any of the three subsequent reports
confirm that either child had ever been represented by his or her own attor-
ney.4
On September 20, 2011, at a hearing of the Florida Senate Children,
Families and Elder Affairs Committee, State Senator Nan Rich of Weston'
stated that the case workers in the Barahonas' dependency case should have
been visiting the children monthly. 6 Senator Rich said: "Its [sic] mind-
boggling that [the Barahonas] could ever have been approved to be foster
parents . . . . Something is dramatically and drastically wrong if all of these
red flags are not seen."' The Senator's comments followed shortly after
three separate investigations into the Barahona matter8 -a grand jury report
in Miami-Dade County, a Blue Ribbon Panel Report, and a report by David
E. Wilkins, Secretary of the Department of Children and Families (DCF).9
the Right Lessons?, RECAPITCHALATION (Mar. 17, 2011, 3:22 PM),
http://open.salon.com/blog/erik-pitchal/2011/03/17/murdered child will-florida-learn-the-ri
ghtlessons.
3. MIAMI-DADE GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
4. See, e.g., id.
5. Senator Rich was a founder of the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) Program of Dade Coun-
ty, Florida. About Nan Rich, NAN RICH, http://www.nantichforsenate.comlabout.asp (last
visited Feb. 26, 2012).
6. Committee on Children, Families, and Elder Affairs Meeting, THE FLA. SENATE
(Sept. 20, 2011, 1:13:50), http://www.flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/Committees/2010-2012/
CF/MeetingRecords/CF 09202011_1045.mp3.
7. Margie Menzel, DCF Secretary Wilkins Gets Tough Questions on Barahona Case,
WCTV.Tv (Sept. 21, 2011, 9:32 AM), http://www.wctv.tv/news/headlines/130265698.html
(alteration in original). There are examples of even more recent problems. See e.g., John
Barry, Deaths of 8 Kids Put Agency in Jeopardy: "We Either Bat a Thousand, or We Bat
Zero," Says the Leader of Hillsborough Kids, Inc., ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at
Al; Editorial, Do Better Protecting Vulnerable Children, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011,
available at http://www.tampabay.comlopinion/editorials/articlel 196495.ece; Carol Marbin
Miller & David Ovalle, Judge: Abused Boy Looks Like Concentration Camp Victim, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 30, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/30/v-print/2616223/judge-abu
sed-boy-looks-like-concentration.html ("'He looks like he just came out of Auschwitz,' Led-
erman said. 'This is like a neon sign for child abuse. It would have been obvious to anyone
who came in contact with this family the last few years.' Among those who came in contact:
a child-abuse investigator from the Department of Children & Families, a mental health coun-
selor from Jackson Memorial Hospital and educators from the [nine]-year-old's school-who
called the state's child abuse hotline recently seeking help for the boy.").
8. Menzel, supra note 7; see generally State v. Barahona, No. FI 16237, 2011 WL
1458426 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 23, 2011).
9. See BARAHONA CASE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1;
BLUE RIBBON PANEL, supra note 1, at 3-4; Menzel, supra note 7; MIAMI-DADE GRAND JURY
REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
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Each report, and the Senator's comments, focused on the shortcomings by
DCF and the community-based agency which came into existence as a result
of Florida's move towards privatization of its child welfare system.'o It is
significant that neither the reports, nor the Senator's comments, focused on
or analyzed the role of Florida's Guardian ad Litem (GAL) Program in the
Barahona case. It is unclear from the available information whether the
GAL Program carried out its responsibilities over the time period the chil-
dren were in care. Arguably, an independent attorney for the children would
have produced a different result for the Barahona children.
This article is a continuation of a discussion as to why, as a matter of
Florida constitutional law, public policy, and professional ethics, Florida's
children need independent attorneys from the inception of all dependency
and termination of parental rights cases to their completion." It is based
upon events which have occurred since the authors' last article on this topic
in the Nova Law Review, including the Barahona case, the resolution by the
10. See BARAHONA CASE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 5;
BLUE RIBBON PANEL, supra note 1, at 5-10; Menzel, supra note 7; MIAMI-DADE GRAND JURY
REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4. Florida privatized its child welfare system in the late 1990s.
See FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(1)(a) (2011); Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing
Attorneys for Children in Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in
Florida: The Issue Updated, 35 NOVA L. REV. 305, 320-21 (2011); see generally Michael J.
Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV.
769 (2001). The private agency in Miami-Dade County, Florida is Our Kids of Miami-
Dade/Monroe. Carol Marbin Miller, Florida's Largest Private Child Welfare Agency Under
Fire After Girl's Death, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.palmbeachpost.comine
ws/floridas-largest-pivate-childwelfare-agency-under-fire- 1348467.html.
11. The federal and Florida state constitutional and statutory analysis of why children are
entitled to independent attorneys in Florida is contained in the authors' prior article. See Dale
& Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 350-61; see also Dale, supra note 10, at 769, 778-80 (dis-
cussing the ability to sue to enforce the right to counsel under the Childhood Abuse Preven-
tion and Treatment Act (CAPTA) and needed changes to CAPTA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07
(2006); Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517-18 (2011) (showing that the Supreme Court
of the United States' latest application of the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)
test to determine whether counsel is required in a civil case); INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. &
A.B.A., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT: STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 109-10 (1981); Sarah Dina Moore Alba, Comment, Searching for the "Civil Gide-
on": Procedural Due Process and the Juvenile Right to Counsel in Termination Proceedings,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1079, 1081 (2011); Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who
Can't or Won't Direct Counsel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 ARIZ. L.
Rev. 381, 384 (2011); Gerard F. Glynn, The Child's Representation Under CAPTA: It is
Time for Enforcement, 6 NEV. L.J. 1250, 1259 (2006); Bernard P. Perimutter & Carolyn S.
Salisbury, "Please Let Me Be Heard:" The Right of a Florida Foster Child to Due Process
Prior to Being Committed to a Long-Term, Locked Psychiatric Institution, 25 NOVA L. REV.
725, 755 (2001); Shireen Y. Husain, Note, A Voice for the Voiceless: A Child's Right to Legal
Representation in Dependency Proceedings, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 232, 233 (2010).
2012] 347
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss2/1
NOVA IAW REVIEW
American Bar Association (ABA) in August 2011 at its Annual Convention
in Toronto adopting the ABA Model Act Governing the Representation of
Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings (Model Act), 2 and
a series of comments, pronouncements, and policy statements by Florida
State officials and advocates.
This article will review the March 2011 Nubia Report: The Investiga-
tive Panel's Findings and Recommendations by the Blue Ribbon Panel, (Nu-
bia Report), the Barahona Case Findings and Recommendations summary
report of the Secretary of the DCF, and the Miami-Dade Grand Jury Report,
each of which contains comments and conclusions about the Barahona case
that no one person was responsible to protect the children's rights.13 The
article will also review recent representations by the GAL Program suggest-
ing the Program may be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, as well
as the past, present, and future financial issues concerning the operation of
the Program. It will discuss recent literature from DCF, the GAL Program,
the court system, and a Pro Bono Attorney Program in Broward County. The
article will demonstrate the inability of each to correctly articulate its legal
and ethical mandate, the result of which is confusion, duplication, and a fun-
damental misunderstanding of the proper role of each, and the meaning of
being the attorney for the child. The article will also comment upon updated
information regarding the Gabriel Myers case 4 and will point out the simi-
larity of the conclusions in that matter to the Barahona case. Finally, the
article will conclude, based upon this additional evidence, as the authors
concluded in their prior article, that children in Florida must have an inde-
pendent attorney. Children cannot remain the only party in a dependency
proceeding who appear pro se.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE BARAHONA REPORTS
An analysis of the findings and recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Panel entitled the Nubia Report, the DCF report on the Barahona matter, and
the Miami-Dade Grand Jury Report each illustrates the deficiencies in the
12. See generally MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE,
NEGLECT, & DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS (2011) [hereinafter MODEL ACT 2011].
13. See BARAHONA CASE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 5;
BLUE RIBBON PANEL, supra note 1, at 6-7; MIAMI-DADE GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 1,
at 2-4.
14. See GABRIEL MYERS WORK GRP., FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, REPORT OF
GABRIEL MYERS WORK GROUP ON CHILD-ON-CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 3 (2010), available at
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/initiatives/GMWorkgroup/docs/Gabriel%20myers%20COC%20rep
ort%20May%2014%202010.pdf. For a discussion of the Gabriel Myers case, see Dale &
Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 308-09.
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Florida dependency system. Three of the deficiencies require comment and
discussion in this article because they demonstrate a child's need for an in-
dependent attorney.
The first deficiency involves the fact that none of the reports analyzes
the role of the GAL Program in the Barahona case, specifically through the
time of the children's adoption." What the "Barahona Case-Key Events"
attachment (Key Events) of the Barahona Case Findings and Recommenda-
tions shows, is that the GAL Program supported continued placement with
the Barahonas prior to adoption on six occasions between 2005 and 2009,
even though questions were repeatedly raised as to the propriety of the
placement.16 For example, the report contains a 2005 hotline report that the
then foster father, Jorge Barahona, sexually abused Nubia, which was inves-
tigated and closed with no indications." In 2006, a hotline report stated that
Nubia had bruises on her chin and face and had been absent from school."
The Child Protection Agency then determined the bruises were not from
abuse and the investigation was closed.' 9 In 2007, a hotline report stated that
Nubia and Victor were allegedly "coming to school unkempt." 20 The inves-
tigation was closed with no indications.2' Yet, there is no detailed discussion
in the secretary's report of the role of the GAL or the GAL Program, if any,
in the investigation of these matters.22 The Key Events document does not
even reference the discharge of the individual GAL assigned to the Barahona
children prior to the adoption. 23 However, the Wilkins summary report does
state that at one point "[t]he Guardian ad Litem was barred from the Baraho-
nas home due to inquiries made with the school." 24 The Wilkins finding was
that:
There was no assessment made of the lack of access to Nubia by
the Guardian ad Litem. The Guardian ad Litem was discharged
15. See generally, BARAHONA CASE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY, supra
note 1; BLUE RIBBON PANEL, supra note 1; MIAMI-DADE GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 1.





21. BARAHONA CASE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY, supra note 1, exh. 3.
22. See id. at 2-4. Nor was there a discussion of the role of the CLS attorneys. See id.
23. See id. at exh. 3; John Lantigua, Guardian Claims He Was Pulled from Case with No
Explanation, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 25, 2011, at A14. It would appear that the GAL Pro-
gram file was not reviewed by either the Blue Ribbon Panel or the Secretary of DCF in his
report. See BARAHONA CASE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 5-
10.
24. Id. at 9.
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from the case to smooth over relationships with the Barahonas.
The case manager never documented concerns over the apparent
deceptions as to Nubia's whereabouts or made any attempt [to] re-
solve the discrepancies in information.25
The Miami-Dade Grand Jury Report states that, in May 2007:
Guardian ad Litem objects in Court to continued placement of the
children with the Barahonas (Court held hearing, found placement
safe and appropriate. In addition, it is important to note that at
some point during the pre-adoption period, the Guardian ad Litem
was barred from the Barahona home due to inquiries made with
the school. According to the DCF report, Guardian ad Litem was
dismissed from the case to "smooth things over with the Baraho-
nas.")26
The second deficiency in the Florida dependency system is illustrated in
the Miami-Dade Grand Jury Report, which says that no one person said, "I
am responsible," acted as "point person," acted as "system integrator," or
fulfilled the role of "ombudsman." 27 The Miami-Dade Grand Jury Report
states that:
It has been suggested to us, and we wholeheartedly agree, that
there must be a point person, someone who will take charge of
each case. In other words, there must be one designated person
who has the responsibility of knowing everything about a case and
making absolutely sure that knowledge is communicated to every
person who has a need to know the information. The most logical
and best way to accomplish this is to assign the Case Manager the
job of being the point person.
This suggestion is curious because chapter 39 and the contracts between
DCF and the lead agency provide for staffing where the case manager as
well as Children's Legal Services (CLS) attorneys, GAL, parents' attorneys,
25. Id.
26. MIAMI-DADE GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 17. The Grand Jury Report also
lists a number of school absences for Nubia. Id. at 17-18.
27. See id. at 16.
28. Id. In Broward County the Case Manager is known as the "Child Advocate." Case
Management, CHILDNET, http://www.childnet.us/casemanagement.aspx?nvar-casemanageme
nt (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
29. FLA. STAT. § 39.6011(1)(a)-(b) (2011); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(e)(1), .400(d) (2011);
See Exhibit B: Children's Legal Services in Contract between Ha. Dep't of Children & Fami-
lies and Child & Family Connections, Inc., 45 (July 1, 2009) (on file with Nova Law Review).
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GAL attorneys, and agency staff should be present to discuss the case. 30 The
idea of a point person is not a new one. Earlier reports involving another
child, Gabriel Myers, who died while in care in Florida, also concluded that
there was a need for a "champion" 31 and that nine year old Gabriel, who al-
legedly committed suicide by hanging himself while in foster care, was "no
one's child."32 The major failure with the proposals in the various reports
that the child have a "champion" or "point person" in every case is that no
individual or organization in a dependency or Termination of Parental Rights
(TPR) proceeding in Florida has, as his or her sole duty and responsibility,
the representation of the child as attorneys understand these terms.33
A third deficiency in the Florida dependency system is found in Secre-
tary Wilkins' Barahona Case Findings and Recommendations summary re-
port where he points to a failure in "critical thinking."3 The Blue Ribbon
Panel also points to a failure in critical thinking.35 The ninth finding of the
Nubia Report states that "technology should never substitute for the exercise
of critical thinking, sound judgment and common sense. Technology should
be used to augment and enhance those skills." 36 "Critical thinking" has par-
ticular significance for attorneys. Starting in the first year of law school,
students are immersed in a process of learning how to think critically and
analytically. 37 This training continues throughout their legal education.38 If
the Barahona children had their own attorney, one assurance, albeit not a
failsafe, would have been that the children would have had an advocate rep-
resenting them who was well-trained in "critical thinking."
Despite these facts, none of the reports evaluate the role of the GAL
Program or its attorneys. 39 Nor, obviously, is there any reference in the re-
30. FLA. STAT. § 39.6011(1)(a).
31. GABRIEL MYERS WORK GROUP, supra note 14, at 3-4; see Dale & Reidenberg, supra
note 10, at 308-09.
32. GABRIEL MYERS WORK GROUP, supra note 14, at 4; Dale & Reidenberg, supra note
10, at 309.
33. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 310.
34. BARAHONA CASE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 5.
35. BLUE RIBBON PANEL, supra note 1, at 3, 7.
36. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
37. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 24, 87 (2007); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1996); Sarah E. Redfield, The Educational Pipeline to
Law School-Too Broken and Too Narrow to Provide Diversity, 8 PIERCE L. REv. 347,
374-75 (2010).
38. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 37, at 48, 53.
39. See generally BARAHONA CASE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY, Supra
note 1; BLUE RIBBON PANEL, supra note 1. Illustrative of the lack of critical thinking by the
panels themselves appears to be the methodology of investigation of the failures in the Bara-
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ports to what might have happened or what role would have been played had
an attorney been appointed for Nubia and Victor Barahona. It is this lack of
critical analysis of the GAL Program and its attorneys and the failure to ana-
lyze the role of independent attorneys for the children, which is troubling and
of on-going concern.
E. THE ON-GOING MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
GUARDIAN AD LITEM IN FLORIDA
In a September 2011 PowerPoint presentation at a meeting of the Flor-
ida Children and Youth Cabinet, the Executive Director of the GAL Program
stated that, "[]ooking into the [f]uture,"4' the first of the GAL Program's
goals and missions was "to provide quality legal and best interest representa-
tion for every child in our dependency system."4 2 This statement mischarac-
terizes both the law and the ethical obligations of the GAL Program attor-
hona case. The presentations to the panels were conducted by the department itself through
its CLS lawyers. BLUE RIBBON PANEL, supra note 1, at 3-5. Neither the persons in charge of
DCF nor the GAL Program at the time the children were in care prior to their adoption were
called to appear before the panels. See id. at 4-5.
40. There is, however, one elliptical reference to an attorney for the child in one of the
reports-on the last page of the March 10, 2011 Nubia Report under the title "Other
Thoughts." BLUE RIBBON PANEL, supra note 1, at 14. Just prior to the "List of Documents
Reviewed" is the following curious statement: "Children's Legal Services and the chief judge
should review practices in the appointment of private lawyers to represent dependent children
to ensure that the Rules of Professional Responsibility are fulfilled." Id. There is no explana-
tion in either report of the meaning of this comment or why CLS should be charged with this
responsibility. An earlier effort to investigate the concept of lawyers representing children in
dependency and TPR cases went by the boards in February 2010. TASK FORCE ON FOSTERING
SUccEss, DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, MEETING SUMMARY 1-2 (Feb. 25, 2010), available
at http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/initiatives/childsafety/meetings/20100225materials.shtml (follow
"2/25/10 Minutes" hyperlink). At a meeting of the Task Force on Fostering Success, chaired
by former DCF Secretary Robert Butterworth, it was reported that a work group of the Task
Force on Legal Representation had "planned an outstanding two day session with national
experts from around the country. Regrettably, the governor's office selected this as one of
many such meetings cancelled due to the budget crisis." Id. at 2.
41. Presentation by Alan Abramowitz, Exec. Dir., Fla. Guardian ad Litem, to Fla. Chil-
dren & Youth Cabinet (Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads
/childadvocacy/GAL CYC Presentation.pdf.
42. Id. (emphasis omitted); FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 2
(2011) [hereinafter GAL 2011 REPORT], available at http://www.guardianadlitem.org/docume
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neys.43 The program attorney is not the child's attorney, and it is unethical to
provide legal advice to an individual who is a party to a case and who is not
one's client." The GAL Program is a separate party distinct from the child,
who is also a party.45 Under Florida law, the GAL Program advocates for
what it considers to be the best interests of the child and nothing else.46 The
GAL Program's website is seeking volunteers, and in response to a hypo-
thetical question, it currently states incorrectly that a "Guardian ad Litem is .
. . appointed by the court to advocate for [a child]."47 The statement is mis-
leading for two reasons: First, the GAL Program is the party appointed, and
second, the GAL Program is appointed to advocate for the best interest of the
child.48
A second example of what may be a violation of the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct is found in the Guardian ad Litem Revised Program
Attorney Standards of Practice effective September 2010 at section 2 .49The
Guardian ad Litem Revised Program Attorney Standards of Practice states
that: "As needed, the Program Attorney shall be available to discuss the
nature of the proceedings with the child except when the child is represented
by counsel. The Program Attorney should use sound judgment and reason-
able diligence when explaining the nature of the legal proceedings to the
child."50
This standard of practice fails to consider that the child is a separate
party unrepresented by an attorney and a minor, and that the GAL attorney
represents the GAL Program as a party.5 ' The Florida Rules of Professional
43. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2011); People v. Gabriesheski, 262 P.3d 653, 659 (Colo.
2011) (en banc). There can be no doubt that there is no attorney-client relationship between
the GAL and the child. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.01.
44. See FLA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-4.3 cmt. (2011).
45. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51); see Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 327.
46. FLA. STAT. § 39.820(1). The child has legal rights, which the GAL Program has
neither standing nor the ethical capacity to protect. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at
330. For a discussion of the various ethical issues a guardian ad litem faces, see Marcia M.
Boumil et al., Legal and Ethical Issues Confronting Guardian ad Litem Practice, 13 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 43, 50-80 (2011).
47. Volunteer Frequently Asked Questions, FLA. GUARDIAN AD LrEM PROGRAM, http://gu
ardianadlitem.org/vol-faq.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
48. See GAL 2011 REPORT, supra note 42, at 2. Later in the page the document describes
the role differently, stating that the GAL communicates "the child's best interests." Id.
49. GUARDIAN AD LITEM REVISED PROGRAM Arr'Y STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 2 (2010);
see also FLA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-4.3 (2011).
50. GUARDIAN AD LITEM REVISED PROGRAM Arr'Y STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 2.
51. See id. § 1.1. Program Attorneys are "full-time State Employees, part-time State
Employees, Contract Attorneys and Other Personnel Services (OPS) Employees providing
legal counsel to the GAL Program." Id. definitions. Furthermore, "[p]rogram attorneys pro-
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Conduct governing contact with unrepresented parties apply to this situa-
tion.52 The commentary to the Florida rule states that:
An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in deal-
ing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested
in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the
lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a
lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and,
where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to
53those of the unrepresented person.
A third area of concern involves a comparison of the 2006 Guardian ad
Litem Program Attorney Standards of Practice and the 2010 Guardian ad
Litem Revised Program Attorney Standards of Practice.4 Both state at Rule
1.4 that: "The Program Attorney shall at all times comply with the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar, all of which are incorporated herein by refer-
ence." 5 The 2006 standards also contain a description of the GAL Program
as the client. 56
The Program Attorney represents the GAL Program as a legal
entity, and the GAL Program is the client as referenced [to] in
Rule 4-1.13, Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. The GAL Program
is appointed to represent the child's best interests in dependency
court proceedings. The Program Attorney provides counsel re-
garding the child's best interest and shall fully participate in the
decisions regarding the child's best interests as indicated in Stan-
dard 4.6 of the GAL Standards of Operation.5 7
Inexplicably, the September 2010 Guardian ad Litem Revised Program
Attorney Standards no longer contain this explanation of the ethical obliga-
tions of a GAL Program attorney to the client, nor does it contain a reference
to the applicable Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.18 Whether and why
vide legal advice on cases and complement other members of the team in advocating for the
best interests of [the] children." STANDARDS OF OPERATION § 1.1 (2006).
52. FLA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-4.3.
53. FLA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-4.3 cmt.
54. Compare GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM Arr'Y STANDARDS OF PRACTICE (2006),
with GUARDIAN AD LITEM REVISED PROGRAM ATT'Y STANDARDS OF PRACTICE (2010).
55. GUARDIAN AD LITEM REVISED PROGRAM Arr'Y STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 1.4
(2010); GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM ATT'Y STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 1.4 (2006).
56. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM Arr'VY STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 1.4.1 (2006).
57. Id. (endnote omitted).
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this information should have been removed from the standards of practice is
itself an ethical question.
Finally, the GAL Program continues to cite to the suspect 2003 legisla-
tive finding regarding the GAL Program, which originated in the original
Blue Ribbon Panel Report as support for the Program.5 9 According to the
Program Director, "if there is a program that costs the least and benefits the
most, this one is it. [T]he volunteer is an 'indispensable intermediary be-
tween the child and the court, between the child and DCF."'
The GAL Program Director failed to refer to the additional findings of
the 2002 Blue Ribbon Panel that:
Sixteen times since 1985, other scandals have prompted gov-
ernors to appoint [eleven] special panels, and state's attorneys to
convene five separate grand juries, to investigate DCF or its prede-
cessor agency, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices. Now this gubernatorial panel, the [twelfth], has answered a
governor's call to do the same.
Twenty-two times in the past [thirty three] years, the Florida
Legislature has mandated that DCF or its predecessor reorganize in
ways great or small. 6'
The Blue Ribbon Panel then said: "We urge the governor to use his moral
suasion with the Florida Bar to [request] more pro bono attorneys for chil-
dren in DCF's custody."62
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FY 2012/13 GAL PROGRAM BUDGET REQUEST
A review of recent GAL Program documents amplifies the problem of
continuing to rely on the eleven-year-old statement that the GAL Program
59. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 316-17.
60. Press Release, Alan Abramowitz, Exec. Dir., Fla. Guardian ad Litem Program, Tri-
age-Which Child Will Have a Voice? Which Child Will Know Someone Is on Their Side?
(Sept. 9, 2011), available at http://www.guardianadlitem.org/documents/Notes%20from%20al
an%209.9.201 I.pdf (quoting GOVERNOR'S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON CHILD PROTECTION, BLUE
RIBBON PANEL REPORT (2002) [hereinafter BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT] (on file with Nova
Law Review)). For a discussion of the problem with this oft-repeated statement-that there is
no factual basis for it, see Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 316- 7.
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"costs the least and benefits the most."63 In 2001, when the first Blue Ribbon
Committee initially made the statement, later adopted by the Florida Legisla-
ture amending chapter 39, the budget of the Program was approximately
$14.1 million of which $8.6 million were state general revenue funds.' In
2001, there were approximately 5000 GAL volunteers. The FY 2009/10
GAL Program budget was $31.9 million 66 of which $30.4 million6 7 were
general revenue funds.68 That year, there were approximately 8000 volun-
teers. 69 The GAL Program's FY 2012/13 Legislative Budget Request (LBR)
dated October 1, 2011, seeks an additional $3.9 million to "increase the av-
erage number of children represented by the GAL program from 21,497 (FY
2010/11) to 24,864 children (FY 2012/13). This increase of +15.7% or
336770 more children receiving GAL advocacy, will improve our overall
representation to 80% of the total Dependency children: up from 70% for
FY 2010/11."" The LBR states that: "We will recruit and train an addi-
63. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 316-17.
64. Id.; OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT No.
02-10, INFORMATION BRIEF: GUARDIAN AD LITEM PLACEMENT MAY SHIFT FOR REASONS OF
FUNDING AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST 2 (2002) [hereinafter OPPAGA INFORMATION BRIEF],
available at http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/021 Orpt.pdf.




66. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 325-27 (explaining that there were also non-
revenue funds received of at least $6,316,190.49).
67. Id. at 325-26. The GAL Program budget remained constant while several other
agencies such as the Department of Corrections, Department of Juvenile Justice and the Re-
gional Conflict Court lost funding. Id.; The News Serv. Fla., Scott Begins Department of
Corrections Job Cuts, N. ESCAMBIA.COM (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.northescambia.com/
2011/02/scott-begins-department-of-corrections-jobs; Jeff Weiner, Budget Cuts Prompting
Two Central Florida Juvenile Facilities to Close, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 31, 2011,
http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/news-politics/2011/05/budget-cuts-prompting-two-central-
florida-juvenile-facilities-to-close.html; Court Funding, FLA. Ass'N OF COUNTIES, http:l/www.
fl-counties.com/Pages/Advocacy/PublicSafety/CourtFunding.aspx (last visisted Feb. 26,
2012).
68. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 326. The GAL Program Budget is actually
larger, including federal funding, in kind services and office space from the counties, and
foundation support from multiple organizations. See id. at 325-27.
69. Id. at 329.
70. Id. Evidence supports the unrealiable and confused state of the GAL Program's data.
A January 2012 web publication from the Florida Guardian Foundation states: "Currently, the
Florida Guardian ad Litem Program represents close to 27,000 abused and neglected children,
but more than 4600 children are still in need of the voice in court." About Us, FLA. GUARDIAN
AD LITEM FOUND., http://www.flgal.org/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
71. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOUND., GAL: FY 2012/13 LEGISLATIVE BUDGET
REQUEST: OCTOBER 1, 2011 (2011) [hereinafter GAL: BUDGET REQUEST], available at http://
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tional 1650 certified volunteers, by June 30, 2013, bringing our total . .. to
9283 certified volunteers," and to hire sixty-four new staff, that are com-
prised of volunteer supervisors, program attorneys, and other support staff.72
Finally, the LBR states that the "LBR request is part of a five year incre-
mental strategy that will result in GAL Program representation of 100% of
our State's dependent children by June 30, 2018, finally achieving the goal
of a GAL for every child."73
The GAL Program state-funded general revenue budget alone has in-
creased from $8.6 million in 200174 to $30.4 million in 2010,' and is pro-
jected by the Program to increase to $34.3 million in FY 2012/13.76 The
total state-funded budget more than doubled from $14.1 million in 2002 to
$31.9 million in 2010.77 It can be expected to rise to $40.6 million in FY
2012/13.78 There were 5000 volunteers in 2001.79 That number rose to 8000
in 2009, and the Program expects it to rise to 9283 in FY 2012/13.0 The
state-funded general revenue budget in ten years will have gone up by almost
four times.8 ' Yet, the number of volunteers will not even have doubled,82 and
the Program will have to wait another six years to reach 100% volunteer
coverage.83
Despite these facts, the director of the GAL Program has stated that,
"[d]ay after day our staff struggles to determine how to effectively and effi-
ciently allocate our very slim resources."8 He adds, "[o]ur staff and volun-
teers are forced to 'triage' the huge number of cases we see every day."-
www.figal.org/news.html (follow "2012 Legislative Budget Request October 2011" hyper-
link).
72. Id.
73. Id.; see Jan Pudlow, GAL Program Prepares Its Pitch for More Funding, FLA. BAR
NEWS (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf
(search "GAL Program Prepares Its Pitch for More Funding"; then follow "GAL program
prepares its pitch for more funding" hyperlink).
74. OPPAGA INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 64, at 2.
75. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 325-26.
76. See GAL: BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 71.
77. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 325-26.
78. See id. at 327.
79. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 65, at 18.
80. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 329; GAL: BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 71.
81. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 325-27.
82. See COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 65, at 18; GAL: BUDGET REQUEST, supra note
71.
83. See GAL: BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 71.
84. Press Release, Alan Abramowitz, supra note 60 (emphasis added).
85. Id.; see GAL 2011 REPORT, supra note 42, at 1.
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The director also announced in January 2012, in a press release from the
Statewide Guardian ad Litem Foundation, that the GAL Program plans to
start a campaign to recruit 10,000 additional volunteer GALs. The press
release states that "[t]here are approximately 31,000 children in Florida's
foster care system today. With nearly 8000 volunteers, the Program is able
to give a voice to 22,000 of those children. Who will be the voice for those
10,000 children?" 87
According to the press release, the GAL Program represents the best in-
terests of 70.9% of the children in care.88 At other times, the Program has
stated other percentages of volunteer coverage.89 Regardless of the actual
numbers, two conclusions can be drawn. A substantial number of children in
the system have no involvement with the GAL Program. 90 And, as the Pro-
gram expands, it will hire more attorneys at greater cost to the Florida tax-
payers.9'
As an alternative solution to the issues confronted by the GAL Program,
the authors propose that the approximately 145 full time attorneys now em-
ployed by the GAL Program, and those to be hired in the future, be trans-
ferred together with their funding to a program that represents children and
that pro bono attorneys be recruited to represent the Program and its volun-
teer GALs.
V. DUPLICATION OF AND CONFUSION IN ROLES OF DCF (CLS) AND GAL
PROGRAM ATTORNEYS
Both the GAL Program and DCF continue to claim through their attor-
ney leadership that they represent and advocate for the best interest of the
child in dependency and TPR proceedings.92 Both agencies assert that they
86. Press Release, Alan Abramowitz, Exec. Dir., Fla. Guardian ad Litem Program,
Guardian ad Litem Program Strategic Campaign for 10,000 Voices (Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter
Press Release, Abramowitz, Strategic Campaign] available at http://guardianadlitem2.org/libr
ary/documents/blog/release i-am-for-the-child_2012-01-06.pdf; see Press Release, Deborah
Moore, Circuit Dir., Guardian ad Litem Swears in New Class of Volunteers at the Meeting of
the Governor and Cabinet (Jan. 18, 2012), http://guardianadlitem2.org/library/documents/blog
/release-govemors-cabinet-meeting_2012-01-18.pdf.
87. Press Release, Abramowitz, Strategic Campaign, supra note 86 (emphasis omitted).
88. See id.
89. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 329 (discussing the legislatively approved
foundation support for the GAL Program).
90. See GAL: BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 71.
91. See id.
92. See STANDARDS OF OPERATION § 1 (2006); Press Release, Fla. Dep't of Children &
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are legal advocates for children. 93 The GAL Program standards state that the
GAL lawyers may explain the nature of legal proceedings to the child, while
at the same time explaining that there is no confidentiality between the pro-
gram attorney and the child. 94 The Florida Department of Children and
Families, Child and Family Services Plan for 2010-2014 describes changes
in the role of CLS attorneys.95 "This change in focus has empowered the
attorneys in [CLS] to become true advocates for children, driving their out-
comes from the time of initial court involvement to permanency."96 The plan
also states that "[t]he CLS attorneys will act as legal advocates for the chil-
dren, and focus on each child's achieving timely permanency."97
Duplication in the role of the GAL and CLS attorneys is also demon-
strated in a recent decision by the Second District Court of Appeal involving
a dispute between the Statewide GAL Program and the Office of the State
Attorney in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit.98 In that case, the court held that
the Statewide GAL Program is an office in the executive branch of govern-
ment and "is not an office within the judicial branch."99 The opinion raises
the issue of duplication of roles and resources given the fact that the mission
statement of CLS, as the lawyers for DCF in the executive branch, is "[t]o
advocate in the best interests of children to achieve permanency, stability,
Mary Cagle, About the Department, FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.dcf
state.fl.us/admin/cls/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
93. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 330-31, 334-36.
94. GUARDIAN AD LrrEM REVISED PROGRAM ATr'Y STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 2 (2010);
see also FLA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-4.3, -5.1 (2011) (demonstrating that it is ethically impos-
sible to do what the standards state the GAL lawyers should do).
95. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES PLAN 2010-2014
10-11 (2009) [hereinafter CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES PLAN 2010-2014], available at
http://centerforchildwelfare.fmhi.usf.edu/kb/resource/Child%20and%2OFamily%20Services%
205%2OYear%20Plan%202010%20-%202014.pdf; see FLA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-4.3; Dale
& Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 335 (describing the change in legal representation by DCF
attorneys to a CLS prosecutorial model).
96. CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES PLAN 2010-2014, supra note 95, at 11. This misstatement
of the law is compounded by the internally contradictory statement by CLS that it represents
the State of Florida in child welfare proceedings and that it does so using a prosecutorial mod-
el. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 335 (citing About the Department, FLA. DEP'T
OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/admin/cls/focus.shtml (last visited Feb.
26, 2012)).
97. CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES PLAN 2010-2014, supra note 95, at 25 (emphasis added).
98. See Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office v. Office of the State Att'y Twentieth Judi-
cial Circuit, 55 So. 3d 747, 748 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
99. Id. at 749. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 332-33 for a discussion of the
transfer of the GAL Program from the judicial to the executive branch.
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and security."'"' At the same time, the Standards of Operation of the GAL
Program, also in the executive branch, states that "the GAL is the only party
mandated to advocate solely for the best interests of the children."o1
The DCF approach to legal representation by its CLS attorneys is also
confused. On the one hand, in the description of CLS on the DCF web page,
the Statewide Director stated: "Children's Legal Services . . . is the Depart-
ment's law firm .. . providing counsel advice and technical assistance to . . .
Community-Based Care (CBC) [parties] in child welfare legal issues." 02 On
the other hand, in the statewide director's written presentation to the Bara-
hona Blue Ribbon Panel in March 2011, the director wrote that there is "[n]o
attorney-client privilege with case managers or PIs."103 This apparent confu-
sion is further illustrated by the presentation to the Barahona Blue Ribbon
Panel on March 7, 2011, by the director of CLS in which the director pro-
vided the panel with a chart including a statement that "CLS attorneys [are
now] empowered to advocate for what the State believes is in the best inter-
est[s] of the child."'" The director added, "CLS [is] not responsible for de-
fending/advocating for the Agency."105
100. Cagle, supra note 92; see Press Release, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, supra
note 92.
101. STANDARDS OF OPERATION § 1.1 (2006). But see The Tracey McPharlin Pro-Bono
Dependency Recruitment Initiative, available at http://www.justiceforall.com/wp-content/uplo
ads/2011/06/Pro-Bono-Brochure.pdf. The Tracey McPharlin Pro-Bono Dependency Recruit-
ment Initiative's brochure states:
How will my representation make a difference in a child's life? Under our current Juvenile
Dependency system there is no one who speaks and advocates for the child. As a pro bono at-
torney you will enable your child client to be heard, respected, protected and provided with the
myriad protections and services that the child is entitled to under state and federal law.
Id. (emphasis added).
102. Cagle, supra note 92; see OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT No. 09-S24, RESEARCH MEMORANDUM: CHILDREN'S LEGAL
SERVICES HAS MADE CHANGES TO ADDRESS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT; SOME
CHALLENGES REMAIN 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/R
eports/pdf/09-s24.pdf. This misstatement of who is the CLS lawyer's client and the ethical
ramifications of such a misstatement are discussed in detail in Dale & Reidenberg, supra note
10, at 334-36.
103. Mary Cagle, Statewide Dir. of Children's Legal Servs., Fla. Dep't of Children &
Families, Address during the public hearing at DCF's S. Region Headquarters 2 (Mar. 7,





105. Id. Of course, chapter 39 provides that "the Agency" (DCF) is a party in dependency
proceedings and must appear by counsel. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2011); see also Dale &
Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 332-33.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Florida's public officials, past and present, confirm the failure of the
dependency system in general'06 and specifically in the Barahona case.10 7
The problems have existed for decades.'08 Blue Ribbon Panels, commis-
sions, legislative committees, and grand juries have investigated and studied
the issues involved in the system and made recommendations.'" Nothing
appears to have worked. Not one of these entities or individuals has sug-
gested that the appointment of attorneys for all children in dependency and
TPR cases in Florida in lieu of the GAL Program is an appropriate option.
On the other hand, the ABA has forcefully advocated for precisely this op-
tion in the Model Act.1no As the foregoing discussion shows, DCF and the
GAL Programs in Florida continue to fundamentally and publicly misstate
their legal and ethical roles."' This combination of duplication and confu-
sion only exacerbates the problem of proper legal representation of children.
106. See Ana Valdes, DCF Strives to Avoid Errors of Past Overhauls; Some Panels' Safe-
ty Ideas Worked, but Others Were Ineffective or Ignored, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 11, 2011, at
Al. DCF Secretary David Wilkins has described what he found in early 2010 as a "total
systemic failure of the child welfare system." Id. On the other hand, former DCF Secretary
Bob Butterworth said it was too soon to say it was a systemic failure: "That's [just] not the
agency I knew." Michael Mayo, Could Tragedy Have Been Avoided for Adopted Twins?,
SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 20, 2011, at Al. In 1999 Governor Jeb Bush stated during a preliminary
injunction hearing in federal court in a case challenging conditions in the Broward County
foster care system that:
I am here to tell you that this administration is committed to transforming our child wel-
fare system across the board, not just foster care, but from the beginning to the very end to
place children that abused [sic] and neglected to a much higher priority that has been in the
past.
The legislature is a partner in this, and I intend to use the resources and the bully pulpit
and the power that the executive branch has to make that partnership work.
We have a temporary problem that we are going to solve, we are going to work on. A lot
of the problems that exist, sadly we don't even have a baseline numbers [sic] to measure-how
we measure progress.
We are so far behind. It is such a tragedy to see how the mismanagement combined with
the lack of resources has developed this situation ....
Dale, supra note 10, at 774-75 n.31 (quoting Gov. Jeb Bush, Transcript Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction Before the Honorable Federico A. Moreno, United States District Judge, 18-
19, Jan. 11, 1999).
107. See Mayo, supra note 106, at Al; Richard J. Gelles, Why Did Florida Children Slip
Through Cracks?, CNN.com (Feb. 18, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-18/opinion/gell
es.florida.child.abuse_I_child-fatality-child-protective-service-jorge-barahona? s=PM:OPINI
ON.
108. See Valdes, supra note 106, at Al; see also Barry, supra note 7.
109. See Valdes, supra note 106, at Al; Valdes, Independent Review Panel, supra note 2,
at A10.
110. See MODELACT2011, supra note 12, § 3.
I11. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 357, 362.
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While traditional legal representation of children by attorneys in all
child welfare cases is not necessarily a panacea for the problem, it is an al-
ternative whose time in Florida has come. Thus, the unseen "red flags" re-
ferred to by Senator Rich in the Barahona case will hopefully be reduced or
eliminated by the appointment of attorneys for the children. Florida has nev-
er provided attorneys to children in dependency cases statewide to address
these "problems." The Model Act is the means to effect this end. Florida
should adopt the Act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While many states in the nation are conducting complex discussions
about the role that children's attorneys should play in dependency and termi-
nation of parental rights proceedings, a smaller number of states are still
looking forward to merely beginning that discussion. Advocates in states
like Florida and Washington, where most children are denied a legal advo-
cate in their dependency and termination proceedings, are struggling to con-
vince anyone who will listen that the interests of children, families, and due
process demand legal counsel be appointed for every child.
This article discusses advocates' efforts in Washington State to build
consensus around the right to counsel for children and youth in foster care
and how that consensus can be used to convince decision-makers to ensure
that each child has an attorney who can protect their rights, who can promote
their interests, and who can ensure that children and youths' voices are heard
in legal proceedings that impact so many areas of a child's life and liberty.
Whether the advocacy in Washington will ultimately prevail is yet to be de-
termined, but the process has resulted in a strong alliance that will not likely
disappear in the near future.
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II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE IN WASHINGTON STATE
A. The Law
Washington State's legal representation landscape in dependency pro-
ceedings reflects a baffling mix of approaches. The state's jurisprudence
boasts some of the earliest and most powerful declarations about parents'
rights to counsel in dependencies and terminations.' Recently, the state has
invested substantial resources into improving the quality of parents' legal
counsel, helping the innovative Parents Representation Program improve the
legal process for many adults in child welfare proceedings.2
Around the same time as the Washington Supreme Court's strong en-
dorsement of the need for parent representation, the issue of children's repre-
sentation took a different course. In 1977, the nation's first Court Appointed
Special Advocates (CASA) program was launched in Seattle-the program's
model was conceived out of a judge's frustration that juvenile courts were
being deprived of sufficient information to protect a child's best interests in
abuse and neglect proceedings.3 The CASA program enlisted citizen volun-
teers to serve as non-attorney guardians ad litem (GALs) who would speak
up for children's best interests in the courtroom.4 Currently, there is a volun-
* Erin Shea McCann is a Staff Attorney with the Children and Youth Project in the
Seattle office of Columbia Legal Services (CLS). McCann started with CLS in 2007 as an
Equal Justice Works Fellow.
** Casey Trupin is the Coordinating Attorney of the Children and Youth Project at
Columbia Legal Services in Seattle, WA. Trupin is also the Co-Chair of the American Bar
Association's Section of Litigation Children's Rights Litigation Committee.
1. See In re Welfare of Luscier, 524 P.2d 906, 908 (Wash. 1974) (en banc) (finding a
right to counsel for parents in termination proceedings, while not distinguishing between the
Federal and Washington Constitutions), abrogated by Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Dur-
ham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), as stated in Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 257 P.3d 570
(Wash. 2011); In re Welfare of Myricks, 533 P.2d 841, 841 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (finding
that parents' right to counsel extends to dependencies as well as terminations).
2. Parents Representation Program, WASH. ST. OFF. PUB. DEF., http://www.opd.wa.gov/
PRP-home.htm (last updated Nov. 9, 2010). The PRP's website notes that "[k]ey elements of
the [PRP] include: [T]he implementation of case load limits and professional attorney stan-
dards; access to expert services and independent social workers; [Office of Public Defense]
oversight; and ongoing training and support." Id. The PRP operates in twenty-five of Wash-
ington's thirty-nine counties. Id.
3. About Us, CASAFORCHILRDEN.ORG, http://www.casaforchildren.org/site/c.mtJSJ7MPI
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teer CASA or non-attorney GAL program in the vast majority of the state's
thirty-nine counties.'
As for dependent children receiving the protection of lawyers, however,
the state has remained solidly stuck among the worst states in the nation-
current state law fails to guarantee counsel to any child involved in an ongo-
ing dependency proceeding and provides unfettered discretion to the courts
to decide whether children get counsel (with two very small exceptions, as
discussed below). The statute only empowers children to raise the issue of
counsel when they reach the age of twelve.' Prior to that age, the statute
dictates that they must rely on the non-attorney GAL, who is most often a
volunteer CASA, or the court, sua sponte, to raise the issue of appointment
of counsel.8 And, even if the child or non-attorney GAL requests counsel for
the child, the court may deny the request.9 Additionally, nothing in state law
requires juvenile courts to even make a finding as to whether a child needs
counsel if it is raised by another party-there is no way for advocates to
know under what circumstances children are being provided counsel.
In looking back, it is interesting that Washington's statute was actually
stronger in years past. Prior to 1993, the statute specifically articulated that
the court could appoint an attorney to represent the child-with no mention
of age-but that year the legislature amended the dependency chapter and
struck the provision articulating that "[t]he court shall . . . appoint an -at4eney
andler a [GAL] for a child"-leaving only the requirement that the court
shall appoint a non-attorney GAL for the child "unless a court for good cause
finds the appointment unnecessary."' 0 This last provision sets Washington
apart from the rest of the nation yet again, in that it statutorily empowers
juvenile courts to deny even a GAL to the child, even though this provision
clearly violates federal law."
5. See CASA Programs in WA, WASH. ST. CASA, http://www.washingtonstatecasa.org/
casa-volunteering/find-a-program (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
6. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(1) (2011).
7. Id. § 13.34.100(6)(a)(i)-(iii).
8. See id. § 13.34.100(1)-(2). "If the child requests legal counsel and is age twelve or
older, or if the guardian ad litem or the court determines that the child needs to be indepen-
dently represented by counsel, the court may appoint an attorney to represent the child's posi-
tion." Id. § 13.34.100(6)(f).
9. See id. "[T]he court may appoint an attorney to represent the child's position."
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(6)(f) (emphasis added).
10. H.B. 1165, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(1) (Wash. 1993).
11. See VICKIE WALLEN, OFFICE OF THE FAMILY & CHILDREN'S OMBUDSMAN, 1999
ANNUAL REPORT 32 (1999), available at http://governor.wa.gov/ofco/reports/1999/ofco_1999
annual.pdf, which "found that approximately one-third of Washington children who are
involved in child abuse and neglect proceedings do not have a GAL to represent their best
interests." The report recommended that "state law be amended to make clear that a GAL
2012]1 365
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The two seemingly arbitrary circumstances under which children are
guaranteed the protection of an attorney in a dependency proceeding include
the instances where a child does not have a GAL and a party or the court
raises the issue with the juvenile court,12 or where a legally free child peti-
tions the juvenile court to reinstate his/her parents' parental rights.13 Interes-
tingly, in other civil legal areas, the courts and the legislature have not been
shy about providing children with counsel, ensuring that they have attorneys
in most status offense proceedings-including At-Risk Youth (ARY) 14 and
Child in Need of Services petitions"-as well as mental health commitment
proceedings1 6 and the contempt phase for both truancy 7 and dependency
proceedings.18
Thus, Washington's Legislature has created a situation in which no
child is required to have counsel until and unless he or she tries to reestablish
shall be appointed to represent the best interests of every child who is the subject of a child
abuse and neglect proceeding." Id. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA) requires State plans to include:
an assurance . .. that the State has in effect and is enforcing a State law, or has in effect and is
operating a statewide program, relating to child abuse and neglect that includes . . . provisions
and procedures requiring that in every case involving a victim of child abuse or neglect which
results in a judicial proceeding, a guardian ad litem, who has received training appropriate to
the role . . . and who may be an attorney or a court appointed special advocate who has re-
ceived training appropriate to that role (or both), shall be appointed to represent the child in
such proceedings.
CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B), (B)(xiii) (2006 & Supp. IV
2010).
12. See WASH. STATE CT. JuCR 9.2(c)(1) (1997). This rule requires the appointment of
an attorney for a juvenile who has no GAL, "[u]pon request of a party or on the court's own
initiative." Id. The authors believe this provision is almost never invoked.
13. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215(3). This statute requires the appointment of an
attorney for a juvenile who petitions the juvenile court to have his/her parents' parental rights
reinstated. Id. The child must be twelve years old to file a petition, although "[u]pon the
child's motion for good cause shown, or on its own motion, the court may hear a petition filed
by a child younger than twelve years old." Id. § 13.34.215(1)(e). To be able to petition, in the
three years since parental rights were terminated, the child must have not achieved permanen-
cy. Id. § 13.34.215(1)(c)-(d).
14. Id. § 13.32A.192(l)(c). "When a proper at-risk youth petition is filed by a child's
parent under this chapter, the juvenile court shall . . . [aippoint legal counsel for the child."
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.192(1).
15. Id. § 13.32A.190(1). "[T]he court shall ... appoint legal counsel and/or a guardian
ad litem to represent the child at the review hearing." Id.
16. Id. § 71.34.710(3). "The minor . . . has a right to have an attorney appointed to
represent him or her before and at the hearing if the minor is indigent." Id.
17. See Tetro v. Tetro, 544 P.2d 17, 19-20 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) ("[W]herever a con-
tempt adjudication may result in incarceration, the person accused of contempt must be pro-
vided with state-paid counsel if he or she is unable to afford private representation.").
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.267(4); see also In re Dependency of A.K., 174 P.3d 11,
22 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (Madsen, J., concurring).
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parental rights after three years floating around in foster care." Additionally,
the legislature has, in violation of federal law, made it legal for children to
even be denied a GAL, resulting in children being completely unrepresented
in their dependency and termination proceedings. 20 This system has deser-
vedly placed Washington State among the bottom ten states in each of First
Star's National Report Card on Legal Representation for Abused and Neg-
lected Children (2007 and 2009).1
Perhaps more problematic, it is an undecided question as to whether
children in Washington State are actually parties to the legal proceedings
that deal with their physical and other fundamental liberty interests or
when the State seeks to permanently sever their relationships with their
families. Though children were clearly parties to dependency proceedings
until 1993, when the legislature amended the dependency chapter that year
and removed the provision allowing courts to appoint attorneys, as noted
above, it also struck the section of the statute that articulated that a child was
a party to the proceedings.22 What is clear about children's party status,
however, is that the court, pursuant to section 13.34.165 of the Revised Code
of Washington (RCW), recognizes a child as a party capable of being held in
civil contempt and detained when not in compliance with an order entered by
the juvenile court in a dependency action.23
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215(1)(d), (3).
20. Compare id. § 13.34.100(1) with CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C.
§5106 a(b)(2)(B)iii (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
21. FIRST STAR, A CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: FIRST STAR'S NATIONAL REPORT CARD
ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN 10-11, 108-09 (1st ed. 2007), available at
http://www.firststar.org/documents/firststarreportcard07.pdf. In 2007, Washington received
an F grade, obtaining only 31 out of 100 possible points and ranking among the bottom five
states. Id. at 10. In 2009, Washington's grade bumped to a D grade-obtaining 61 out of 100
points-but, that was primarily due to a change in First Star's grading method. See id. at 9,
108; FIRST STAR & CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INST., A CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A NATIONAL
REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 2t, 23,
126-27 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION], available at
http://www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/FinalRTC_2ndEdition-jr.pdf. Washington remained
among the bottom nine states. Id. at 21.
22. See H.B. 1165, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wash. 1993).
23. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.165; In re Dependency of A.K, 174 P.3d at 21 (Mad-
sen, J., concurring) ("[Als long as a dependency court employing the sanctions . . . under
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B. Justice by Geography
Despite Washington's weak statutory protections, some counties have
taken it upon themselves to provide greater protection than is required by
state law. King County, the state's most populous county, 24 provides attor-
neys to all children twelve years old and older.25 Another judicial jurisdic-
tion, Benton-Franklin County, provides attorneys to all children nine years
old and older, although the local court rules allow the appointment of an at-
torney for any child who is six years old or older who does not have a
GAL. 26 In the other thirty-seven counties, attorney appointment appears to
follow no pattern, except for in the counties where attorneys are never ap-
pointed.27
In 2008, spurred on by legislative efforts discussed below and in an at-
tempt to map appointment of attorneys to adolescents, the Washington State
Office of Civil Legal Aid (OCLA) surveyed stakeholders in the dependency
judicial system.28 The result was as advocates expected; the study found that
"there is no discernable basis for decision-making in this area either state-
24. Desiree Phair, King County Profile, EMP. SECURITY DEPARTMENT, WASH. ST., https://
fortress. wa.gov/esdlemploymentdatalreports-publications/regional-reports/county-profile
s/king-county-profile (last updated Jan. 2012).
25. WASH. KING SUPER. CT. LJUCR 2.4(a) (2005).
Any parent, guardian and/or legal custodian of the child, or child age [twelve] or older, who
appears at the [seventy-two] hour hearing may be represented, at [the initial shelter care] hear-
ing, by [c]ourt-appointed counsel regardless of financial status unless the party expressly
waives this right or has retained counsel.
Id. (emphasis added).
26. WASH. BENTON/FRANKLIN SUPER. CT. LIUCR 9.4(A) (2008); WASH.
BENTON/FRANKLIN SUPER. CT. LJUCR 9.2(A)(l)(e)-(i) (1988). In speaking with the Benton-
Franklin Counties Juvenile Court Administrator, Sharon Paradis, the authors learned that the
two local court rules work in tandem to ensure that no child goes without some sort of advo-
cate in their dependency and termination proceedings. Telephone Interview with Sharon
Paradis, Juvenile Court Adm'r for Benton-Franklin Cntys. (Dec. 16, 2011) (on file with Nova
Law Review). Ultimately, all children ages nine and older are provided attorneys, but the
court rules "fill the gap" if there are not enough volunteer non-attorney GALs to represent
children ages eight and under. Id.; see also WASH. BENTON-FRANKLIN SUPER CT. LtUCR
9.4(A) (2008). Thus, the court rules allow children as young as six to be appointed an attor-
ney if there are not enough volunteer GALs in the county. Telephone Interview with Sharon
Paradis, supra; see also WASH. BENTON/FRANKLIN SUPER. CT. LIUCR 9.2(A)(1)(e)-(i) (1988).
27. See Press Release, Wash. Defender Ass'n, Washington Supreme Court to Hear Sig-
nificant Case Regarding Foster Children's Right to an Attorney (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.defensenet.org/news/press-release-washington-supreme-court-to-hear-significant-
case-regarding-foster-childrens-right-to-an-attorney.
28. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF CIVIL LEGAL AID, PRACTICES RELATING TO THE
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR ADOLESCENTS IN JUVENILE COURT DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
IN WASHINGTON STATE 1 (2008) (on file with Nova Law Review).
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wide or in the counties."29 Further, even within individual counties "there is
little consistency in perceptions relating to the practice of appointment of
counsel."3 o In many other counties, however, adolescents are appointed
counsel in less than one-third of the cases.3' As one judge interviewed for
the study put it, "[t]here seem to be two models for adolescent representa-
tion: '[A]lmost always' and 'almost never." 3 2
Thus, whether a child gets an attorney in Washington State depends
mostly on where the child lives, as opposed to some individualized determi-
nation of need. 33 The current approach to the appointment of counsel is high-
ly problematic and results in the arbitrary denial of justice. This result is
unsurprising, given that neither the statute nor case law requires the trial
court to consider whether to appoint an attorney; nor does either provide any
standards or guidelines for the courts to consider whatsoever.
III. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE LANDSCAPE
In 1977, the Washington Legislature passed the Juvenile Court Act, set-
ting up the framework for dependency proceedings.34 As noted above, in
1993, the legislature amended the statute to account for the federal require-
ment that all children must be appointed a GAL.
Unfortunately, the amendment actually narrowed not only the type of
advocate a child could receive-removing the provision that children may be
represented by "an attorney"-but it also added the "good cause" exception
for appointing a GAL.36 Additionally, the amendment removed the explicit
provision that children were parties to the proceedings, and made them "sub-
jects" of the proceeding-though it likely did not truly remove their party
status.37 Since that time, no meaningful changes had been made to the statu-
tory system of representation, until 2007, when the legislature granted child-
ren-not parents-the ability to petition the court to reinstate their parents'
parental rights if the child had floundered in the foster care system for three
years after termination.38 In such a case, with the urging of child advocates,
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 6. The report did not analyze how often children younger than twelve were
appointed counsel. See id. at 5.
32. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF CIVIL LEGAL AID, supra note 28, at 5.
33. See id. at 6.
34. 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1002.
35. See H.B. 1165, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wash. 1993).
36. Id. § 2(1); see WALLEN, supra note 11, at 60.
37. H.B. 1165, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(1).
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215(1)(c) (2007).
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the legislature included in the bill a provision that the child petitioner would
have an attorney to assist in pursuing reinstatement. 39
By 2008, a strong coalition of child advocates had been formed and be-
gan focusing on the need to improve the statutes that govern the appointment
of attorneys to children and youth involved in dependency proceedings.40
The coalition included advocates from civil legal services and the public
defense community, child welfare lobbyists, clinical law professors, and,
perhaps most importantly, youth who were at that time, or had been, in foster
care.41 These youth were brought into the conversation by a local foster care
advocacy organization, the Mockingbird Society, which has come to
represent the "youth voice" in Washington.4 2
Despite momentum from the child advocacy community and the youth
themselves, there was, and remains, major resistance to the idea of legal re-
presentation within the legislature.43 One opposition camp believes that if
children are provided lawyers, those lawyers may advocate for children to
return to their biological homes, which may be unsafe." Another camp ex-
pressed concern that children's lawyers would argue against their parents,
putting parents in the position of defending themselves against their children
in court.45 Advocates quickly realized that any work done in the legislature
was going to require a great deal of education about the complex dependency
process, in addition to the intricacies of the different roles and obligations of
39. Id. § 13.34.215(2).
40. See NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 21, at 5-6; ANDREw E.
ZINN & JACK SLOWRIVER, CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO,
EXPEDITING PERMANENCY: LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR FOSTER CHILDREN IN PALM BEACH
COUNTY 1-2 (2008), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/old-reports
/428.pdf.
41. See NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 21, at 5-6; ZINN &
SLOWRIVER, supra note 40, at 1.
42. The Mockingbird Society is "dedicated to building a world-class foster care system
that ensures the care, support, and resources necessary for children, youth, and families to
thrive." Our Mission, THE MOCKINGBIRD Soc'Y, http://www.mockingbirdsociety.org/about/
our-mission (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). Its mission "is to advocate for systems reform based
on the personal experiences of children, youth, and families impacted by the foster care sys-
tem." Id.
43. See Andrea Khoury, A.B.A., Testimony Before the House Judiciary Committee of
the Washington State Legislature Regarding House Bill 3048, Providing for Child Representa-
tion in the Court Process 4 (Jan. 25, 2008) (transcript available on A.B.A. website).
44. Response Brief of Department of Social & Health Services (DSHS) at 36, Dep't of
Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 64736-9-1 (Wash.
Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2010).
45. See Supplemental Brief of Respondent Department of Social & Health Services at 21,
Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6
(Wash. Aug. 10, 2011).
47
: Nova Law Review 36, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2012
KENNY A. DOES NOT LIVE HERE
a non-attorney GAL or volunteer CASA and an attorney.46 This posed a
challenge, considering only a very small handful of the forty-nine senators
and ninety-eight representatives were lawyers themselves,47 and considering
the legislature had provided millions of dollars in funding to the CASA pro-
gram in recent years.4
Despite initial resistance, advocates began talking with legislators about
House Bill 3048,49 which proposed developing the Dependent Youth Repre-
sentation Pilot Program.o The pilot would operate in at least two counties
that "lack[ed] a strong system [of] appointing attorneys for dependent child-
ren [twelve] years and older."5' The pilot would not only ensure that all
children ages twelve and older are appointed an attorney, but also
that all of the attorneys involved are trained in dependency mat-
ters; that no attorney has a caseload larger than [eighty] current
cases; and that the judges, commissioners, GALs, and CASAs re-
ceive training in dependency matters to better understand the at-
torney's role in the proceedings with respect to their own roles.52
The bill also required an evaluation.53 House Bill 3048 died, as did a budget
provision that would have accomplished the same end.54 Both efforts were
killed due to opposition to the legal representation for dependent children, as
opposed to representation by a non-attorney GAL or volunteer CASA. De-
spite the failure, the effort generated enough interest by members of the
House Judiciary committee that it led to the OCLA study referenced above.
Legislators wanted to know where and why children were being provided
attorneys and under what circumstances were they being denied an attor-
ney.56 Again, the OCLA study found wide disparities throughout the state.
46. See Press Release, supra note 27.
47. See Katherine Long, Washington Legislature Average in College Grads, Low in
Lawyers, SEATTLE TIMEs, June 12, 2011, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmllocalnews
/2015304719jlegislators I 3m.html.
48. WALLEN, supra note 11, at 59.
49. See, e.g., Khoury, supra note 43, at 5; Jim Theofelis, Testimony to the Judiciary
Committee on HB 3048, MOCKINGBIRD TIMES, Feb. 2008, at 1, http://www.mockingbirdsoc
iety.org/files/pdflfeb08.pdf.




54. See WASH. STATE OFFICE OF CIVIL LEGAL AID, supra note 28, at 1-2.
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The survey study, though far from scientific, would become very useful to
later efforts.
In 2009, with the economic picture looking quite different than it did in
the spring of 2008, advocates attempted to craft a budget-neutral bill.58 The
result was House Bill 1183, which reflected the information found in the
OCLA study59 and would have simply required dependency courts to make a
finding, on the record, as to whether counsel for children twelve and older
was necessary and the reasons for the finding. 60 As long as some reason was
noted on the record, the bill would have still allowed the court to exercise
unfettered discretion in denying counsel to a child.1 Unfortunately, judges'
and clerks' associations expressed concern that this would take significant
judicial time and would thus cost too much to implement.62 The fiscal note
estimated that five minutes of court time at each hearing would be required
for the "judicial officer inquiring and then stating reasons for the appoint-
ment of an attorney, or the reasons for not appointing an attorney." As a
result of the costs associated with this estimate, the bill died.
In 2010, advocates had to yet again revise their expectations downward
and attempt to craft a bill that even in the eyes of judges and court clerks
would be fiscally neutral, but that would keep the legislature's attention fo-
cused on providing adequate protection of children's rights in dependency
proceedings.6 That bill, House Bill 2735, was the meekest of all the bills to
date, requiring solely that children twelve and older be advised of their al-
ready-existing right to request legal counsel. 65 Advocates reasoned that since
adolescents already had a right to request counsel, and GALs and agency
caseworkers were already required to talk to children, it would be difficult to
justify how the bill would impose a fiscal impact.66 However, the Superior
Court Judges Association, despite testifying that the Association "certainly
58. See H.R. 1183, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009).
59. Compare id., with WASH. STATE OFFICE OF CIVIL LEGAL AID, supra note 28. The
legislative intent section of the bill noted that "[t]he legislature recognizes that inconsistent
practices in and among counties have resulted in few children in Washington being afforded
adequate legal representation in dependency proceedings, thereby putting the health, safety,
and welfare of children at risk." H.R. 1183.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDICIAL IMPACT FISCAL NOTE, OFFICE OF FIN.
MGMT. ST. OF WASH., https://fortress.wa.gov/ofm/fnspublic (search "Session Year 2009" and
"Bill Number 1183", then click on "04/17/2009" link) (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
63. Id.
64. See H.R. REP. No. 61-2735, at 1-2 (2010), http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs
/2009-I/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House%2OFinal/2735%20HBR%20FBR%2010.pdf.
65. Id. at 2.
66. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 62.
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concur[red] with the underlying policy," again expressed concern about the
fiscal impact, reasoning that judges
want[ed] to make sure if the request for counsel is there that there
is going to be counsel that is going to be available and .. . that we
have the funding necessary to ensure that those rights of the indi-
viduals are protected with the attorney. . . . [Tlhe concern is that
it's, in a sense, an unfunded mandate because there is not going to
be opportunity to pay for the counsel to be there when they request
it.67
The fact that children were being denied attorneys simply because they
were not asking for an attorney came as no surprise to advocates working on
the bill. The fiscal note expressed an additional concern that requiring
judges to inquire about whether children were notified of their right to re-
quest counsel would add an average of five minutes to court hearings.
Based on strong testimony and advocacy from youth, coupled with on-
going reassurances that the bill established no right to counsel and retained
the judges' absolute discretion to deny counsel for any reason or no reason
whatsoever, the bill passed both houses unanimously, and was signed into
law with no amendment ever being offered. 69 While the requirement of no-
tice to adolescents that they could ask for an attorney was a meaningful step
in the right direction, the bill's intent section bolstered arguments made by
youth and advocates for several years-that attorneys did, in fact, "have dif-
ferent skills and obligations than [GALs and CASAs], especially in forming
a confidential and privileged relationship with a child."o The bill added that
"[w]ell-trained attorneys can provide legal counsel to a child on issues such
as placement options, visitation rights, educational rights, access to services
while in care and services available to a child upon aging out of care."" Per-
haps the bill's most important contribution, however, was the requirement
that "the administrative office of the courts . . . [along] with the state su-
preme court commission on children in foster care, shall develop recommen-
67. House Judiciary Committee, Public Hearing H.B. 2523, H.B. 2735, H.B. 3039, &
H.B. 3058, TVW.ORG, at 1:00:10-1:01:26 (Jan. 27, 2010), http://tvw.org/index.php?option=
com-tvwplayer&eventlD=2010010154. The Superior Court Judges' Association's testimony
opposing H.B. 2735 can be found at 1:00:55. Id.
68. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 62. The fiscal note said that this would
cost the counties and the state more than $150,000 in a fiscal year. See id.
69. H.B. 2735,61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010).
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dations for voluntary training and caseload standards for attorneys who
represent youth in dependency proceedings."72
House Bill 2735's small legislative victory regarding notice to youth in
foster care was couched in what some advocates believe was a far more im-
portant win-the recognition by the legislature that attorneys have an impor-
tant role to play in the lives of children and youth in abuse and neglect pro-
ceedings.
IV. LITIGATION EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE SYSTEM
From the beginning of the local advocacy community's renewed focus
on this issue, advocates were under no illusion that meaningful change would
likely have to come through the establishment of a constitutional right to
counsel-legislative advocacy would not likely yield the same result as a
court holding. How to obtain a court victory, however, was subject to some
debate.
A. Could We Have a Kenny A.?
One approach advocates discussed, and the most recent example of suc-
cess, was the Georgia litigation brought by the organization Children's
Rights in the 2005 Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue'3 case. The litigation, a
child welfare class action reform case, included a claim that the extraordina-
rily high caseloads of children's attorneys in Fulton and DeKalb Counties
resulted in a violation of dependent children's constitutional due process
rights.74 In the most clear decision on children's right to counsel to date, the
Federal District Court of the Northern District of Georgia held that indeed,
pursuant to Georgia statute and the Due Process Clause of the Georgia Con-
stitution, children in foster care had a right to counsel in deprivation proceed-
ings, and that the caseloads carried by attorneys there were violating that
right.
Later that year, the Supreme Court of Washington took note of Kenny
A. The citation came in Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.) 76-in
which the court avoided ruling on children's rights to counsel, but noted that
"[w]hen adjudicating the 'best interests of the child,' we must in fact remain
centrally focused on those whose interests with which we are concerned,
72. Id. § 5.
73. 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
74. Id. at 1355.
75. Id. at 1357-59.
76. 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).
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recognizing that not only are they often the most vulnerable, but also power-
less and voiceless."77 This citation led advocates to believe successful litiga-
tion in state court was a distinct possibility. However, a number of problems
still stood in the way of bringing any claim in Washington, much less a suc-
cessful one. First, unlike in Georgia, attorneys were not being provided to
children by statute in Washington State, thus the claim would have been sig-
nificantly different.7 8 Second, the claims in Kenny A. were smartly made in
the context of a larger reform case. In Washington, the class action reform
case, Braam ex rel. Braam v. State,7 9 had been initiated seven years prior to
the Kenny A. ruling, and such claims were not included.80 Additionally, the
fact that children were not appointed attorneys created a tricky situation, in
that it became difficult to access children who could actually assert the ne-
cessary claims. 8'
Some progress was made when, in 2007, the Washington Defender As-
sociation, with the help of funding from the Children's Justice Act, created a
Children's Representation Project (CRP).82 The goals of the CRP were to
both improve the quality of legal representation for dependent children, and
also to improve the accessibility of it.83 Advocates worked with the CRP to
create a template motion for appointment of counsel for children, adaptable
for any situation. 4 Using the template, and with the technical assistance of
the CRP, advocates intervened in a number of cases throughout the state to
obtain counsel for children in their cases. The idea was, first and foremost,
to make it easier for parents' attorneys or GALs to move the juvenile court to
appoint legal counsel for children in individual cases---other parties would
not have to reinvent the wheel if they wanted to obtain an attorney for a
77. Id. at 179 n.29.
78. See Amici Curiae Brief of Kidsvoice et al. in Support of Appellant at 2, Dep't of Soc.
& Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Termination of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6 (Wash. Sept.
26, 2011).
79. 81 P.3d 851 (Wash. 2003) (en banc).
80. Compare id. at 854, with Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.
8 1. See Braam ex rel. Braam, 81 P.3d at 854-57, 863.
82. See generally Children's Justice Act, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.
acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/programs-fund/state-tribal/justice-act.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2012); see also Children's Representation Project, WASH. DEFENDER Ass'N, http://www.defen
senet.org/childrens-representation-project (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
83. Children's Representation Project, supra note 82.
84. See generally Sample Motion to Appoint Counsel for Dependent Youth, WASH.
DEFENDER Ass'N, available at http://www.defensenet.org/childrens-representation-project
(follow "Motion to Appoint Counsel for Dependent Youth" hyperlink; then follow "Sample
Motion for Appointment of Counsel FINAL I 1-13-09(2).doc" hyperlink).
85. See generally id.; Children's Representation Project, supra note 82.
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child/children.8 6 Another purpose behind posting the template motion, how-
ever, was that if any motion was denied, it would be appealable and the at-
torney would already be connected to the statewide association that supports
public defense agencies. Prior to 2009, however, the authors were unaware
of any motions for counsel that were not resolved before appeal, thwarting,
or at least complicating, an affirmative litigation effort.
B. Bellevue School District v. E.S. Provides a Glimmer of Hope
As the years stretched on after the Kenny A. ruling, it became more ap-
parent that appellate advocacy, rather than affirmative litigation, might be the
best way to resolve the issue in Washington State.88 In 2009, the state court
of appeals ruled in Bellevue School District v. E.S.89 that children in initial
truancy hearings had a constitutional due process right to counsel, given the
educational, privacy and physical liberty interests at stake in those proceed-
ings.90 Though the decision mistakenly indicated that dependent children
already had a statutory right to counsel, underscoring the confusion around
the issue, the ruling appeared to clear the way to establish such a right for
dependent children given that dependency proceedings turn over almost all
decisions about a child's life to the state and require years-perhaps a child's
entire lifetime-of court involvement.9 '
In 2009, shortly after the Bellevue decision was issued by the court of
appeals, there was an opening to bring the dependency issue before the ap-
pellate courts. After her children had spent four years in foster care, a trial
court in rural northeastern Washington terminated the parental rights of
T.R.9 2 T.R.'s then twelve-year-old daughter, D.R., and eleven-year-old son,
A.R., had been represented by the same volunteer CASA since their entry
86. See Children's Representation Project, supra note 82.
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 199 P.3d 1010, 1017 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009),
reh'g granted, 210 P.3d 1018 (Wash. 2009), and rev'd, 257 P.3d 570 (Wash. 2011).
89. 199 P.3d 1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009), reh'g granted, 210 P.2d 3d 1018 (Wash.
2009), and rev'd, 257 P.3d 570 (Wash. 2011).
90. Id. at 1017.
91. See id. at 1014, 1017. The court noted that "[t]ruancy hearings are the only type of
proceeding, civil or criminal, in which a juvenile respondent is not provided counsel." Id. at
1013 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(6) (2011)). That statute, however, fails to guaran-
tee attorneys for children twelve or older in dependencies. See WASH. REV. CODE §
13.34.100(6). See supra Section II(A) of this article for an overview of what section
13.34.100(6) does and does not provide.
92. Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, 15, State v. Roberts (In re D.R. & A.R.), No. 27394-
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into care.93 At no point during the life of the dependency did the CASA ever
meet A.R., who had been involuntarily institutionalized for a year in the
state's most intensive child psychiatric hospital and then placed across the
state away from his mother and sister.94 The CASA met face-to-face with
D.R. no more than three times since being assigned to the case, the longest
encounter being forty-five minutes.95
During the termination trial (during which D.R. turned twelve), T.R.'s
counsel asked for the court to appoint counsel to D.R." The court asked the
CASA to speak to the child about the issue.97 The CASA did not talk with
D.R. about the issue of counsel, despite several requests from the court.98
The CASA testified at the termination trial that she did not want to bring up
with D.R. the idea of getting an attorney because she was concerned the
discussion might cause D.R. anxiety." Despite that the CASA and D.R.'s
therapist testified that they did not understand the legal impact the termi-
nation would have on D.R.," the court denied the mother's motion to ap-
point counsel to D.R.'0 ' The court noted that the "denial of counsel would
raise an [appealable] issue," but "that it was simply 'too late in the game' for
another lawyer to catch up with the progress of the case." 02
The mother, T.R., appealed the termination and her counsel moved to
appoint appellate counsel for the children.10 3 The court appointed Columbia
Legal Services and the Center for Justice to represent D.R. and A.R., respec-
tively.'0 The children filed briefs supplementing the mother's argument that
her children's due process rights were violated and that all dependent child-
ren have a constitutional right to counsel in dependency and termination pro-
ceedings.'05 The children's briefs added salient facts about the effect upon
the children of being "represented" by only a CASA who never met with
93. Appellant Child D.R.'s Opening Brief at 3-4, State v. Roberts (In re D.R. & A.R.),
No. 27394-6-III (Wash. Ct. App. June 5, 2009).
94. Id. at 4, 9; Brief of Appellant A.R. at 12-13, State v. Roberts (In re Dependency of
D.R. & A.R.), No. 27394-6-Ill (Wash. Ct. App. June 5, 2009).
95. Appellant Child D.R.'s Opening Brief, supra note 93, at 4.
96. Appellant's Opening Brief, In re D.R. & A.R., supra note 92, at 13-14.
97. Id. at 13.
98. Id. at 14.
99. Id.
100. See Motion to Reverse & Remand Case to Superior Court at 2, In re Dependency of
D.R. & A.R., No. 27394-6-111 (Wash. Ct. App. July 1, 2009).
101. Appellant's Opening Brief, In re D.R. & A.R., supra note 92, at 14.
102. Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted).
103. Appellant Child D.R.'s Opening Brief, supra note 93, at 10.
104. See id.; Brief of Appellant A.R., supra note 94.
105. Appellant Child D.R.'s Opening Brief, supra note 93, at 1-2; Brief of Appellant
A.R., supra note 94, at 2.
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A.R. and who testified in favor of termination even though D.R.-who she
had barely met with, over four years-opposed the termination."
Instead of responding to the children's briefs, the State surprisingly
filed a motion to reverse and remand the termination, conceding that both
D.R. and A.R. should have had counsel during the termination (despite the
fact that nobody had ever requested counsel for A.R.).107 In its concession,
the State wrote "that the trial court abused its discretion in denying legal
counsel for A.R. and D.R.; [and] that this error may well have affected
the outcome of the case."'"8 The State admitted that D.R. opposed the
termination and that "her significant legal concerns were not represented"
at trial by the children's volunteer CASA and that the CASA did not have
"the ability to advocate for [D.R.'s] legal position."'" The State further
admitted that "A.R. also had significant legal issues" and "[1]ike D.R.,
[he] was not able to adequately present a legal argument to the court op-
posing termination because he did not have counsel.""o The State rec-
ommended reversal-stating counsel would be appointed for the children
in the underlying dependency-but opposed any consideration by the
court of appeals of the children's claim regarding any dependent child's
constitutional right to counsel."' The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded the case but did not rule on the constitutional issue presented by
the children." 2 At the children's request, the Supreme Court of Washington
accepted review in May 2010." Even though the children had asked the
Court to review the right to counsel in both dependencies and terminations,
the Court limited its review to the right to counsel in termination proceed-
ings.1 14
The children briefed the issue of the right to counsel in terminations un-
der the federal and state due process clauses and coordinated an amicus ef-
106. Appellant Child D.R.'s Opening Brief, supra note 93, at 4; Brief of Appellant A.R.,
supra note 94, at 12.
107. Motion to Reverse & Remand Case to Superior Court, supra note 100, at 1.
108. Id. at 1-2.
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id. at 3.
Ill. See id. at 3-4.
112. Order Denying Motion to Modify Commissioner's Ruling at A2, A4, In re Termina-
tion of D.R. & A.R., No. 27394-6-Ill consolidated with No. 27395-4-Ill (Wash. Ct. App. Dec.
28, 2009).
113. In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., 231 P.3d 840, 840 (Wash. 2010); Amicus Curiae
Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington at 2, In re Termination of A.R. &
D.R., No. 84132-2 (Wash. Jan. 11, 2011).
114. In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., 231 P.3d at 840.
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fort that resulted in the filing of eight briefs in support of the children."' 5 The
amici represented a diverse group of stakeholders that ranged from foster
youth and alumni of care, to foster parent advocacy groups, local legal ser-
vice agencies and the statewide chapter of the ACLU, national advocacy
groups, and the Washington State Psychological Association.116
On January 27, 2011, the Supreme Court of Washington heard oral ar-
guments.'"7 As this was an issue of first impression, it was unclear what to
expect from the court, but the questions ranged from whether a ruling on this
issue would impact children's right to an attorney in a private dissolution
action, to whether the issue would be resolved if all CASAs and GALs were
provided attorneys." 8 The court seemed to struggle with the notion that at-
torneys could represent even very young children, and focused on the fact, at
the time of oral argument, D.R. and A.R. had attorneys because of the State's
concession." 9 The court wanted to know why it should rule on a case that
appeared to lack aggrieved parties, given that the children had prevailed at
the court of appeals.120 Advocates for the children argued that the case pre-
sented an issue of continuing and substantial public interest, was likely to
continue evading review, and that the court should decide the issue because it
had never before come to the court's attention. 12 1
Only five days after oral argument, the Supreme Court of Washington
dismissed review of the case, pointing to the statutory amendments in House
115. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington,
supra note 113, at 1; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Mockingbird Society at 3, In re Dependency
of D.R. & A.R., No. 84132-2 (Wash. Mar. 24, 2010); Appellant Child D.R.'s Opening Brief,
supra note 93, at 1-2; Appellant's Opening Brief, In re D.R. & A.R., supra note 92, at 1;
Brief of Appellant A.R., supra note 94, at 20; Amici Curiae Brief of Kidsvoice et al. in Sup-
port of Petitioners at 1, 5, In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., No. 84132-2 (Wash. Dec. 23,
2010); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Washington State Psychological Association at 5, In re
Termination of D.R. & A.R., No. 84132-2 (Wash. Jan. 11, 2011).
116. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington,
supra note 113, at 1; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Mockingbird Society, In re Dependency of
D.R. & A.R., supra note 115, at 1; Amici Curiae Brief of Kidsvoice et al., In re Termination
of D.R. & A.R., supra note 115, at 19; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Washington State Psycho-
logical Association, In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., supra note 115, at 1.
117. Supreme Court Calendar, WASH. CTS. (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.courts.wa.gov
/appellate trialcourts/supreme/calendar/?fa=atcsupreme calendar.display&year-201 1 &file
=20110127.
118. See generally Oral Argument, In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., No. 84132-2 (Wash.
Jan. 27, 2011), available at http://tvw.org/index.phpoption=com-tvwplayer&eventlD=2011
010025B.
119. Id. at 16:23-17:00, 58:23.
120. Id. at 16:40, 57:00.
121. See id. at 16:25.
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Bill 2735 that came about since the appeal 22 and that there was no aggrieved
party. 2 3 It was unclear what the amendment to the statute had to do with the
status of the parties, given that the statute still provided no right to counsel
and would not have pertained to A.R.124 The outcome was devastating to the
clients and the advocates who had been working on this case since early
2009.
C. Life After In re Termination of D.R. & A.R.
The attention brought to the issue through In re Termination of D.R. &
A.R.1 2 5 prompted attorneys regularly working on dependency and termination
appeals to consider making the right to counsel argument in their cases.
While In re Termination of D.R. & A.R. was being briefed for argument be-
fore the Supreme Court of Washington, another case was working its way up
the appellate chain.
Department of Social & Health Services v. Luak (In re Dependency of
M.S.R. & T.S.R.)126 involved twin children who were nine years old when
their mother's rights were terminated.127 In that case, unlike in In re Termi-
nation of D.R. & A.R., counsel had never been requested for the children,
perhaps due to the fact that the statute allowed appointment for children un-
der age twelve only upon request by the GAL or where the trial court, sua
sponte, felt it necessary.128 But the mother, frustrated by the fact that the
volunteer CASA would only stipulate to how the children might feel about
the termination, wanted the children's actual wishes to be represented to the
court.129 The trial court denied the request to hear directly from the child-
122. See discussion supra Part 111.
123. Order Dismissing Review, In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., No. 84132-2 (Wash.
Feb. 1, 2011); H.B. 2735, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010); Jessica Breslin, WA Supreme
Court Declines to Rule on Child's Right to Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights, XXX
NAT'L CTR. FOR YOUTH L., Jan.-Mar. 2011, http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2011
/jan-mar_201 1/wa supreme courtdeclines to rule on childs-right tocounselin terminat
ion.of-parental-rights/.
124. See H.B. 2735.
125. 231 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2010).
126. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Depen-
dency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 64736-9-1 (WASH. CT. App. Oct. 14, 2010).
127. Id.
128. Supplemental Brief of Respondent Department of Social & Health Services, supra
note 45, at 5-6 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(6)(f) (2011)); see also discussion
supra Part III.
129. Supplemental Brief of Appellant Luak at 3, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In
re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6 (Wash. July 7, 2011).
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ren. 130 The mother appealed the termination and argued that due process
requires that all children have an attorney to protect their fundamental liberty
interests during termination of parental ights proceedings.' 3'
Shortly after dismissal of In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., and prior to
the In re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R. court of appeal's oral argument
date, the Supreme Court certified the case for review.132 The mother's attor-
ney, having been well-versed in the issues in her prior job where she
represented national amici in In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., moved the
court to appoint appellate counsel for the children.13 3 The State opposed the
motion, and the court denied the mother's request.' 34 The court did, howev-
er, allow nineteen amicus parties-almost all of whom had also participated
as amici in In re Termination of D.R. & A.R.-to submit six briefs to the
court.'3 5 Thus, in a case examining whether children have a constitutional
right to counsel in termination proceedings, the children in the case went
unrepresented in the dependency, the termination, and on appeal, and amici
would be left to argue about the children's rights and interests without any
access to the record.136 The CASA did not appear in the appeal, leaving any
130. Id.
131. Id. at 3-4.
132. In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., 231 P.3d 840, 840 (Wash. 2010).
133. See Motion to Appoint Counsel for Children at 1, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v.
Luak (In re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6 (Wash. Apr. 6, 2011).
134. Answer of DSHS Opposing Ms. Luak's Motion to Appoint Counsel for Children at 1,
Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6
(Wash. Apr. 14, 2011); Order, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Dependency of
M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6 (Wash. June 10, 2011).
135. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Mockingbird Society at 1, Dep't of Soc. & Health
Servs. v. Luak (In re Termination of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6 (Wash. Sept. 26, 2011);
Amici Curiae Brief of Columbia Legal Services & the Center for Children & Youth Justice in
Support of Appellant at 2, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Termination of M.S.R.
& T.S.R.), No. 85729-6 (Wash. Sept. 26, 2011); Amici Curiae Brief of the Children & Youth
Advocacy Clinic in Support of Appellant at 3, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re
Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6 (Wash. Sept. 26, 2011); Brief of Amici Curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of Washington et al. at 1, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v.
Luak (In re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6 (Wash. Sept. 26, 2011); Amicus
Curiae Brief of the Washington State Psychological Ass'n in Support of Petitioner at 2, Dep't
of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6 (Wash.
Sept. 5, 2011); Amici Curiae Brief of Kidsvoice et al., supra note 78, at 2; see sources cited
supra note 115.
136. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Mockingbird Society, In re Termination of M.S.R. &
T.S.R., supra note 135, at 1; Amici Curiae Brief of Columbia Legal Services & the Center for
Children & Youth Justice, supra note 135, at 2; Amici Curiae Brief of the Children & Youth
Advocacy Clinic, supra note 135, at 3; Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union
of Washington et al., supra note 135, at 1; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Washington State Psy-
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child's representative completely absent from the process. Ultimately, the
arguments presented to the court mirrored those argued in In re Termination
of D.R. & A.R.-that because termination proceedings are among the most
intrusive and destructive legal proceedings to which any child or adult could
ever be subjected, every court in the past thirty years has found that ap-
pointment of counsel to all children is constitutionally required.'37  The
mother's counsel and amici argued that Washington is among a minority of
states that fail to provide a universal right to counsel and that its method of
appointing counsel is sporadic and results in "justice by geography."l 38
Amici brought the perspective of the people most affected by the decisions
made in a termination proceeding-children and youth.139 One example of
this perspective was found in the brief submitted by the Mockingbird Socie-
ty, which stated that:
If the parent-child relationship is terminated, it is the child
who is exposed to the foster care system. It is the child who is of-
ten bounced from one foster home to another. It is the child who is
forced to live in sometimes overcrowded and unsanitary condi-
tions. It is the child who may suffer from abuse and neglect at the
hands of substitute guardians. It is the child who is punished or
detained in contempt for contacting the estranged biological par-
ents. It is the child-not the State, not the parents, not the judge,
and not the [GAL or CASA]-who must cope with living in a
strange and often daunting world that lacks any nurturing or stabil-
ity.1
Finally, amici reminded the court that unlike almost any other criminal or
civil proceeding, there is little certainty when state involvement will end,
with cases lasting up to eighteen years-an entire childhood.141
The State's argument largely rested on its belief that because parents
did not have a right to counsel under Lassiter v. Department of Social Ser-
vices of Durham County, North Carolina,14 2 then children could not possibly
chological Association, supra note 135, at 2; Amici Curiae Brief of Kidsvoice et al., supra
note 78, at 2.
137. See Supplemental Brief of Appellant, supra note 129, at 4.
138. See Amici Curiae Brief of Columbia Legal Services & the Center for Children &
Youth Justice, supra note 135, at 17-20.
139. See id.
140. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Mockingbird Society, In re Termination of M.S.R. &
T.S.R. supra note 135, at 6 (citations omitted).
141. Amici Curiae Brief of the Children & Youth Advocacy Clinic, supra note 135, app.
at 7.
142. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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have a right to counsel. 43 The State's argument not only ignored the strong
constitutional pronouncements made by the Supreme Court of Washington in
In re Welfare of Luscier'" and In re Welfare of Myricks14 5-instead arguing
that these holdings were eviscerated by Lassiter-but also equated children
to chattel who could not have greater or even equal rights to their parents.146
The court heard oral argument in In re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.
on October 18, 2011, nine months after the dismissal of In re Termination of
D.R. & A.R.147 It will be perhaps quite some time before a decision is issued,
but advocates hope that the Supreme Court of Washington is not the first in
thirty years to declare that children lack a constitutional right to counsel in
cases that permanently sever children from their family members.
D. What About Dependency Proceedings?
While Washington's child advocacy community waits for a decision
from the state supreme court regarding the right to counsel in termination
proceedings, advocates are keeping a close eye on another case in the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals. In re Dependency of K.A.S.,1 48 raises the issue of
the right to counsel in dependency proceedings, which could affect the nearly
10,000 children that are in the foster care system in Washington State.1 49 In
K.A.S., a parent appealed the finding of dependency and argued that all child-
ren have a right to counsel in dependency proceedings, relying heavily on
143. Id. at 24, 26-27, 34; Supplemental Brief of Respondent Department of Social &
Health Services, supra note 45, at 8-13.
144. 524 P.2d 906 (Wash. 1974) (en banc), abrogated by Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), as stated in Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 257 P.3d
570 (Wash. 2011).
145. 533 P.2d 841 (Wash. 1975) (en banc).
146. Id. at 841; In re Welfare of Luscier, 524 P.2d at 908; Supplemental Brief of Respon-
dent Department of Social & Health Services, supra note 45, at 8-13.
.147. See generally Oral Argument, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Depen-
dency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.), No. 85729-6 (Wash. Oct. 18, 2011) available at http://tvw.org
/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2011100005C&TYPE-V&CFID=8351653&CFTOKEN=3819
7884&bhcp=1; Order Dismissing Review, supra note 123.
148. Brief in Support of Motion for Accelerated Review at 1, In re Dependency of K.A.S.
No. 65769-1-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2010).
149. Id. For information about the number of children in the care of the Children's Ad-
ministration, see the 2010 Year in Review Report. See WASH. STATE DEP'T OF Soc. &
HEALTH SERVS., CHILDREN'S ADMINISTRATION: 2010 YEAR IN REVIEw (2011), http://www.
dshs.wa.gov/pdf/calyear-in-review20l0.pdf. The report notes that of the "11,625 children in
the care of Children's Administration" in 2010, "9757 were in out-of-home care such as foster
care or group homes." Id.
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briefing from In re Termination of D.R. & A.R.150 Despite arguing that all
children should have counsel at their dependency trial, the mother declined
to request appellate counsel for the child.'51 When advocates filed a motion
requesting leave to file amicus briefs, the court of appeals denied the motion
and proceeded to oral argument without hearing any arguments directly from
the child, the GAL-who did not participate in the appeal-or from the le-
gions of stakeholders that participated as amici in In re Termination of D.R.
& A.R. and In re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.'52
The court of appeals heard oral argument on November 4, 2011, less
than a month after oral argument in In re Dependency of M.S.R. & T.S.R.' 53
Like the supreme court case, it is unclear when a decision will be issued, or
how it might be affected by the supreme court's ruling in In re Dependency
of M.S.R. & T.S.R.
V. CONCLUSION: WASHINGTON'S LONG ROAD AHEAD
The right to counsel remains to be established, but significant gains
have been made. For example, House Bill 2735 resulted in the development
of a report on standards and caseloads by experts from the key child welfare
constituency groups, including the Attorney General's Office and CASA
which begins with the pronouncement that, "[a]ll children subject to depen-
dency or termination of parental rights court proceedings should have legal
representation as long as the court jurisdiction continues."' 54 This consensus
is no small feat, and it is one that came about after significant community
education and consistent pressure.' 5 Obviously, the pronouncement is likely
to have little effect until the supreme court or the legislature become part of
150. See Brief in Support of Motion for Accelerated Review, supra note 148, at 8-22; see
also Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, supra note
113, at 5-7; Amici Curiae Brief of Kidsvoice et al., In re Termination of D.R. & A.R., supra
note 115, at 4-7.
151. See Brief in Support of Motion for Accelerated Review, supra note 148, at 8-22.
152. See generally In re Dependency of K.A.S. No. 65769-1-I (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 17,
2010); see sources cited supra note 115, 135.
153. Appellate Court Case Summary, In re Dependency of K.A.S., No. 657691, WASH.
CTs. (July 29, 2010), http://dw.courts.wa.gov/index.cfm?fa=home.casesummary&casenum
ber=657691 &searchtype=aNumber&crt itlnu=AOI &filingDate=2010-0729%2000:00:00.0&
courtClassCode=A&casekey=1 52650874&courtname--COA,%20Division%201.
154. STATEWIDE CHILDREN'S REPRESENTATION WORKGROUP, WASH. COURTS ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, MEANINGFUL LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN
WASHINGTON'S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM: STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, VOLUNTARY TRAINING,
AND CASELOAD LIMITS IN RESPONSE TO HB 2735 at 5, available at http://www.law.washington
.edu/Directory/Docs/Kelly/HB2735.pdf.
155. See id. at 1-2.
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the consensus, but the decisions of both of these bodies are necessarily af-
fected by a community's maturation on an issue. Advocates hope that either,
or both, will take note of this fact, as well as the emerging national consensus
reflected by the American Bar Association's Model Act Governing the Re-
presentation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Cases. There
have been other advances as well. Anecdotal information indicates that the
substantive provisions of House Bill 2735 have resulted in more children
being appointed attorneys simply because more children are asking for attor-
neys. More attorneys for parents, bolstered by the availability of briefing,
are moving for counsel for children. Appellate attorneys, as well, are look-
ing at this issue.
In light of the recession, efforts in Washington may only get more diffi-
cult. The only certainty, it appears, is that the issue is coming to a head with
the result having major repercussions for the rights of children in Washing-
ton State and beyond. It is certainly possible that the courts and the legisla-
ture may reinforce the status of children as chattel. But such a result would
be contrary to the now overwhelming opinion among stakeholders and the
youth themselves-that children and youth have the most at stake in these
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I. INTRODUCTION
For as long as lawyers have been representing children in New York
state and elsewhere, the unfortunate backdrop for this otherwise noble and
rewarding work has been an often heated debate regarding the proper role of
a child's lawyer in neglect and abuse, permanency and termination of paren-
tal rights proceedings. While a state has considerable discretion in defining
that role, New York, like many other states, has provided only general guid-
ance to children's lawyers, who are referred to as counsel or confusingly, as
"law guardians" in New York statutes. As a result, while everyone agrees
that the child's lawyer, like any other lawyer, must conduct an adequate fac-
tual investigation, communicate regularly with any verbal client and help
such a client understand the proceedings and make sound decisions, and pre-
pare for and advocate at court hearings, lawyers have been left relatively free
to follow, or override in their discretion, positions taken by their young and
immature clients. In other words, lawyers have been able to navigate freely
between the traditional lawyer's role-advocating for the client's expressed
interests, and a guardian ad litem role-advocating for what the guardian
determines to be in the child's interest.
On October 17, 2007, Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, a long-time child-
ren's rights champion, signed new section 7.2 of the Rules of the Chief
Judge, which states that in juvenile delinquency and person in need of super-
vision proceedings, "the attorney for the child must zealously defend the
child," and that in other proceedings, the child's attorney "should be directed
by the wishes of the child" if "the child is capable of knowing, voluntary and
considered judgment," even if the attorney "believes that what the child
wants is not in the child's best interests."
* Gary Solomon is the Director of Legal Support for the Juvenile Rights Practice.
** Tamara Steckler is Attorney-in-Charge of the Juvenile Rights Practice.
1. Reprinted with permission from the October 22, 2008 edition of the New York Law
Journal@ 2011 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without
permission is prohibited.
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Under Rule 7.2, the attorney "would be justified in advocating a position
that is contrary to the child's wishes" when the attorney "is convinced either
that the child lacks the capacity for knowing, voluntary and considered judg-
ment, or that following the child's wishes is likely to result in a substantial
risk of imminent, serious harm to the child."
Rule 7.2 was promulgated shortly after the New York State Bar Associa-
tion's formal adoption of Standards for Attorneys Representing Children in
New York Child Protective, Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings, which strike a similar theme. Even before these developments,
The Legal Aid Society's Juvenile Rights Practice, for the first time in its for-
ty-six-year existence, engaged its staff in a comprehensive discussion of the
role of the child's lawyer with a view towards developing formal written
guidelines for juvenile rights lawyers.
Now, against the complementary backdrop created by Rule 7.2 and the
state bar standards, Legal Aid's guidelines, Giving the Children a Meaningful
Voice: The Role of the Child's Lawyer in Child Protective, Permanency, and
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, have been released.2
We believe that the strength of the adversarial process lies in the full
presentation and consideration of the affected parties' points of view. The
child, whose liberty interests are implicated in the proceeding, is entitled to
this opportunity no less than any other party. Accordingly, like Rule 7.2 and
the state bar standards, the Juvenile Rights Practice guidelines endorse the
traditional lawyer's role as advocate for the child's wishes, while also recog-
nizing narrow exceptions to the general rule.
Juvenile Rights Practice lawyers may, but are not required to, take posi-
tions that are inconsistent with the client's expressed wishes only when the
client "lacks the capacity to fully comprehend the nature of the proceeding
and the issues raised and communicate a preference and comprehensible rea-
sons for it," or when arguing successfully for the result the child prefers
would expose the child to a risk of "grave physical harm."
However, we recognize the residual danger that lawyers will evaluate
"capacity" using different standards. For instance, a lawyer might equate
capacity with maturity, and thus believe that any child of fifteen or sixteen
lacks capacity. Or, while evaluating the child's capacity, a lawyer might treat
what appears to the lawyer to be a bad decision by a child as evidence of a
lack of capacity. To insure that capacity determinations will be as consistent
as possible, the guidelines endorse the view that by age ten, a child usually
2. LEGAL AID SOCIETY, GIVING THE CHILDREN A MEANINGFUL VOICE: THE ROLE OF THE
CHILD'S LAWYER IN CHILD PROTECTIVE, PERMANENCY AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
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has decision-making ability, and that many children ages seven through nine
possess such ability.
II. EXTENSIVE RESEARCH
The Juvenile Rights Practice guidelines do not adopt this view without
good reason or without exhaustive research. Before arriving at this result, the
guidelines: 1) carefully analyze New York statutes, case law, and attorney
ethics and practice standards, as well as other authorities, and conclude that
this model of representation is permissible; 2) highlight the ways in which the
effectiveness and integrity of the judicial process, and the child's confidence
in that process, are enhanced when there is a lawyer who advocates in accor-
dance with the child's unique perspective; and 3) rely on expert authority
supporting the view that by age seven a child's social, language, and cogni-
tive abilities have become more complex and sophisticated.
At the same time, however, the guidelines recognize that although many
young children do possess sufficient capacity to make decisions and ought to
have a loyal advocate, their deficits in experience, insight, and maturity
heighten the importance of the lawyer's counseling role. Even when the law-
yer is "client-directed" in that the child's wishes will prevail in the end if the
lawyer and the child disagree, a lawyer's representation of a child, like a law-
yer's representation of an adult, also is "lawyer-directed" in the sense that a
lawyer should, without overwhelming the client's will, attempt to steer the
client away from self-destructive and other ill-conceived positions and to-
wards better ones. The guidelines also recognize that while a child has the
right to make certain fundamental decisions that implicate his or her liberty
interests, decisions involving litigation strategy, including the means by
which to achieve the child's litigation goals, are made by the lawyer.
The guidelines also lay out a methodology for attorneys to use when
making decisions on behalf of non-verbal infants and other children who lack
capacity. This is often referred to as "substituted judgment" representation.
The lawyer, lacking the direction provided by a client, has no alternative but
to advocate in accordance with the governing legal standard.
For instance, the lawyer will look to the imminent risk standard at a re-
moval hearing, and to the preponderance of the evidence or clear and con-
vincing evidence standard at a fact-finding hearing. When making decisions
on behalf of a child who lacks capacity in certain other contexts, for instance,
a custody dispute involving non-parental custodians, the lawyer may, consis-
tent with applicable legal standards, consider the child's best interests.
The guidelines also instruct the lawyer to give at least some weight to
the wishes of a child who lacks decision-making capacity, since the child has
first-hand knowledge of the home environment and even very young children
389
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can make a substantial contribution to the decision-making process. The
lawyer also should keep in mind the disparity between the lawyer's own life
experiences and expectations, and those of the child. At a formal hearing, the
lawyer should seek to elicit as much information as possible; although in
many cases the lawyer already will have adopted at least a tentative position
before the hearing commences, the lawyer cannot be certain that new infor-
mation will not change his or her position.
III. CONCLUSION: WORKING WITH JUDGES
We recognize that many Family Court judges have come to expect the
child's lawyer to employ a "substituted judgment" model much more broadly
than is permitted by section 7.2 of the Rules of the Chief Judge or by the
guidelines we now adopt, and that the judges value that model because it
seems to insure that they will get as much information as possible.
There are a number of ways to address such concerns. First, if the
child's lawyer engages in effective counseling, makes appropriate determina-
tions regarding a client's incapacity and/or the risk of grave physical harm,
and avoids making frivolous arguments, judges should not be faced with a
child's lawyer who is advocating for a result that would place the child at risk
of serious harm. In any event, the judge can choose to reject the lawyer's
arguments.
Moreover, the evidence the judge requires will be presented by lawyers
representing other, highly adversarial parties. If those lawyers are ineffec-
tive, the judge has the option of soliciting additional evidence; indeed, appel-
late courts have instructed judges to do precisely that when important evi-
dence has not been produced. Finally, with promulgation of Rule 7.2, and
adoption of the state bar standards, a new era of child advocacy in New York
has officially begun, and there is no turning back.
[Vol. 36390
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 2011 Legislative Session, Connecticut took a tremendous
step forward by giving children involved in child protection proceedings
"real" attorneys through Public Act 11-51 .' Ironically, in the very same act,
it took an immense step backward by eliminating the very agency responsi-
ble for proposing and shepherding this enactment through the legislature, and
just six years earlier, created to ensure the quality of children's attorneys.2
While this article's focus is not the effect of the current budget crisis on state
agencies and not-for-profit organizations serving the poor, the recent expe-
rience of Connecticut and its stalled effort to provide quality legal represen-
tation to children and indigent parents in child protection cases highlights the
fragility of the commitment to legal representation as a means to hold the
child welfare system accountable. Providing client-directed attorneys for
children consistent with the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct and
the American Bar Association's (ABA's) Model Act Governing the Repre-
sentation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings
(Model Act) is a critical measure for improving legal protection for children
involved with the state's child welfare agency. However, it must be accom-
panied by an adequate system of attorney compensation and accountability to
* Carolyn Signorelli is currently an Assistant Attorney General in charge of Special
Projects for the Child Protection Department of the Office of the Attorney General in Con-
necticut. She is the former Chief Child Protection Attorney for the State of Connecticut where
she spent five years from March of 2006 until June 30, 2011, working to create a new agency
devoted to improving legal representation for children and parents in child protection proceed-
ings.
1. See 2011 Conn. Acts 18-19 (Reg. Sess.).
2. Compare id. at 2, with 2005 Conn. Acts 26-27 (Spec. Sess.).
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achieve its promise of a true voice for children with the court and the child
welfare agency.
Public Act 11-51 section 17 eliminates Connecticut's requirement that
counsel for children in neglect, abuse, and termination of parental rights pro-
ceedings serve in a dual capacity as attorney and guardian ad litem (GAL).
It clearly defines the attorney role consistent with the Connecticut Rules of
Professional Conduct by stating: "Counsel for the child shall act solely as
attorney for the child." This amendment is the product of the author's de-
3. See 2011 Conn. Acts 18.
4. Id. The following is the version of section 17 of Public Act 11-51 with the additions
and deletions to the former General Statutes of Connecticut section 46b-129a, thus demon-
strating the amendments:
(2) [a] (A) A child shall be represented by counsel knowledgeable about
representing such children who shall be [appointed by the court] assigned to
represent the child [and to act as guardian ad litem for the child.] by the office of
Chief Public Defender, or appointed by the court if there is an immediate need for
the appointment of counsel during a court proceeding. The court shall give the par-
ties prior notice of such assignment or appointment. Counsel for the child shall act
solely as attorney for the child.
(B) If a child requiring assignment of counsel in a proceeding under section 46b-
129, as amended by this act, is represented by an attorney for a minor child in an
ongoing probate or family matter proceeding, the court may appoint the attorney to
represent the child in the proceeding under section 46b-129, as amended by this act,
provided (i) such counsel is knowledgeable about representing such children, and
(ii) the court notifies the office of Chief Public Defender of the appointment. Any
child who is subiect to an ongoing probate or family matters proceeding who has
been appointed a guardian ad litem in such proceeding shall be assigned a separate
guardian ad litem in a proceeding under section 46b-129, as amended by this act, if
it is deemed necessary pursuant to subparagraph (D) of this subdivision.
(C) The primary role of any counsel for the child [including the counsel who also
serves as guardian ad litem,] shall be to advocate for the child in accordance with
the Rules of Professional Conduct. [When a conflict arises between the child's
wishes or position and that which counsel for the child believes is in the best inter-
est of the child, the court shall appoint another person as guardian ad litem for the
child.]
(D) If the court, based on evidence before it, or counsel for the child, determines
that the child cannot adequately act in his or her own best interests and the child's
wishes, as determined by counsel, if followed, could lead to substantial physical, fi-
nancial or other harm to the child unless protective action is taken, counsel may re-
quest and the court may order that a separate guardian ad litem be assigned for the
child, in which case the court shall either appoint a guardian ad litem to serve on a
voluntary basis or notify the office of Chief Public Defender who shall assign a
separate guardian ad litem for the child. The guardian ad litem shall [speak on be-
half] perform an independent investigation of the case and may present at any hear-
ing information pertinent to the court's determination of the best [interest] interests
of the child. [and] The guardian ad litem shall be subiect to cross-examination
upon the request of opposing counsel. The guardian ad litern is not required to be
an attorney-at-law but shall be knowledgeable about the needs and protection of
children and relevant court procedures. [In the event that] If a separate guardian ad
litem is [appointed] assigned, the person previously serving as [both] counsel [and
guardian ad litem] for the child shall continue to serve as counsel for the child and a
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termination that client-directed representation for children was essential to a
strategy to improve representation for children subject to neglect, abuse, and
termination of parental rights petitions filed in juvenile court by the Depart-
ment of Children and Families (DCF).5 What follows is a story that starts
somewhere in the middle of Connecticut's twisted and broken road towards
quality legal representation for children and parents in child welfare proceed-
ings.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CHILD PROTECTION
ATTORNEY
The story of this legislation began when the general assembly created
the Commission on Child Protection (COCP) during the 2005 Legislative
Session through Public Act 05-3 sections 44 through 47.6 The decision to
create this Commission was a culmination of several factors, not the least of
which was a lawsuit brought by the Juvenile Matters Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion (JMTLA) against the Judicial Department for violating the rights of their
indigent clients by not adequately paying court-appointed counsel. While
the lawsuit was dismissed on standing grounds, the conclusion of district
court Judge Christopher Droney essentially directed the Judicial Department
and the legislature to address the issues raised by the suit:
Although the pay structure for appointed counsel representing
indigent families and children in the Connecticut state courts may
result in inadequate resources for effective representation in par-
different person shall be [appointed] assigned as guardian ad litem, unless the court
for good cause also [appoints] determines that a different person should serve as
counsel for the child, in which case the court shall notify the office of Chief Public
Defender who shall assign a different person as counsel for the child. No person
who has served as both counsel and guardian ad litem for a child shall thereafter
serve solely as the child's guardian ad litem.
Id. at 18-19.
5. The author was appointed as Connecticut's first Chief Child Protection Attorney,
head of the Commission on Child Protection, on March 31, 2006. See Thomas B. Scheffey,
Training Now a Must for All Children's Lawyers, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 16, 2012, http://www.ct
lawtribune.com/getarticle.aspx?id=40982. Early on, the author was invited by CT Voices for
Children, Casey Family Services, and DCF to listen to different groups of foster youth about
their experiences with courts and attorneys. Her own experience in court as an Assistant
Attorney General representing DCF and the stories of the youth helped to shape her decision
that clearly defining the role of counsel for children as a traditional client-directed attorney
was critical to improving representation.
6. 2005 Conn. Acts 25-27.




: Nova Law Review 36, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2012
NOVA LAW REVIEW
ticular cases, the Association has not shown that it has standing to
make that claim in this case. This Court is bound by the constitu-
tional and prudential requirements of standing, and cannot permit
cases to proceed which do not meet those requirements. Of
course, the decision here on the standing of the Association does
not mean that other parties could not raise these issues in this
Court or the Connecticut Superior Court. Finally, it may very well
be that an administrative or legislative review of the issues raised
in this suit may be an appropriate course.8
That decision came out on March 28, 2005, and the legislation passed during
a special session in June 2005.' The intent was to create an independent
agency devoted to improving attorney services for children and indigent par-
ents in child protection matters.'o The Act provided for the appointment of a
Chief Child Protection Attorney (CCPA) by an eleven member COCP." The
CCPA was responsible for providing a system of state-paid legal representa-
tion in juvenile and family matters and ensuring the quality of that represen-
tation. 12 While the primary impetus of this legislation was the problems with
the system of legal representation in neglect, abuse, and termination of pa-
rental rights cases, the administration of billing for state-paid attorneys in
family matters cases-including attorneys for minor children and GALs for
children of indigent divorce and custody litigants-was also transitioned to
the CCPA.'3 The legislation called for the CCPA to:
(3) Establish training, practice and caseload standards for the re-
presentation of children, youths, indigent respondents and indigent
legal parties pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection. Such
standards shall apply to each attorney who represents children,
youths, indigent respondents or indigent legal parties pursuant to
this section and shall be designed to ensure a high quality of legal
representation. The training standards for attorneys required by
this subdivision shall be designed to ensure proficiency in the pro-
cedural and substantive law related to such matters and to establish
a minimum level of proficiency in relevant subject areas, includ-
8. Id. at 251.
9. See id. at 239; see generally 2005 Conn. Acts.
10. See 2005 Conn. Acts 26.
11. Id. at 25-26.
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ing, but not limited to, family violence, child development, beha-
vioral health, educational disabilities and cultural competence.1
A. Step One: Standards of Practice
In order to address the issue of practice standards, the author established
two working groups to conform the Standards of Practice for Parent Repre-
sentation and the NA CC's Model Standards for Representation of Children
(NACC Standards) to Connecticut law.15 The working groups consisted of
volunteer judges, child advocates, lawyers, and law professors who began
their work in the Summer of 2006.16 At this time, most case law in Connect-
icut regarding the respective roles of counsel for minor children and GALs
arose from dissolution and custody actions.17 In 2003, the appellate court in
In re Tayquon H.,'8 decided the first child protection case outlining the au-
thority and function of a separate GAL in the context of a child protection
proceeding.'9 While In re Tayquon H. focused on whether the authority of a
separate GAL for a minor parent usurped the authority of the minor parent's
biological parent in the neglect proceedings, it also analyzed the historical
distinctions between counsel and GALs. 20 In its discussion, the court relied
on decisions in family matter cases, even though the statutory scheme for
appointment of counsel and GALs in child protection proceedings under
section 46b-129a of the General Statutes of Connecticut as very different
than those in family matter proceedings where authority was derived from
section 46b-54 to appoint a separate attorney.2 ' A probate court statute, sec-
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-123d(a)(3) (2011).
15. CAROLYN SIGNORELLI, COMM'N OF CHILD PROTECTION, THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE CHIEF CHILD PROTECTION ATTORNEY 27 (2007) [hereinafter SIGNORELLI, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ct.gov/ccpa/lib/ccpa/TheFirstAnnualReport_12-3-
07.pdf.
16. See id.; COMM'N ON CHILD PROT. STATE OF CONN., CONN. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
FOR Arr'Ys & GUARDIANS AD LITEM REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROT. CASES 2 (2006)
[hereinafter CONN. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE], available at http://www.ct.gov/ccpallib/ccpal
final standardskids_12-27-06.doc.
17. See Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 677, 688 (Conn. 1998) (explaining that an at-
torney for a child should be heard regarding the child's best interests, as an attorney would be
"arguing on behalf of his or her client, based on the evidence in the case and the applicable
law ... in a similar manner as most other attorneys are heard, that is, through such methods as
written briefs, questioning of witnesses, oral arguments, and other proceedings that take place
during the course of a trial"); see also Schult v. Schult, 699 A.2d 134, 139 (Conn. 1997) (cit-
ing Knock v. Knock, 621 A.2d 267, 275 (Conn. 1993)).
18. 821 A.2d 796 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
19. Id. at 799, 803.
20. Id. at 802-07.
21. Id. at 802-04, 807.
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tion 45a-620, provided discretion to appoint a separate GAL.22 This cross-
citing was concerning because of the very different legal rights and interests
at stake for children in child protection proceedings who are considered par-
ties to the case, as compared to the interests of children in custody battles.23
It became alarming in July of 2005, when the family court case, Carrubba v.
Moskowit, 24 was decided. The court described the role of an attorney ap-
pointed as counsel for a minor child in dissolution actions as follows:
Of course, we recognize that such attorneys perform a hybrid role
because of their simultaneous duty to function as an advocate for
the child. That function, however, must always be subordinated to
the attorney's duty to serve the best interests of the child. -Even
when an attorney for the minor child functions less as a guardian
ad litem and more as an advocate because of factors such as the
child's advanced age, maturity level and ability to articulate her
preferences, the shifting of the balance from an objective evaluator
of the child's best interests to personal advocate happens because
those factors increase the likelihood that the child is able accurate-
ly to identify and to make choices to pursue her own best interests
independently, without the aid of an objective assistant to the
court. Thus, even the advocacy role of the appointed attorney for
the minor child may be reconciled with the attorney's primary du-
ty-to assist the court in serving the best interests of the child.
The Working Group on the Connecticut Standards of Practice for At-
torneys & Guardians ad Litem Representing Children in Child Protection
Cases determined that since the appellate court in In re Tayquon H. had refe-
renced the need for courts to define the roles and duties of counsel and GALs
on a case by case basis "absent firm guidelines from [the] legislature or other
sources," and since the legislature had granted the CCPA the authority to
promulgate practice standards, our standards would seek to reinforce and
clarify the role of counsel as that of a client-directed attorney.26 This had to
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-620 (2011).
23. See In re Tayquon H., 821 A.2d at 801-02, 807 n.20. The author recognizes that
several interests coincide for children in dissolution and custody actions and children in neg-
lect proceedings, such as safety, continuity of care, stability of placement and maintenance of
family relationships. However, in child protection cases where the state is a party and poten-
tial custodian, the stakes for children are even greater and the enforcement of rights while in
foster care, even more critical.
24. 877 A.2d 773 (Conn. 2005).
25. Id. at 783.
26. In re Tayquon H., 821 A.2d at 807 n.20 (alteration in original); CONN. STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 1, 4.
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be done within the boundaries of the existing appointment statute.27 The
Working Group therefore focused on the statute's provision: "The primary
role of any counsel for the child including the counsel who also serves as
guardian ad litem, shall be to advocate for the child in accordance with the
[Connecticut] Rules of Professional Conduct."28 It also sought to provide
guidelines for assessing best interest and whether or not a conflict existed
through objective criteria. The Working Group was provided the NACC
Standards as well as the reports from the Fordham Proceedings of the Confe-
rence on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, and the
Draft UNLV Recommendations of the Conference on Representing Children
in Families to assist in the task.29
Under the heading Role of Attorney/GAL for Minor Child, the Con-
necticut Standards of Practice for Attorneys & Guardians ad Litem
Representing Children in Child Protection Cases provides:
Under Connecticut's framework of dual representation for a minor
child in juvenile matters, as set forth in [General Statutes of Con-
necticut section] 46b-129a(2) and discussed in In re Tayquon H.
. . . , the attorney/GAL for a child must attempt to provide tradi-
tional client-directed representation whenever possible. To that
end the attorney/GAL must assess the child's competency to rend-
er decisions concerning the objectives of representation and his or
her own best interest. Only when it is determined that the child
client does not have such competency or has diminished capacity
can an attorney/GAL substitute his or her objective determination
of the child's best interest and request a separate GAL due to the
existence of a conflict.30
By bringing the need to assess competency into the standards, since it
was absent from the statute, the Working Group attempted to address the
27. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129a.
28. Id. § 46b-129a(2).
29. SIGNORELLI, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 27; CONN. STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 34 nn.5, 7; see generally STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS
WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES 8 (Nat'l Ass'n of Counsel for Child-
ren, Revised Version 1999) [hereinafter REVISED STANDARDS OF PRACTICE]; JAMES BELL ET
AL., REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON DETERMINING THE CHILD'S CAPACITY TO MAKE
DECISIONS, reprinted in 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1339 (1996); NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR
CHILDREN, NACC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE &
NEGLECT CASES (2001), available at http://www.naccchildiaw.org/resource/resmgr/docs/
nacc standards-andrecommend.pdf; Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on
Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 6
NEV. L.J. 592 (2006).
30. CONN. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 4.
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existing practice of substituting the attorney's assessment of best interest for
all children's expressed wishes. The commentary went on to explain:
These [s]tandards explicitly recognize that the child is a separate
individual with potentially discrete and independent views. To en-
sure that the child's independent voice is heard, the child's attorney
must advocate the child's articulated position. Consequently, the
child's attorney owes traditional duties to the child as client. Con-
sistent with Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14, "Client with Dimi-
nished Capacity" the attorney/GAL must seek the appointment of a
guardian only when a client's ability to make an adequately consi-
dered decision is diminished.3
The aspect of the statute that was difficult to reconcile with the Con-
necticut Rules of Professional Conduct was its provision of a subjective test
for determining the existence of a conflict, requiring a separate GAL when-
ever the child's wishes or position varied from that which counsel believed
was in his or her client's best interest.32 With no express requirement that a
child's capacity be assessed before an attorney could substitute his or her
own view of best interest and no statutory framework, case law, or training
on deciphering a particular child's best interest from an objective standpoint,
many children were not having their perspectives presented to the court in a
manner consistent with the traditional duties of competency, diligence, loyal-
ty, zealousness, and confidentiality. 3 3 While the NACC Standards attempted
to accomplish this, the statute's language was very limiting and of course
took precedence over the standards.34 Attorneys continued to substitute their
judgment for their client's expressed wishes, to treat their role as that of best
interest advocate, and to assert they could adequately represent their client's
wishes simply by stating them on the record and then defer to the GAL to
advocate for his or her subjective view of best interest. Many attorneys be-
31. Id.; see CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2011).
32. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129a (2005) ("When a conflict arises between the
child's wishes or position and that which counsel for the child believes is in the best interest of
the child, the court shall appoint another person as guardian ad litem for the child."), with
CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14, and CONN. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note
16, at 4-5.
33. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129a, with CONN. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, Supra
note 16, at 4, and ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. ET AL., THEIR DAY IN COURT: ENSURING ADEQUATE
REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES CASES (2006),
available at http://www.caseyfamilyservices.org/userfiles/pdf/ec-2006-day-in-court-program.
pdf.
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lieve the appointment in a dual capacity permitted them to express their
client's wishes and simultaneously advocate for what the attorney believed to
be in their client's best interest. As a result, a legislative amendment was
needed to clarify the role of counsel and ensure each child in neglect and
abuse proceedings received an advocate and advisor bound by the Connecti-
cut Rules of Professional Conduct.
B. Step Two: Educating Stakeholders About the Importance of the Child's
Voice in Child Protection Proceedings
While the CCPA was a very new image in the Connecticut child advo-
cacy landscape in 2006, the existence of the position helped focus some addi-
tional attention on the issue of children's rights in child protection proceed-
ings. Existing advocacy organizations that were influential in the legisla-
ture's decision to establish the COCP collaborated with the CCPA to contin-
ue the momentum of the new agency. On November 20, 2006, The Annie
E. Casey Foundation/Casey Family Services, Connecticut Voices for Child-
ren (CT Voices) and the President Pro Tempore of Connecticut's Senate held
a symposium at the Capitol called "Their Day in Court: Ensuring Adequate
Representation for Children and Parents in Child Protective Services Cas-
es."36 The main theme of the day outlined in the symposium brochure was a
recognition of the legislature's "important first step in tackling the critical
issue of how best to ensure that children and parents involved in child protec-
tion proceedings have adequate legal representation by establishing the
Commission on Child Protection" and the need to support its mission.37 The
brochure, as well as many speakers that day, went on to sow the seed for the
importance of client-directed attorneys for children: "These complicated
legal decisions are best made when all parties have the benefit of zealous and
competent legal counsel as required by law and professional ethics."38
In the Fall of 2006, at the request of its President and COCP member,
Shelley Geballe, CT Voices took over a research project the author had un-
dertaken to examine the most effective means to provide legal representa-
tion; and in March of 2007, published with Yale's Legislative Services pro-
gram, a white paper entitled Giving Families a Chance: Necessary Reforms
for the Adequate Representation of Connecticut's Children and Families in
35. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. ET AL., supra note 33.
36. Id. Co-sponsors included the COCP, Center for Children's Advocacy, Connecticut
Bar Foundation James W. Cooper Fellows, Connecticut Jim Casey Youth Opportunities Initia-
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Child Abuse and Neglect Cases.39 While this paper focused on the need for
improved competency and an organizational model of representation as best
practice, it served as a valuable reminder to legislators about the importance
of the work.4 0 The CCPA and the Judicial Department's Court Improvement
Program Coordinator, Marilou T. Giovannucci, collaborated to bring Andrea
Khoury, Assistant Director of Child Welfare for the National Child Welfare
Resource Center and Director of the ABA's Youth at Risk Bar-Youth Em-
powerment Project, to Connecticut. Attorney Khoury spent a day presenting
to lawyers and judges about the importance of children attending court and
participating in the formulation of their case goals through a traditional attor-
ney-client relationship. This training included former foster youth sharing
their experiences in an effort to help judges and lawyers understand the need
to give children in the system a meaningful voice. The author in the COCP's
First Annual Report pointed out to the Governor, legislators and the Judicial
Department how the current
statutory framework, which is tied to both federal funding re-
quirements and philosophical perspectives on the ability of minors
to enforce legal rights, has significant ethical and training implica-
tions for contract attorneys, as well as financial implications for
the COCP due to the number of separate GALs that are appointed
whenever an attorney/GAL perceives a conflict between their child
client's expressed or implied wishes and their client's best inter-
est.4 1
C. Step Three: Legislative Proposals
During the 2008 Legislative Session, the CCPA submitted a proposal to
amend section 46b-129a of the General Statutes of Connecticut, which was
voted on favorably by the Judiciary Committee and included in Senate Bill
325.42 This bill provided for a cut off at age seven, whereby attorneys would
no longer act in a dual capacity for children ages seven and older.43 This was
a compromise position based upon concerns raised by the Office of the Child
Advocate. The legislation actually passed in the Senate and was slated for a
39. See generally WILLIAM BOWEN ET AL., GIVING FAMILIES A CHANCE: NECESSARY
REFORMS FOR THE ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF CONNECTICUT'S CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (2007), available at http://www.ctkidslink.org/publicati
ons/welf07reformsforrep.pdf.
40. See id. at 3.
41. SIGNORELLI, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 16.
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vote on the consent calendar of the House on the last day of the session.'
Unfortunately, a controversial amendment was attached to it.45 By the time
the author convinced the proponent of the amendment not to call the
amendment, it was too late and the bill was never called. The author was
back to the drawing board in 2009.
In 2009, the proposal was contained in Senate Bill 1057.' Only five
entities submitted written testimony concerning the bill. 47 The Connecticut
Association of Nonprofits summarily opposed it without explanation and the
State of Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice opposed another technical
amendment of the bill that it mistakenly believed applied in delinquency
proceedings.48 Given that 2009 was a difficult budget session, the bill did
not make it out of committee.49
In 2009, the author published an article in the Connecticut Law Tribune
entitled When Children Are Clients: Ethical Dilemmas Emerge in Child
Protection Proceedings.0 This effort to "educate" the bar and others on the
issue may have backfired in that the family bar became aware of the CCPA's
agenda. Since the COCP's enabling legislation also referenced the need for
standards for state paid lawyers in family matters cases and the COCP was
responsible for "qualifying" attorneys and GALs to represent children in
divorce and custody matters when the parents were indigent, they were con-
cerned that the legislation would eventually extend to eliminate the "hybrid"
role of attorneys for minor children enunciated in Carrubba.5 ' Apparently
there was some backroom opposition mounted. In addition, the proposal was
now opposed by the very legislator who had originally introduced it in 2008.
44. Judiciary Committee, Bill Status Report on S.B. 325, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Feb.
26, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/CGABSPrint.asp?selBillType=
BiIl&billnum=SBOO325&whichyear-2008.
45. See S.B. 325, Feb. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2008) (amendment).
46. S.B. 1057, Jan. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009).
47. See Judiciary Committee, Public Hearing Testimony on S.B. 1057, CONN. GEN.
ASSEMBLY (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/menu/commdoctmybillall
comm.asp?bill=SB-01057&doc.year-2009.
48. See Div. of Criminal Justice, Testimony of the Division of Criminal Justice: S.B.
1057, at 3 (Mar. 2, 2009).
49. See Judiciary Committee, Bill Status Report on S.B. 1057, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY
(Feb. 26, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/CGABSPrint.asp?selBill
Type=3ill&billnum=SBI0 057&whichyear=2009.
50. Carolyn Signorelli, When Children Are Clients: Ethical Dilemmas Emerge in Child
Protection Proceedings, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 17, 2009, at 16.
51. 2007 Conn. Acts 3 (Reg. Sess.); Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 877 A.2d 773, 783 (Conn.
2005). "Upon a finding that a party is unable to afford counsel [in a family relations matter],
the judicial authority shall appoint . . . an attorney to provide representation from a list of
qualified attorneys provided by the Chief Child Protection Attorney." 2007 Conn. Acts 3.
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She expressed pessimism about the ability to form an attorney-client rela-
tionship with minors due to their poor judgment and inconsistent positions.
Also, some of the contract attorneys disagreed with a provision in the pro-
posal that allowed the court to raise the issue of a conflict or the need for a
separate GAL. The latter provision was a result of a compromise with the
Judicial Department, as well as concern over the fact that in 2008 DCF had
suggested this amendment to the bill. 52 The Judicial Department was con-
cerned about losing a best interest advocate.5 3 It wanted any amendment to
clarify that judges had the authority to appoint a GAL in the event counsel
for the child was not requesting one but that the court needed information
from an objective source.54 Courts were already appointing separate GALs
on occasion without a request from counsel for the child even though the
existing statute did not expressly authorize sua sponte appointments or
another party to raise the issue.55 In addition, the Supreme Court of Connect-
icut's decision in In re Christina M.56 held that courts did have an obligation
to appoint a separate GAL absent a request from counsel when there was
sufficient evidence on the record of a conflict." Since the critical goal of the
proposal was to secure a loyal and zealous advocate for each child's wishes
in the courtroom, and the language of the proposed amendment required a
finding of impaired judgment and risk of substantial harm, before the court
could exercise that discretion, from the author's perspective, it was an easy
concession to secure Judicial Department support. Unfortunately, even
with the Judicial Department's official support, reservations communicated
to the Judiciary Committee leadership by a fellow legislator resulted in the
proposal dying in committee.
After the 2011 defeat, in preparation for the 2011 Legislative Session,
the author attended a Connecticut Bar Association Family Section meeting in
order to explain the need for the amendment to section 46b-129a of the Gen-
eral Statutes of Connecticut on behalf of children involved with DCF, to
assure members of the family bar that the COCP had no intention of getting
52. Compare 2007 Conn. Acts 3, with Conn. Judiciary Committee Joint Favorable Re-
port, concerning Senate Bill No. 325, entitled "An Act Concerning the Commission on Child
Protection."
53. See generally An Act Concerning the Appointment of Counsel and Guardians ad
Litem in Child Protection Matters, and the Appointment of Permanent Legal Guardians:
Hearing on, H.B. 6442 Before the Judiciary Comm., Feb. Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2011) (testimony
of Christine E. Keller, Chief Administrative Judge for Juvenile Matters).
54. See id. at 1.
55. See id.
56. 908 A.2d 1073 (Conn. 2006).
57. Id. at 1086.
58. See S.B. 1057, Jan. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009).
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involved in the role of counsel debate in the dissolution and custody context,
and to answer any questions they had. 9 The author also undertook to revital-
ize the all but defunct Children and the Law Committee of the Connecticut
Bar Association (CBA).6 Given the fact that the COCP's legislative agenda
had garnered more attention and opposition since 2008 when it almost quiet-
ly passed into law and the lack of a constant presence on the legislative lob-
bying floor, the author determined that it would be critical to gain support
from the CBA House of Delegates and its lobbying efforts.6' The Secretary
of the JMTLA, who was the instigator of the suit against the Judicial De-
partment and a major proponent of the establishment of the Commission,
Douglas Monaghan, agreed to volunteer with the CBA to serve as the new
Chair of the Committee.62 At the first meeting of the "new" Children and the
Law Committee, the proposal to amend section 46b-129a of the General
Statutes of Connecticut-to provide traditional client-directed representa-
tion-became part of the Committee's legislative agenda along with, the
advocacy for the COCP's budget in order to ensure the improvements put in
place continued and for a new permanency option to termination of parental
rights-permanent guardianship. 63 In fact, the Committee voted to amend
the proposal to eliminate the seven-year age cutoff. The Committee re-
quested a favorable vote from the CBA House of Delegates, and without any
opposition from the Family Law Section, the request passed at the January
10, 2011 meeting of the House of Delegates.64
With the lobbying efforts of the CBA and the unanimous support at the
public hearing held on February 28, 2011, House Bill 6442 progressed
59. CHILDREN & THE LAW COMM., CONN. BAR Ass'N, MINUTES OF COMMITTEE MEETING
MAR. 10, 2011 (2011), available at https://www.ctbar.org/userfiles/Committees/ChildrenAnd
TheLaw/Minutes/03-11-201 1.pdf.
60. See Douglas Monaghan, Child Welfare and Juvenile Law Committee, CONN. BAR
ASS'N, https://www.ctbar.org/Sections%20Committees/Committees/ChildWelfareAndJuvenile
Law.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
61. See CAROLYN SIGNORELLI, COMM'N OF CHILD PROTECTION, THE SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE CHIEF CHILD PROTECTION ATTORNEY 27-28 (2009), available at http://www.
ct.gov/ccpallib/ccpa/CCPASecondAnnualReportFY_.2008.pdf. This strategy had proven
very successful in the 2007 budget session when the CBA supported increasing the COCP
budget to secure an hourly compensation rate for child protection attorneys. See SIGNORELLI,
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 35.
62. See Monaghan, supra note 60.
63. See CHILDREN & THE LAW COMM., CONN. BAR Ass'N, MINUTES OF COMMITTEE
MEETING OCT. 28, 2010 (2010), available at https://www.ctbar.orgluserfiles/Committees/
ChildrenAndTheLawlMinutes/1 0-28-201 0.pdf.
64. See CHILDREN & THE LAW COMM., CONN. BAR Ass'N, MINUTES OF COMMITTEE
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through the session. 5 One of its selling points during this extremely dire
budget session was the fact that if the proposed standard for appointing a
separate GAL-specifically requiring that the conflict concern substantial
harm and a finding of impaired capacity-was implemented, fewer separate
GALs would be appointed.6 This would translate into a cost savings. It
appears this argument did resonate with legislators because instead of per-
mitting the potential cost savings to remain in the budget for the program of
legal representation, which was deficient, an amount equal to the estimated
cost savings was subtracted from the Child Protection Commission's budget
for GALs.67 This approach was fortuitous of the unfortunate turn of events
when House Bill 6442 was subsumed into the budget bill Public Act 11-51,
which consolidated the COCP into the Public Defender's Commission. 68 So
while the COCP died, one of its most important initiatives finally survived
the legislative session and became law.69
III. CONCLUSION
So while it remains to be seen under the new leadership of the system of
legal representation in child protection cases how this new law will be im-
plemented, the passage of this legislation remains a positive development in
child welfare law in Connecticut. Hopefully, by joining the list of states that
65. See e.g., An Act Concerning the Appointment of Counsel and Guardians ad Litem in
Child Protection Matters, and the Appointment of Permanent Legal Guardians: Hearing on
H.B. 6442 Before the Judiciary Comm., Feb. Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2011) (testimony of Carolyn
Signorelli, Chief Child Protection Att'y for the State of Conn.). Each legislative session the
author drafted extensive written testimony explaining the inherent conflict created by the dual
capacity appointment and how that diminished the voice of children in child protection pro-
ceedings. The testimony also cited to the ABA Model Act, the Conferences at Fordham and
UNLV and the NACC and ABA Standards of Practice. See id. at 4 n.6. In 2011, borrowing
from the ABA's Litigation Section, Children's Rights Committee's Video on giving children a
true voice (with permission), the author put together a PowerPoint presentation on "Why
Lawyer's for Children in Child Protection Matters Should Always Provide Client-Directed
Representation," and provided it to legislators. Presentation by Carolyn Signorelli, Chief
Child Prot. Att'y, Why Lawyers for Children in Child Protection Matters Should Always
Provide Client-Directed Representation, to State Legislatures (Oct. 19, 2011) (on file with
Nova Law Review).
66. See Conn. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary Comm., H.B. 6442 (2011) Staff Analysis (Reg.
Sess. 2011), http://cga.ct.gov/201I/FN/201 IHB-06442-R000704-FN.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2012); OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, SUMMARY OF 2011 PUBLIC
ACTS 80 (2011), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/olr/Documents/year/PASUMBK/
201IPASUMBK-20111212_Summary%20of%20201l%2OPublic%2OActs.pdf.
67. See Conn. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary Comm., H.B. 6442 (2011) Staff Analysis.
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have client-directed attorneys for children, Connecticut will contribute to the
momentum behind the ABA's passage of the Model Act and more states will
follow suit. For those states or programs considering adopting the Model
Act or similar legislation, the author hopes this article will provide some
important lessons about identifying and educating potential opponents and
navigating the vagaries of the legislative process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than 400,000 children currently in the custody of state-run
foster care systems,' and for over a million more who will become subjects
of dependency court litigation in the next decade, 2 the American Bar Associ-
* Associate Director, Children's Rights (www.childrensrights.org), New York, N.Y.;
J.D., Boston University School of Law. The authors would like to thank Bea Paterno for her
invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
** Independent consultant to child-serving non-profit organizations (www.erikpitchal.
com); Lecturer in Law, Northeastern University; J.D., Yale Law School.
1. Based on data from fifty states, 408,425 children were in the custody of state-run
foster care systems on September 30, 2010. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL.,
THE AFCARS REPORT 1 (2011), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-res
earch/afcars/tar/reportl 8.htm.
2. Based on data from forty-three states, 17.6% of child victims had court actions in
2009. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009 85 (2009),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm09/cmO9.pdf. In the same year, an
estimated "702,000 ... children were victims of maltreatment." Id. at 21. Additionally, an
estimated 98,339 child victims had court actions in 2009. Id. at 93. If the maltreatment num-
82
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss2/1
NOVA IAW REVIEW
ation's (ABA's) 2011 Model Act Governing the Representation of Children
in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings' (2011 Model Act) offers
tremendous hope. To be sure, the 2011 Model Act is a ringing reaffirmation
of the ABA's 1996 pronouncement of what child advocacy should look like.4
However, the 2011 Model Act is also a concession by the ABA that the
promulgation of standards of practice was insufficient to convince states to
actually provide adequate, effective, and zealous counsel to all children in
the child welfare system.5 With the 2011 Model Act, the ABA now takes the
official policy position that states should implement a very specific approach
to child representation-one that guarantees that all children in dependency
cases are provided a lawyer who is well trained, decently paid, committed to
the fundamental principles of lawyering, and who has a reasonable caseload.
Unquestionably, the practice of child welfare law has matured greatly in
the forty years since the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act first
required states to provide a "guardian ad litem" to all children in dependency
cases, as a mandate in exchange for each state's receipt of federal financial
support for child abuse programs.7 Most states now require the appointment
of a lawyer in these circumstances,' and a variety of professional organiza-
tions, 9 training programs,'0 academic scholarship," and financial resources
bers stay consistent, 983,390 child victims will have court actions over the next ten years. See
id.
3. See generally MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE,
NEGLECT, & DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS (2011) [hereinafter 2011 Model Act].
4. Compare id., with STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT
CHILDREN IN ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES (1996) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF PRACTICE].
5. Sadly, there has not yet been any clear action at the federal level, either through spe-
cific federal legislation or through the judicial recognition of a federal constitutional right to
counsel for children in all dependency proceedings.
6. 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, §§ 1-4.
7. Child Abuse Prevention & Treatment Act (CAPTA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, §
4(b)(2)(G), 88 Stat. 4, 7.
8. See CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010).
9. Among other organizations that support the development of child welfare law and its
practice are the NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, NACC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 5 (2001), available at http:/l
www.naccchildlaw.org/resource/resmgr/docs/nacc-standardsandrecommend.pdf; About the
Center, A.B.A. CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE L., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/childlaw
.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012); Children's Rights Litigation Committee, A.B.A. SEC. OF
LITIG., http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/about.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2012).
10. Noteworthy training opportunities in child welfare law include the NACC's Annual
Child Welfare, Juvenile and Family Law Conference, Red Book Trainings, and Curriculum
Development. See David Lansner, The National Conference on Children and the Law, A.B.A.
SEC. OF LITIG. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/c
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are now available to support this advocacy work. The National Association
of Counsel for Children (NACC), based in Denver, has over 2000 mem-
bers-mostly child welfare lawyers and judges-and offers a certification
program in thirty-one states, providing experienced attorneys an appropriate
credential to show the world their expertise in child welfare law and elevate
the reputation of the profession generally.12
Despite this progress, states' performance in implementing the Stan-
dards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse & Neglect
Cases (ABA Standards) lags. In a recent national report card by First Star
and Children's Advocacy Institution (CAI),13 assessing the degree to which
states are fulfilling the promise of counsel for children, researchers deter-
mined that only eleven states earned an "A." 4 Fifteen states earned a "D" or
"F," and roughly one-third of the states do not require the appointment of
counsel at all.' 5 Notably, the First Star and CAI report card only analyzed
the law, not its implementation.16 Anecdotally, children's lawyers around the
nation-even in those states that earned an "A" on the First Star and CAI
report card-regularly complain that they have far too many cases, not
enough training, and inadequate pay. 7 In short, it is well known in this field,
if not openly recognized within the legal profession, that well-meaning and
ontent/articles/fall20 11 -national-conference-children-law.html; Trainings, Accreditation and
Assessments FAQs, NACC, http://www.naccchildlaw.org/?page=FactSheet (last visited Feb.
26, 2012).
11. The scholarship in the area of child representation is extensive. See, e.g., CHILD
WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN
ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES (Donald N. Duquette & Ann M. Haralambie eds.,
2d ed. 2010); Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical
Reflections on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 573 (2008); Michael J.
Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency and Termina-
tion of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida: The Issue Updated, 35 NOVA L. REv. 305
(2011); Martin Guggenheim, How Children's Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 805
(2006); Merril Sobie, The Child Client: Representing Children in Child Protective Proceed-
ings, 22 ToURo L. REv. 745 (2006); Jane Spinak, When Did Lawyers for Children Stop Read-
ing Goldstein, Freud and Solnit? Lessons from the Twentieth Century on Best Interests and
the Role of the Child Advocate, 41 FAM. L.Q. 393 (2007).
12. Become an NACC Certified Child Welfare Law Specialist, NACC, http://www.naccc
hildlaw.org/?page=Certification (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
13. FIRST STAR & CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INST., A CHILD's RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN
(2d ed. 2009), available at http://www.caichildlaw.org/MisclFinalRTC_2ndEdition_1r.pdf.
14. Id. at 8.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id. at 13-14.
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talented lawyers who want to do the right thing for their child-clients are
nonetheless committing malpractice every day.
At the very least, the 2011 Model Act provides an opportunity for re-
newed attention, energy, and commitment to the principle that every child
who is the subject of an abuse or neglect petition should have an effective
lawyer at all stages of his or her experience in the dependency courts." With
its passage, advocates are well poised to press legislatures and court officials
in many states to enact its language and fulfill its promises. Any state that
adopts the 2011 Model Act is likely to earn an "A" on the next report card.
Importantly, the question remains whether an "A" for excellence in leg-
islative drafting translates to something meaningful for children on the
ground. Certainly, successful implementation will depend on who is in-
volved in the translation effort and what steps they take. This essay de-
scribes one radical, systemic transformation of child advocacy-one that was
inspired by the ABA Standards-and pushed in part by impact litigation-
and how it happened. Because this change was grounded in core principles
that later found animation in the 2011 Model Act, the story of how this over-
haul happened may be instructive for those jurisdictions interested in imple-
menting the 2011 Model Act. This is the story of the Kenny A. ex rel. Winn
v. Perduel9 litigation.
II. ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Anyone familiar with the American child welfare system knows of the
significant challenges state and local governments have faced over the last
forty years in safely and effectively caring for foster children.20 While a full
recitation of the often sorry state of public child welfare systems is beyond
the scope of this essay, it is worth noting that Kenny A.'s right-to-counsel
narrative is part of a broader story of a failing foster care system in metropol-
itan Atlanta. As they had done successfully in many other jurisdictions, in
2002, lawyers from the national non-profit advocacy group, Children's
Rights-in conjunction with prominent local counsel 21-brought a class ac-
18. See 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 3(a).
19. 218 F.R.D. 277 (N.D. Ga. 2003). The authors were part of the team of lawyers who
represented the plaintiff foster children in Kenny A. Id. at 283. No confidential or privileged
material is described in this essay.
20. See, e.g., First Star Foster Children Issues and News: Foster Care Challenge Con-
tinues, FIRST STAR (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.firststar.orglabout-first-star/first-star-newsfeed
/itemid/355/vw/l.aspx.
21. The authors would be remiss if they did not recognize the extraordinary contribution
of Jeffrey 0. Bramlett, an attorney and partner at the firm of Bondurant Mixson & Elmore,
L.L.P. in Atlanta, who has continued to serve as co-lead counsel from the very beginning of
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tion suit on behalf of all 3000 foster children in the custody of Georgia's
child welfare agency whose cases originated in Fulton and DeKalb Coun-
ties.22 The claims that would become known as the "state case" alleged that
as a direct result of systemic agency failures, Georgia officials-in their offi-
cial capacities-were violating the federal constitutional and statutory rights
of children to be safe while in state custody in foster care, to receive required
services, and to be provided opportunities for and efforts toward finding a
permanent home.23 As with Children's Rights' other cases, the allegations
lodged against the Georgia system were deservedly explosive: Children who
had been removed from their parents' homes for their own safety were being
severely abused, horribly neglected, denied basic health care and educational
services, and left to languish for years if not their entire childhood in state
custody.24 The complaint laid out the utter brokenness of the State's De-
partment of Human Resources and its statewide Division of Family and
Children's Services, as operated in metropolitan Atlanta (Fulton and DeKalb
Counties).25
Of course, no child ends up in foster care without the approval of a ju-
venile court judge; and as plaintiffs' counsel investigated the problems in the
Atlanta area foster care system, they discovered that the provision of counsel
for foster children in the Atlanta juvenile courts was illusory.26 Indeed, those
charged with protecting individual foster children's interests during the pen-
dency of their child protection cases in juvenile court-the "child advocate
attorneys"-were unable to perform the minimum duties one might expect of
them, due to crushing caseloads of 500 or more children per lawyer.27 The
children were thus "caught in the grip of an uncaring, unconstitutional vice
the Kenny A. reform campaign, and actively illustrates the power of partnership between the
private bar and public interest organizations in civil rights reform litigation.
22. First Amended Complaint exh. A at 14, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D.
277 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS), available at http://www.childrensrights.org
/wp-content/uploads//2009/01/2003-08 20_amendedcomplaint file stamped.pdf; see also
Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at 283. Kenny A. was originally filed in state court, although it included
federal claims. Notice of Removal at 1-2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS). Shortly after it was filed, the defendants re-
moved the matter to federal court. Id.; Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at 284. Plaintiffs later filed an
amended complaint. First Amended Complaint, supra at 1.
23. First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 3-6, 34-37; see Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at
283.
24. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 3-5.
25. See generally id.
26. See id. at 5, 48-50; Erik Pitchal, Children's Constitutional Right to Counsel in De-
pendency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 663, 668-69 (2006).
27. First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 5; Pitchal, supra note 26, at 669.
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where even their own putative advocates were unable to help them."28 Ad-
vocates for children in metropolitan Atlanta were galvanized by the need for
significant reform in the representation of children in the juvenile court.
Because Georgia law makes each of the 159 counties responsible for provid-
ing lawyers in juvenile court proceedings to litigants who cannot afford
them, plaintiffs in Kenny A. named Fulton and DeKalb Counties as defen-
dants, in addition to state officials. 29 The right-to-counsel aspect of the law-
suit thus became known as the "county case."
The county case was aggressively litigated. During discovery, plaintiffs
deposed several key leaders in the counties, including the Fulton County
Juvenile Court Administrator and the Chief Judge of the DeKalb County
Juvenile Court.30 Plaintiffs' counsel also deposed child advocate attorneys
from each county, learning more details about their inability to, among other
things, meet each client on their caseload and conduct robust, independent
investigations of each case.3 ' One of the attorneys characterized the task of
meeting with each child client as "aspirational."32 Plaintiffs' counsel also
deposed the then-executive director of the NACC regarding the NACC's
recommendation that a full-time children's attorney in dependency court
should have no more than 100 open child clients at any time, including ade-
quate support staff.33 By the time discovery ended, caseloads were down to
an average of 439 in Fulton County and 183 in DeKalb County-lower than
28. Pitchal, supra note 26, at 669 (describing Kenny A. litigation). The "vice" turned out
to be an important element of the complaint when it came to staving off the state's motion to
dismiss on Younger abstention grounds. See Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at 285-87; State Defen-
dant's Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2002). Under the Younger abstention doctrine, providing a rare and ex-
traordinary exception to a federal court hearing cases properly before it, Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971), federal courts must abstain from deciding cases when, among other
things, to do so would interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding involving the same
litigants. In Kenny A., plaintiffs successfully argued that the Younger test was not met, among
other things, because-as alleged in the complaint-they were not able to obtain any mea-
ningful relief in Juvenile Court on account of their advocates' overwhelming caseloads. Ken-
ny A., 218 F.R.D. at 287. The court was also persuaded that the defendants had waived any
abstention argument when they voluntarily removed the case from state court to the federal
forum. Id. at 285.
29. First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 9-13; Pitchal, supra note 26, at 667-69.
30. See Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1362-63 (N.D. Ga.
2005); see also Pitchal, supra note 26, at 669 n.33, 670.
31. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-63.
32. Id. at 1363.
33. Id. at 1362; NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, supra note 9, at 7.
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at the initiation of the case, but still well above the NACC recommenda-
tion.34
At the close of discovery, the counties moved for summary judgment,
essentially arguing that foster children in Georgia do not have the right to
counsel in juvenile court dependency cases.3 ' Because children lacked this
right-the argument went-the counties' decision to provide lawyers who
36
may be practicing below minimum standards was of no legal significance.
Thus, the first challenge of the case-and the first major victory-was to
establish, as a matter of law, that foster children have the right to a lawyer in
dependency court. 37  Plaintiffs' right-to-counsel claim was based on the
Georgia State Constitution's due process clause, but the district court ana-
lyzed the issue under the Mathews v. Eldridge38 test because under Georgia
law, due process protections are co-extensive with the federal analogue.39
Mathews teaches that when determining whether a given procedural protec-
tion is required, courts must balance three factors: 1) the liberty interest at
stake; 2) the risk of erroneous results without the desired protection; and 3)
the state's interest, including fiscal considerations.4 0
As one of us has previously written,4 ' the court's decision in Kenny A.
was as straightforward in approach as it was remarkable in outcome. Finding
that foster children have a liberty interest at stake in all dependency cases,
34. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1356; NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, supra
note 9, at 7. There were two reasons for the drop in caseloads. First, there was a decline in
the foster care census-something that was outside the control of the counties-a trend that
continued in the years following. See JAMES T. DIMAS & SARAH A. MORRISON, PERIOD 10
MONITORING REPORT 126, 128 (2011) [hereinafter STATE TENTH PERIOD MONITORING
REPORT], available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/2011-060
6_ga-period 10-monitoring-report.pdf. Second, between the filing of the case and the reso-
lution of the summary judgment motion, DeKalb County-the smaller of the two-had hired
an additional three child advocate attorneys, bringing their total staffing to five. See Kenny A.,
356 F. Supp. 2d at 1356, 1356 n.3.
35. See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of State Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-cv-1686-MHS, 2004 WL
5503780 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 2004).
36. See generally id.
37. See generally id. Less challenging was prevailing on the related argument that if
there is a right to counsel, then there is also a right to effective counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387, 395 (1985) ("It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
the effective assistance of counsel." (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14
(1970) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
38. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
39. See Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1355, 1360; Hood v. Carsten, 481 S.E.2d 525, 527
(Ga. 1997).
40. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321.
41. See Pitchal, supra note 26, at 675.
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due to the possibility that they could be placed by the public agency in an
environment restrictive of their physical movements, and finding that the
imprecise standards used in juvenile court proceedings led to an unaccepta-
bly high risk of erroneous outcomes, the court held that no remedy short of
appointing a lawyer to every child would suffice for constitutional purpos-
es.42 If anything, the court could have better justified its decision by defining
children's liberty interests far more broadly, which would have perhaps been
more persuasive to other courts considering the same issue in the future.43 In
any event, upon holding that foster children in Georgia have the right to
counsel in all abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings, the court con-
cluded that plaintiffs had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether they were receiving effective assistance of counsel, making sum-
mary judgment for the defendants inappropriate."
III. DEFINING EFFECTIVE COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
Once the court denied the counties' summary judgment motions, the
parties quickly came to the settlement table to discuss a mutually agreeable
outcome.45 Separate mediated settlement negotiations were held with each
county, 46 as the factual and political landscape in each locale was quite dif-
ferent. After several months of negotiations, separate consent decrees were
agreed to, and following preliminary approval, notice, and a fairness hearing,
the district court so-ordered them.47 The main features of the decrees are
summarized in this table:
42. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1360-61.
43. See Pitchal, supra note 26, at 681.
44. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-64.
45. Id. at 1364; see Notice of Proposed Settlement Regarding the Right of Children to
Have Lawyers in Deprivation Cases at 2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-
1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2006) (ordering proposed settlement) [hereinafter DeKalb
County Notice of Proposed Settlement]; Notice of Proposed Settlement Regarding the Right
of Children to Have Lawyers in Deprivation Cases at 2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No.
1:02-CV-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2006) (ordering proposed settlement) [hereinafter
Fulton County Notice of Proposed Settlement].
46. See DeKalb County Notice of Proposed Settlement, supra note 45, at 2; Fulton Coun-
ty Notice of Proposed Settlement, supra note 45, at 2.
47. Order at 1-2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter DeKalb County Order]; Order at 1-2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v.
Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Fulton County Order].
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Principle DeKalb decree48  Fulton decree4 9
Caseloads 130 cases maximum per The findings and require-
full-time lawyer will be ments of an independent
allowed. workload study will be au-
tomatically incorporated into
the decree unless a party
objects.
Staffing Seven new attorneys A total of twelve attoreys,
will be hired within a two investigators, and three
year, for a total of ele- support staff must be hired
ven lawyers plus a di- by the signing of an agree-
rector (then subsequent- ment (then subsequently in
ly maintaining com- compliance with the work-
pliance with the re- load study standard).
quired caseload).
Standards of Prac- Child Advocate Attor- Practice standards (con-
tice neys must practice in tained in an appendix to the
accordance with a set of decree and incorporated by
nine "responsibilities of reference) are more detailed
child advocate[s]," and specific than in DeKab
which are enforceable and are also enforceable,
by plaintiffs; perfor- with performance evaluated
mance is to be evaluated by a neutral accountability
by a neutral accounta- agent.
acdcwhstf eea icpadbility agent.
In addition to the substance, both decrees had detailed provisions re-
garding enforcement and duration. 50 Generally speaking, each county had to
be in substantial compliance with the caseload, staffing, and performance
48. Consent Decree Between Plaintiffs & DeKalb County, Georgia at 3-6,
8, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2006) [he-
reinafter DeKalb County Consent Decree], available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/06/2006-03-23_ga_dekalb consentdecree.pdf.
49. Consent Decree at 5-7, app. A 1, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-
1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Feb 13, 2006) [hereinafter Fulton County Consent Decree], available at
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2006-02-13_gajfulton-consent
decree.pdf; see also DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5-6.
50. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 8-10; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 8-10.
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provisions for a sustained period of eighteen months before it could request
an exit from the federal court."
With respect to the caseloads in Fulton (caseloads in DeKalb County
were limited to 130) the workload study (conducted by the University of
Georgia) concluded that there were too many additional factors that impacted
the efficiency of child advocate attorneys to settle on one static caseload
maximum.52 Instead, the study identified a list of structural impediments
within the Juvenile Court and the state's public child welfare agency ("exter-
nal" problems), as well as ongoing issues within the Child Advocate Office
("internal" concerns). The study concluded that if no reforms took place,
then the maximum caseload for child advocate attorneys should be eighty
child-clients at a time.54 If the internal issues were resolved, then the casel-
oads could appropriately rise to 100 per attorney, and if the external impedi-
ments were also removed, then child advocate attorneys could effectively
represent up to 120 child-clients at any one time. 5 Neither party objected to
the workload study's conclusions, so its recommendations were incorporated
automatically into the consent decree as enforceable caseload requirements. 6
The performance standards required by both decrees are the type of la-
wyering tasks that have wide acceptance in the field as fundamental activities
required of all attorneys representing children. Indeed, as the decrees were
being drafted and negotiated, we relied explicitly on the ABA Standards,7
and in many cases incorporated the ABA's approach verbatim. 58 For exam-
ple, both decrees require the child advocate attorney to "establish and main-
tain an attorney-client relationship" with the child-client.5 9 These provisions
were inspired by ABA Standard C-1, which states that "[e]stablishing and
maintaining a relationship . . . is the foundation of representation" and calls
on children's lawyers to meet with their clients-regardless of age-before
51. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 9-10; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 9.
52. See GOVERNMENTAL SERVS. Div., CARL VINSON INST. OF GOv'T, CHILD ADVOCATE
ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND WORKLOAD STUDY 142, 152 (2007) [hereinafter FULTON
COUNTY WORKLOAD STUDY], available at http://childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008
/06/2007-06-25_ga_fulton-workload-study.pdf.
53. See id. at 67-70.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id.
56. See Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 6-7.
57. See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 1-15.
58. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 3, 5-6; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 3-4.
59. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 6; Fulton County Consent Decree,
supra note 49, at 3.
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court hearings and whenever a case development warrants iti6 Not surpri-
singly, the 2011 Model Act has a similar requirement." Other provisions in
the decrees that came directly from the ABA Standards (and were later codi-
fied in the 2011 Model Act) included: file pleadings, 62 request services by
court order if necessary,63 enforce compliance with court orders that favor the
client," negotiate settlements,65 and participate in appeals.
The county case, along with the state case, plainly met the requirements
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2), and indeed the Kenny
A. litigation was directed at reforming a system in which agency-wide (state
case) and county-wide (county case) failures harmed children and exposed
them all to risks of harm in violation of their rights.67 Discretion in individu-
at cases-or, unfortunately, the absence of discretion-was occurring within
a fundamentally broken system. However, in terms of implementing the
right-to-counsel remedy in the county case, the parties agreed that the exer-
cise of professional legal discretion did not require every lawyering task to
be done on every case.68 Thus, the language in the consent decrees around
practice standards provided some flexibility. 69 For example, in DeKalb, most
performance standards were said to be required as "necessary in the reasona-
ble exercise of professional judgment."7 0 An exception was to "establish and
maintain an attorney-client relationship" with each child as the parties agreed
60. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 7.
61. 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 7(c).
62. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 9; see also DeKalb County Consent De-
cree, supra note 48, at 5; Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 3; 2011 MODEL
ACT, supra note 3, § 7(b).
63. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 9; DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra
note 48, at 6; Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 4; see also 2011 MODEL ACT,
supra note 3, § 7(b).
64. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 9; DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra
note 48, at 6; Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 4; see also 2011 MODEL ACT,
supra note 3, § 7(b)(9).
65. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 10; DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra
note 48, at 6; see 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 7(b).
66. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 15; DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra
note 48, at 6; Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 4; see also 2011 MODEL ACT,
supra note 3, § 7(b).
67. Fulton County Order, supra note 48, at 1; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2); Kenny A.
ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 286 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
68. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5-6; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 3-4.
69. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 4-5; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 5.
70. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5.
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that this was something that simply had to be done in every case.7' Similar-
ly, in Fulton, many of the standards were applicable "[w]here appropriate
and necessary to the case," though again, the requirement to meet with and
establish an attorney-client relationship with the child was required in every
case. 72
71. Id. at 6.
72. See Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, app. A at 4. The parties did not
negotiate for a specific provision regarding the role that the child advocate attorneys should
play-client-directed or "best interests." See id. app. A at 3-4; DeKalb County Consent De-
cree, supra note 48, at 5. It certainly would have been a reasonable position to argue that
"right to counsel" means the right to a traditional lawyer who operates in accordance with the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 1.14's directions concerning the
representation of a client with a disability (such as minority). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2011). Instead, as implemented, Kenny A. focused more on the right to
have a lawyer functioning as an attorney-establishing a relationship, investigating the case,
developing a theory, and being a zealous advocate. See DeKalb County Consent Decree,
supra note 48, at 6; Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 3. If the position advo-
cated was the lawyer's view of the client's best interests as opposed to the child's wishes, the
parties were content to let that lie. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5-6;
Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 3. As it turned out, the DeKalb Child Advo-
cate Office took the following position regarding the role of its lawyers:
Counsel's principal duty is to zealously advocate for the client's best interests. The lawyer's
duty is to form a principled position of the child's best interests and advocate for that position.
Nevertheless, the child advocate attorney also has an obligation to inform the court of the
child's desires, even when the child's wishes diverge from the attorney's determination of the
child's best interests. The determination of a child's best interests must be formed by an expli-
cit analysis of the actual available options.
DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, app. B at 3-4. Fulton took a view somewhat
closer to the 1996 ABA Standards:
In Fulton County, child advocate attorneys represent the best interests of the child, while at the
same time representing the child's expressed preferences. This model allows the child to ex-
plain what he or she believes is in his or her best interests. If the child advocate determines
that the child's expressed preference would be seriously injurious to the child (as opposed to
merely being contrary to the lawyer's opinion of what would be in the child's interests), the
child advocate attorney may request appointment of a separate guardian ad litem and continue
to represent the child's expressed preference as the child's attorney, unless the child's position
is prohibited by law or without any factual foundation.
Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, app. A at 3. In 2009, a new director of the
Fulton Child Advocate Office, who had many years of experience as a public defender, was
hired. See WILLIAM G. JONES, FOURTH KENNY A. REPORT FOR FULTON COUNTY 19 (2010)
[hereinafter FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at http://ww
w.childrenstights.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/11/2010-lll2_fulton.county-fourth-monitor
ing-report.pdf. Under his leadership, Fulton changed its model of child representation to
client-directed, and the consent decree was modified to reflect this. See Modified Consent
Decree app. A at 2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga.
May 18, 2009) [hereinafter Fulton County Modified Consent Decree], available at http://www
.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads//2009/10/2009-05-19_ga fulton-county-modifiedco
nsent.decree.pdf. The 2011 Model Act reflects this same standard. See 2011 MODEL ACT,
supra note 3, § 7(c).
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For the objective "input" requirements of the right-to-counsel decrees
such as caseloads, staffing, and training, a neutral monitor was required to
review and validate county data and records.7 3 However, assessing the coun-
ties' performance with the agreed-upon lawyering standards required the
involvement of a neutral party to essentially look over the shoulders of the
attorneys. 74 In each county, an "Accountability Agent" was selected to de-
termine whether or not the lawyers were practicing in accordance with the
input requirements and performance standards." On the latter, if in a given
case a lawyer did not file a particular motion, for example, it would also be
up to the accountability agents to determine if this was a reasonable exercise
of professional judgment or a practice error outside such judgment.76
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Designing a monitoring regime that balanced the imperative to assess
the quality of counsel with the need to respect legal professional judgment
was challenging, and made more difficult because Kenny A. was sui gene-
ris.1 The implementation phase of the county case raised an interesting per-
formance question: Assuming that it is possible to judge quality lawyering
in the first place, how "good" is "good enough"? In other words, what is the
minimum quality job performance that would still be considered "effective"
under the consent decrees and would satisfy children's procedural due
process rights? Certainly, the assertion by one of the deponents early in the
litigation that meeting each of her clients was "aspirational," if considered a
normative claim, would be repugnant. But is there a difference between
"best practices" and the constitutional minimum? The Kenny A. decrees and
the monitoring protocols developed to implement them did not address this
issue directly.
73. Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 7. After delineating the many du-
ties of a child's lawyer, the 2011 Model Act notes that "lawyers must have caseloads that
allow realistic performance of these functions." 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 7(b) cmt.
74. See Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 8.
75. See id. For Fulton County, the parties agreed on the appointment of Judge William
Jones, a retired dependency judge from North Carolina with a national reputation. Id. at 7.
For DeKalb County, the parties selected Karen Beatrice Baynes-Dunning, a former Georgia
juvenile court judge and Associate Director of the Governmental Services Division at the
University of Georgia's Carl Vinson Institute of Government. DeKalb County Consent De-
cree, supra note 48, at 6, 11.
76. See Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 5-8, app. A 4.
77. See id. app. A at 1.
78. See generally Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49. Nor did they need to as
a legal matter. A clear line of Supreme Court precedent allows parties to a consent decree to
agree and enforce terms beyond federal constitutional or statutory minima, and plaintiffs are
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In both counties, after the accountability agents verified that the struc-
tural requirements of the decrees had been met-and both defendants com-
plied with the staffing and caseload obligations in relatively short order79-
their focus turned to assessing compliance with the performance standards
not required to re-prove constitutional violations in an original complaint against challenges
over compliance with a decree that goes beyond such minima. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Haw-
kins, 540 U.S. 431, 439-40 (2004) (showing the remedy was one that the defendant state
officials "had accepted when they asked the District Court to approve the decree" and "[o]nce
entered, a consent decree may be enforced"); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 354 n.6 (1992)
("[P]arties may agree to provisions in a consent decree which exceed the requirements of
federal law." (citing Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992))); Rufo,
502 U.S. at 389-90 ("The position urged by [the defendants] 'would necessarily imply that the
only legally enforceable obligation assumed by the state under the consent decree was that of
ultimately achieving minimal constitutional prison standards. . . . Substantively, this would
do violence to the obvious intention of the parties that the decretal obligations assumed by the
state were not confined to meeting minimal constitutional requirements."' (quoting Plyler v.
Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir. 1991))); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City
of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) ("[A] federal court is not necessarily barred from
entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court
could have awarded after a trial."). The Supreme Court's decision in Home v. Flores, 129 S.
Ct. 2579, 2594-95 (2009)-in which the Court, in the context of FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5),
instructed lower courts to evaluate whether a "durable remedy" had been achieved and to
make sure that "responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to
the State and its officials' when the circumstances warrant"-did not alter this precedent. See,
e.g., Juan F. v. Rell, No. 3:89-CV-859, 2010 WL 5590094, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2010)
("Hore ... did not turn 60(b)(5) motions into vehicles to relitigate the original claims of the
underlying litigation, in an effort to determine whether ongoing violations of federal law ex-
ist."); Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126, 171 (D.D.C. 2010) (emphasizing that a court "may
not rewrite the existing consent orders so as to reduce defendants' promise to some ill-defined
constitutional floor"); see also LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Gray, 412 F. App'x 315, 315
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming the district court's rejection of a claim under 60(b)(5)
of "durable statutory compliance" under Home).
79. See KAREN B. BAYNES, DEKALB COUNTY CHILD ADVOCACY CENTER COMPLIANCE
REPORT 4-5 [hereinafter DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2007-0724_ga-dekalbi st-comp
liance-report.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2012); WILLIAM G. JONES, THIRD KENNYA. REPORT FOR
FULTON COUNTY 4-8 (2009) [hereinafter FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING
REPORT], available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads//2009/l1/2009-10-
30-ga-fulton-county-thirdperiod monitoring-report.pdf. DeKalb was in compliance with
the caseload standard of 130 almost from the day the court so-ordered the decree, as officials
there increased staffing dramatically even before the summary judgment motion was decided.
See DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra at 4-5. Fulton lagged behind
somewhat, as the structural impediments identified by the authors of the Workload Study
remained in place for approximately eighteen months, triggering a caseload obligation of
eighty. See FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra at 5, 18. It was not
until the Third Monitoring Report found that all of the structural blocks had been removed that
the caseload requirement changed to 100. See id. at 18.
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set forth in each decree.so They did this by looking carefully at a sample of
individual cases, assessing whether the attorneys' performance on a variety
of measures was acceptable in each case, and then aggregating the data to get
a systemic view of quality.8' It was left to the parties to decide whether the
accountability agents' findings would support a judicial finding of "substan-
tial compliance" with the consent decrees in the legal sense;8 2 by agreement
of the parties, the accountability agents did not draw this ultimate legal con-
clusion themselves.
Constructing a metric for assessing lawyer performance was a chal-
lenge, but a familiar one for anyone charged with determining compliance
with a standard as opposed to a rule. Courts, of course, are used to working
in the world of standards. The advantage of having a rule as opposed to a
standard is that it provides clarity as to what is expected and how one's per-
formance will be measured. The child advocate attorneys and attorney su-
pervisors in DeKalb and Fulton certainly wanted clarity, but they also
wanted flexibility." For example, the DeKalb County decree required attor-
neys "[t]o establish and maintain an attorney-client relationship with each
Class Member client and to maintain such contacts with the client as are ne-
cessary in the reasonable exercise of professional judgment to ensure ade-
quate and effective legal representation."
The Fulton County decree contained similar language. 86 One could eas-
ily imagine a rule that would operationalize this standard more concretely
such as: The child advocate attorney shall meet with each client within thirty
days of the case opening, once a quarter thereafter, and within ten days of
any placement move. This rule would provide clarity to the lawyer about
80. See DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 5-7;
FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 13-14, 64-66.
81. FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 13-15;
KAREN B. BAYNES, DEKALB COUNTY CHILD ADVOCACY CENTER COMPLIANCE REPORT 2
(2008) [hereinafter DEKALB COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at http://
www.childrenstights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/2008-07-22_gajdekalb_3rdcomplianc
ereportl.pdf.
82. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 10-11; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 7-9.
83. See DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 23;
FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 5.
84. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5-6; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, app. A at 1.
85. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 6.
86. Compare id., with Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, app. A at 3-5.
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what is expected and to the monitor about what to look for. However, in
the context of legal services, the parties decided against a minimum number
of contacts and instead agreed upon implementation and measurement that
was flexible.
The accountability agent in each county constructed a protocol to ana-
lyze several dozen lawyer activities-activities that came from the require-
ments of each respective decree.89 In both counties, a random sample of cas-
es was selected during each monitoring period-approximately every six
months-to be reviewed using the protocol. 90  A numerical scale was
created, and each activity in each case was scored on the scale.9' In DeKalb,
the accountability agent looked at the child's attorney file for each case in the
sample and then interviewed the attorney to get a better understanding of
what did and did not occur in that particular case.92 The accountability agent
assigned a score of zero to four for each item on the protocol for each case
and aggregated the data by item.94 The Fulton accountability agent also used
a protocol for file reviews, but supplemented this with a separate protocol,
which he used to assess in-court performance. 95 He used a scale of zero to
three for each item on these protocols. 96
87. See 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 7(b)(5), (8). The 2011 Model Act requires
lawyers to meet with child-clients before every court hearing, after every placement change,
and at least once a quarter. Id.
88. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5-6; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, app. A at 1, 3-5.
89. KAREN B. BAYNES, DEKALB COUNTY CHILD ADVOCACY CENTER COMPLIANCE
REPORT 20 [hereinafter DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2007-12-19_ga-dekalb_2ndcom
pliance-report.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2012); WILLIAM G. JONES, FIRST FULTON COUNTY
KENNY A. REPORT 10-11 (2008) [hereinafter FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING
REPORT], available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2008-0111
-ga-fulton_1stcompliance-report.pdf.
90. DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 2; FULTON
COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 49.
91. DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 2; e.g.,
FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 49, 51-52.
92. DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 8. A mas-
ter's-level social worker also reviewed each file to determine whether the child's needs were
being met. DEKALB COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 81, at 2.
93. An item scored "0" was deemed not applicable for that given case. DEKALB COUNTY
FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 8. Otherwise, "I" was for poor perfor-
mance, "2" for needs improvement, "3" for satisfactory, and "4" for excellent. Id.
94. DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 14.
95. FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 49; FULTON
COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 14.
96. FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 14. Initially,
the Fulton agent used a zero-to-four scale similar to that in the DeKalb study. See FULTON
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The accountability agents operationalized the requirement to "establish
and maintain an attorney-client relationship," for example, by looking for
evidence of meetings with clients and content containing the client's posi-
tion.97 In reviewing the DeKalb files, the accountability agent looked for
content evidencing "client interviews" and also assessed whether the attorney
notes contained the "child's position."98 She rated each file on the zero-to-
four scale for these items.99 Similarly, in Fulton, the file review protocol
looked at child interviews, but there were five separate items assessed under
this category, including the: 1) child's position, 2) number of contacts, 3)
explanation of the court process, 4) length of contact, and 5) attorney-client
relationship."3 0 The court observation protocol contained an item called
"[c]ourt informed of [c]hild's [p]osition."'o' All of these items were rated on
the Fulton zero-to-three scale.102
This approach to monitoring lawyer performance raised interesting
measurement challenges. For a given case, what distinguishes "client inter-
views" that need improvement from those that are satisfactory? From an
attorney file alone, is it possible to say that an attorney's explanation of the
court process to a ten year-old met expectations, as opposed to exceeded
them? What factors are used to determine whether the overall attorney-client
relationship met expectations? The parties simply trusted the neutrality and
experience of the accountability agents to be able to assess performance,
giving appropriate deference to the professional judgment of the attorneys,
while still holding them accountable for a certain base level of perfor-
mance.103
COuNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 65. Later the scale was
changed to zero-to-three. FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note
79, at 14. Under the revised scale, an item scored "zero" was deemed not applicable for that
given case. Id. Otherwise, "I" was for performance that did not meet expectations, "2" was
for performance that did meet expectations, and "3" was for performance that exceeded ex-
pectations. Id.
97. See DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 24, 27.
98. Id.
99. DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 8.
100. FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 59.
101. Id. at 70.
102. FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72, at 74.
103. The consent decrees did not preclude challenges to the findings of the respective
accountability agents. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 6-8; Fulton
County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 6. Additionally, the accountability agents shared
drafts of their findings and each of their monitoring reports for comment before finalizing
them and before they were filed with the court. See, e.g., DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD
MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 13. As it turned out, the parties never disputed the
findings. See generally DEKALB COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 81;
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The aggregation of this data presented a legal enforcement challenge
and, at least in theory, a constitutional question. If, for example, in 75% of
cases the number and length of the contacts were satisfactory or better, but in
only 30% of cases did the attorney satisfactorily explain the court process,"
has there been effective assistance of counsel in the constitutional sense?
What percentage of items, in what percentage of cases, have to be at the "sa-
tisfactory" level or higher to say that there has been "substantial compliance"
with the decree? To say that constitutionally effective representation has
been provided? To say that the 1996 ABA Standards or the 2011 Model Act
standards have been met?
The parties never had to confront these questions in Kenny A. because
the conclusions that could be drawn from each monitoring report were quite
clear.'05 DeKalb showed evidence of compliance with the decree from the
first monitoring report and sustained this level for eighteen months, entitling
it to court-approved exit from court supervision.'06 Fulton initially struggled
to meet the caseload requirements of its decree, and it took multiple monitor-
ing reports before it began to show consistent compliance with the perfor-
mance requirements.107 Once it demonstrated compliance with the quality
standards, there was no dispute, and after sustaining its performance for eigh-
teen months, Fulton also exited with court approval.'0o
The changes over the life of the Kenny A. litigation in both counties'
approaches to child advocacy and actual performance were remarkable. In
2002 when the case was filed, the child advocate attorneys had upwards of
500 clients each, could not have possibly-and had not-met most of their
clients, and had no support staff, investigators, or access to social workers or
DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89; DEKALB COUNTY
FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79; FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD
MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72; FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT,
supra note 79; WILLIAM G. JONES, KENNY A. REPORT SECOND FULTON COUNTY (2008) [herei-
nafter FULTON COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at http://www.
childrenrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/2008-08-01 _ga_2nd-fulton monitoring.rep
ort.pdf; FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89.
104. See, e.g., FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 59.
105. And again, in terms of the enforcement of consent decrees versus constitutional mi-
nima, they did not need to. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
106. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 3, 10; Georgia County Exits Court
Oversight After Reform of Legal Representation for Foster Children, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
(Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.childrensrights.org/news-events/press/georgia-county-poised-to-
exit-court-oversight-after-reform-of-legal-representation-for-foster-children/.
107. FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72, at 10.
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independent experts.'" They were hired and supervised directly by the Ju-
venile Court judges before whom they appeared, often functioning more as
courtroom managers than as advocates or lawyers." 0 Fulton County had four
lawyers with virtually no support,"' and DeKalb County had two.'12 In con-
trast, when DeKalb exited in 2008, attorneys there had caseloads ranging
from sixty-five to ninety.' 13 There was an independent Child Advocacy Cen-
ter staffed by a director and eleven full-time case-carrying attorneys-
including two supervisors, as well as four investigators and four paraleg-
als;'l 4 regular internal performance reviews were being conducted, with cor-
rective action plans instituted where appropriate;" attorneys attended train-
ings on a regular basis on child welfare law and related topics, at both local
and national conferences;"'6 and the level of advocacy was consistently
high."' 7 In the words of the DeKalb accountability agent, "[t]here is a sys-
temic and deliberate process of quality improvement that while originally
mandated [as part of] the consent decree, has now become [part of] the cul-
ture of the [Child Advocacy] Center."" 8
Likewise, by the time Fulton exited in 2011, all internal reforms called
for by the workload study had been implemented, triggering a caseload max-
imum of 100;"9 caseloads were in fact consistently far under 100;I20 an inde-
pendent Child Advocate Board had been established under county govern-
ment, which was responsible for hiring and supervising the director of the
Child Advocate Office;'21 the Child Advocate Office was staffed with the
director, sixteen full-time attorneys-including one supervisor, four adminis-
trative support staff, four investigators, two social services coordinators, and
one educational advocate;122 the staff participated in a variety of comprehen-
sive training courses;123 the rate and number of client contacts and attorney
109. Georgia County Exits Court Oversight After Reform of Legal Representation for
Foster Children, supra note 106.
110. Id.
I 11. See Georgia's Fulton County Poised to Exit Court Oversight, supra note 108.
112. See Georgia County Exits Court Oversight After Reform of Legal Representation for
Foster Children, supra note 106.
113. Id.
114. DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 3.
115. Id. at l2-13.
116. DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 6.
117. DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 5.
118. DEKALB COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 81, at 6.
119. Georgia's Fulton County Poised to Exit Court Oversight, supra note 108.
120. Id.
121. FULTON COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 103, at 40.
122. FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72, at 21.
123. Id. at 42-51.
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participation in extra-judicial meetings and proceedings was exceptionally
high; 124 and for most of the items on the attorney file and court observation
protocols, the accountability agent found the performance to meet or exceed
expectations in well over 90% of the cases. 125 Remarkably, during the final
year of the consent decree, the assistant county attorney who had represented
Fulton County throughout the Kenny A. case elected to leave his position and
become the director of the Child Advocate Office,126 surely having been in-
spired by the level of practice the office had achieved and the challenge of
sustaining it once the incentive of satisfying the federal court's order was
gone.
A number of factors explain this dramatic turnaround and the counties'
successful experience under the Kenny A. right-to-counsel reform effort.
Clearly, a significant but-for cause was the existence of the litigation itself;
there is no action quite like a civil rights class action to protect and remedy
violations of the rights of vulnerable citizens by a government defendant.
Securing the right to counsel and negotiating a favorable consent decree was
only part of the litigation story, however; the implementation that followed
was successful for independent reasons. First, the presence of the accounta-
bility agents in the case and the seriousness of purpose with which they ap-
proached their role cannot be overstated. Judge Baynes was local and was
deeply familiar with the Georgia Juvenile Court and child welfare systems,
and she had the credibility and back-up support from the University of Geor-
gia.'27 While Judge Jones was based in North Carolina, he spent countless
days and weeks on-site in Fulton County, not only conducting his reviews
but also offering meaningful technical assistance to the Child Advocate Of-
fice leadership and staff as they revamped processes and procedures and
created a new culture of advocacy. Both Judges Baynes and Jones had
enormous credibility with the parties from the beginning.128
Second, there was complete commitment from local leadership; both
within the new child advocacy structures in each county as well as the broad-
er county government, and the county leaders involved in Kenny A. set their
124. See id. at 59, 61.
125. Id. at 75.
126. Id. at 19.
127. See DeKalb County Notice of Proposed Settlement, supra note 45, at 6.
128. Judge Baynes was also the author of the Fulton County Child Advocate Attorney
Representation and Workload Study. Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 6.
Plaintiffs readily agreed to Fulton County's request that a study be conducted in order to set
the caseload requirements. Id. at 5. The fact that the study was so well done, by a respected
former judge, who was part of a respected institute at the University of Georgia, eliminated
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sights early on full and sustained compliance. After trying a few different
ways to structure the program, Fulton County ultimately settled on the crea-
tion of an independent Child Advocate Board to oversee the office, removing
it from the Fulton County Juvenile Court.129 DeKalb hired a charismatic and
passionate attorney to direct its new Child Advocacy Center,3 o and she made
compliance with the Kenny A. decree her number one management priority.
Third, while Plaintiffs' counsel maintained the ability to enforce the de-
crees through contempt litigation (and had done so in the state case),131 the
ongoing monitoring and negotiation process in the county case very quickly
took on an atmosphere of open sharing of problems and collaboration among
the parties, and the accountability agents effectively acted as both reporters
of performance and conveners of the parties, sometimes by effectively utiliz-
ing shuttle diplomacy.13 2 This factor, without question in our view, limited
the delay and expense of separate enforcement litigation.
Undoubtedly, compliance in both counties was aided by a fourth reason
outside the parties' control: a rapidly declining foster care census. Many of
the problems in the delivery of effective, adequate, and zealous counsel
flowed from grossly unmanageable caseloads. Because of changes at the
state level (among other reasons), the overall caseloads that child advocate
attorneys carried in DeKalb County dropped from approximately 900 when
the case was filed to 750 when DeKalb exited in 2008.1'3 The decline in
Fulton was from approximately 2000 when the case was filed to 1005 in
2010.'3 Notwithstanding the enormous increase in staffing in both counties,
the drop in the foster care census made the caseload ratios in the county de-
crees more quickly attainable.
129. Id. at4-5.
130. DEPARTMENT DIRECTORS, OFFICE OF THE CEO, DEKALB COUNTY, http://www.co.
dekalb.ga.us/portals/ceo/trennystovall.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
131. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Order for Defendants to Show Cause Why They Should
Not be Adjudged in Civil Contempt & Sanctioned at 1, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No.
1:02-cv-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2008); Stipulation Regarding Plaintiffs' Contempt &
Discovery Motions & Assertion of State Defendants' Noncompliance with Outcome Measures
9 & 10 at 1, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No.1:02-cv-1686-M HS (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11,
2008), available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2007-06-25
gajfultonworkloadstudy.pdf.
132. See generally DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79;
FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89.
133. DEKALB COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 81, at 7.
134. FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 41; FULTON
COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72, at 25.
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V. WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES A LAWYER MAKE?
Asserting the Kenny A. right-to-counsel claims in tandem with claims
seeking comprehensive reforms in the state child welfare agency allowed the
dangerously poor Atlanta foster care system to provide a compelling context
for the need for counsel for children in the juvenile courts. As it turned out,
Kenny A. offers something of a natural experiment in which to observe the
impact of improvements in child advocacy with parallel improvements in
outcomes for the lawyers' clients. At the same time that the county case was
progressing, the plaintiffs' claims against the state-with respect to the oper-
ation of the foster care system in metropolitan Atlanta-were moving for-
ward. The state case was settled with a negotiated consent decree in 2005,
requiring the state to increase its performance on thirty-one outcome meas-
ures, many of them phased-in over several years, related to the safety, per-
manency, and well-being of class members.135 The State Consent Decree
also included process and infrastructure requirements in many areas, includ-
ing, among others, caseload limits for agency case managers and supervisors
assigned to foster children; 36 the investigation of reports of abuse or neg-
lect;'37 limits on the use of non-family placements-shelters, groups, homes,
and institutions-for foster children;138 the oversight of private providers
under contract with the state to deliver services for foster children;'39 the
delivery of medical, dental, and mental health for foster children; and the
requirements of a child welfare management information system. 140
To date, in several areas of the State Consent Decree, significant
progress has been made for foster children in DeKalb and Fulton County.
For example, the State Consent Decree requires children who enter foster
care along with one or more siblings to be placed together with all of their
siblings;141 from 2006 to 2010, compliance increased from 73% to 94%.142
The State Consent Decree also requires the state to make appropriate ar-
135. Consent Decree at 31-38, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS
[hereinafter State Consent Decree], https://www.gascore.com/forms/docs/ConsentDecree.pdf
(last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
136. Id. at 22-23.
137. Id. at 28.
138. Id. at 15-19.
139. Id. at 23-24.
140. State Consent Decree, supra note 135, at 20-22.
141. See id. at 6.
142. JAMES T. DIMAS & SARAH A. MORRISON, PERIOD III MONITORING REPORT 41 (2007)
[hereinafter STATE THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at http://www.childrensi
ghts.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2007-12-17_gastate..period3_monitoring-report.pdf;
STATE TENTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 34, at 7, 13.
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rangements for parent-child visits when the child's permanency goal is reuni-
fication; 143 from 2007 to 2010, compliance increased from 25% to 88%.
Additionally, according to data compiled by the state and verified by the
court-appointed "Accountability Agents" in the state case, improvements
have been made and sustained in placing foster children closer to their home
communities and limiting the use of facilities and institutions as placements
for foster children, especially young children.145
The correlation between reforms in the right-to-counsel decrees from
2006 to 2010 and some of the positive outcomes for foster children under the
state decree are striking. Needless to say, however, correlation does not nec-
essarily indicate causation. Many variables contribute to success in child
welfare outcomes. For example, while zealous advocacy by child advocate
attorneys may well have contributed to keeping more siblings together in
foster care or ensuring more visits with children and their parents, the con-
tinued pressure of the Kenny A. state case and increased resources and tools
available to agency case managers likely played a role as well. Absent a
tightly designed, randomized control group study-in which the control
group gets "regular" advocacy, the experimental group gets a model of advo-
cacy based on the requirements of the Kenny A. county decrees, and all other
variables are controlled for-it would be nearly impossible to draw causal
links between the "input" of adequate, effective, and zealous advocacy in the
juvenile courts and measurable improvements in child welfare outcomes.'
143. State Consent Decree, supra note 135, at 36.
144. STATE THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 142, at 41; STATE TENTH
PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 34, at 45.
145. STATE TENTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 34, at 6, 102. To be sure,
despite areas of progress, the defendants in the state case still lag in making required im-
provements in a number of areas, such as efforts to move children into permanent homes out
of state custody, particularly through adoption; the timely investigation of reports of child
abuse or neglect for foster children already in state custody; the delivery of mental health and
development screens and treatment for foster children; and providing required services for
children before they are discharged from custody. See id. at 23-29, 53-59, 63-66, 93-97,
105-06,110,112-15.
146. At least one national project currently underway has the potential to evaluate the
delivery of quality representation for children in dependency cases. Overview, QIC-
CHILDREP, http://www.improvechildrep.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). "In . . . 2009, the
U.S. Children's Bureau [selected the] University of Michigan Law School [for] the National
Quality Improvement Center on the Representation of Children in the Child Welfare System
(QIC-ChildRep)." Id. According to the official website of the QIC-ChildRep, "[t]he QIC-
ChildRep, is a five-year, [five] million dollar project to gather, develop and communicate
knowledge on child representation, promote consensus on the role of the child's legal repre-
sentative, and provide one of the first empirically-based analyses of how legal representation
for the child might best be delivered." Id.
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Importantly, is such research even desirable to show the utility of adopt-
ing the 2011 Model Act? Even if one could design and conduct such re-
search and draw causal inferences, it is not at all clear that such a project
would be good for children or for the rule of law. The normative value of
providing lawyers to those who face a significant liberty deprivation-the
clarion promise of Gideon v. Wainwright,147 In re Gault,148 and Mathews-
outweighs the cold calculus of whether or not these lawyers contribute, in the
aggregate, to faster permanency or increased placements of siblings together,
among other desirable outcomes. Firstly, the lawyer's charge is to zealously
represent the individual client, without regard to what, in the aggregate, con-
stitutes a "good" outcome for a class of children. Indeed, the Kenny A. right
to counsel litigation sought to establish a right to counsel, ensure lawyers had
the tools to do their work-caseload caps, training, etc.-and ensure at least
a minimal quality of lawyering in practice.149  The Kenny A.'case never
sought particular outcomes in individual cases.
Secondly, and perhaps more vitally, lawyers serve an inherently critical
role in the justice system that far exceeds quantifiable outcomes, whether in
the aggregate or in individual cases. To be sure, lawyers seek to achieve
outcomes that can be said to be "good" for their clients.150 But they also di-
rectly and indirectly work zealously to protect, enhance, and champion their
clients' procedural rights. As a voice for the voiceless, lawyers for child-
ren-as well as lawyers for indigent clients throughout the civil and criminal
systems-"make a difference" by telling clients' stories and seeking justice
regardless of outcomes. Regardless of how many criminal trials end in a
guilty verdict, we do not question the value of defense lawyers' advocacy
merely because it cannot be proven that they achieve "good" outcomes for
their clients.' 5'
147. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
148. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
149. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
150. This is true even for children's lawyers in the dependency context, whether they
follow a client-directed or a best interests model; the only difference is who gets to decide
what a "good" outcome looks like-the client, or the lawyer. QIC Best Practice Model of
Child Representation, QIC-CHILDREP, http://www.improvechildrep.org/DemonstrationProject
s/QICChildRepBestPracticeModel.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
151.
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial un-
less counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both
state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defen-
dants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the
public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime,
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers
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VI. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM KENNY A. FOR PROPONENTS OF
THE 2011 MODEL ACT
Unsurprisingly, many provisions of the 2011 Model Act are very simi-
lar to the 1996 ABA Standards.15 2 Because the Kenny A. county decrees drew
upon the ABA Standards, anyone interested in implementing the 201 t Model
Act can fairly look to the Kenny A. experience for lessons on how to put its
principles into practice.
A. Implementation Matters
The right to counsel, like all rights-especially positive rights-requires
ongoing, systematic attention to transform it from a principle into practice.
In the absence of a meaningful implementation plan that addresses all core
components, the right will at best be provided in an idiosyncratic, ad hoc
way.
B. Caseloads Matter
By far the biggest controlled "input" under the right-to-counsel county
decrees was the workloads of lawyers. 5  Without question, at a certain level,
caseloads become so high that the right to counsel is compromised.'54 Before
performance standards or other aspects of the right to counsel can be fully
addressed, the caseload issue must be tackled.
C. Leadership Matters
Implementation of the right to counsel for all children in all dependency
cases represents a major change in values for most jurisdictions. To be ef-
fective, the reform efforts must be led by creative, passionate, and dedicated
to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the
very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on pro-
cedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
152. Compare 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, with STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, Supra note
4.
153. See Fulton County Modified Consent Decree, supra note 72, at 4; see also FULTON
COUNTY WORKLOAD STUDY, supra note 52, at 4.
154. Fulton County Modified Consent Decree, supra note 72, at 4.
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leaders who can simultaneously understand the big picture while focusing on
details. They need to be able to form and maintain good relationships with
many stakeholders while still being advocates for their program in order to
develop the internal capacity within the advocacy office for maintaining fi-
delity to the practice model and to be able to develop policies and proce-
dures, mentor staff, identify problems, and self-correct.
D. Client Directed Representation is Achievable
Fulton County, the largest urban county comprising metropolitan Atlan-
ta,'15 made the change relatively smoothly while meeting all the performance
standards for quality representation in the decree.'
E. Training and Support Matter
Child welfare law is a specialized area of practice. Implementing the
right to counsel in this area requires a comprehensive training plan and ade-
quate support from social workers, investigators, and paraprofessionals.'57
Fulton and DeKalb County were successful because program leaders recog-
nized this and political leaders made an appropriate investment in these
areas.
F. Independence from the Judiciary Matters
States vary in how their programs for appointing counsel to indigent
clients are operated. Some are administered by an executive branch agency
and some are by the administrative office of the courts; some are run as a
state government function and others are at the county level. 58 Regardless, it
is critical that the individuals who serve as court-appointed counsel do so
independently of the bench officers before whom they appear.
155. Fulton County, Georgia QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.g
ov/qfd/states/13/13121.htmi (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
156. See FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72, at 4.
157. NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, supra note 9, at 4-5, 8.
158. See Child Abuse Prevention & Treatment Act (CAPTA) Amendments of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-235, § 107(b)(2)(A)(v)(1-VI), (vii), I 10 Stat. 3063, 3073.
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G. Performance Can Be Measured Without Invading Professional
Discretion or Requiring "Good Results"
When the client population is too young to lodge formal complaints and
lacks the capacity and resources to select their own counsel, there must be a
mechanism to ensure quality professional performance. The Kenny A. expe-
rience shows this can be done effectively even in the absence of consensus
over what "good outcomes" are or an easy ability to measure causation-in
addition to the questionable utility in measuring causation.159 It is important
to develop a culture of process in which it is accepted wisdom that lawyers
are an essential protection for children regardless of how any one case turns
out.
Our experience in the investigation, litigation, settlement, and imple-
mentation phases of the Kenny A. litigation strongly suggests that ultimately,
while impact litigation created a needed push, these two county defendants
genuinely recognized that providing effective counsel to all children in
abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings was, and remains, the right
thing to do. That realization, perhaps more than any factor, transformed the
system for representing children in those counties.
159. See supra Part V.
2012] 433
108
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss2/1
FISCAL RETURNS ON IMPROVED REPRESENTATION OF




I. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 435
II. CAPTURING OUTCOMES ................................. ..... 436
III. IMPROVING CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES THROUGH COURT-
BASED REFORM ................................................. 437
IV. THE FOSTER CHILDREN'S PROJECT OF PALM BEACH COUNTY ......... 439
A. Chapin Hall's Palm Beach Study.... ................ 442
V. NEXT STEPS IN ASSESSING THE FISCAL IMPACT OF JUVENILE
REPRESENTATION REFORMS IN DEPENDENCY COURT....... ..... 443
A. Identifying Willingness-to-Pay Estimates ........ ....... 445
B. Additional Challenges in Improving Estimates of Fiscal
Returns from Model Act Implementation ............... 447
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................... ...... 449
I. INTRODUCTION
Compelling normative arguments alone may justify the embrace of the
Model Act Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and
Dependency Proceedings (Model Act) recently adopted by the American Bar
Association.' However, policy makers and court administrators will look
beyond the potential to improve procedural justice in considering whether to
adopt the new standards and devote limited state resources to provide fund-
ing for representation under the Model Act. They will examine the potential
* Assistant Professor, University of Missouri School of Social Work and Truman
School of Public Affairs; Courtesy Appointment, University of Missouri School of Law; B.A.,
1988, University of Chicago; J.D. 1992, Cornell Law School; A.M. 2005 and Ph.D. 2010,
University of Chicago.
** Supervising Attorney, Foster Children's Project, Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach
County, Inc.; J.D. 1989, Florida State University.
The authors would like to thank Mark Courtney, Andrew Zinn, and Harold Pollack
for their helpful suggestions and guidance.
1. See generally Donald N. Duquette, Child Representation in America: Progress Re-
port from the National Quality Improvement Center, 46 FAM. L.Q. (forthcoming 2012) (manu-
script) (on file with Nova Law Review).
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of improving actual case outcomes and the overall fiscal impact such repre-
sentation will yield.
This article explores the evidence that the new standards may yield ben-
efits that outweigh the fiscal costs of implementing the Model Act, and those
of competing models of representation. It first examines the few extant stu-
dies that shed light on whether the new standards might achieve the stated
aims of the child welfare system-especially with regard to timely perma-
nency-better than competing models of representation. One particular
study, which evaluated the outcomes and fiscal impact of legal representation
akin to that of the Model Act, is examined in greater depth. While research
so far is promising that enhanced representation yields fiscal returns, the
evidence remains very limited. In the final section, the authors provide sug-
gestions for future study to develop our understanding of the broader impact
of the Model Act on case outcomes, which in turn affects the bottom line of
agencies, courts, and broader society.
II. CAPTURING OUTCOMES
Key to understanding the changes brought on by the new standards is an
identification of the important, measurable outcomes expected in dependency
cases. Commentators have long emphasized the importance of finding sta-
ble, permanent homes for children and that achieving resolution of depen-
dency cases must be done quickly to limit the duration of disruption of child-
ren's lives.2 Consequently, child welfare and juvenile court professionals
have heretofore focused on two primary outcomes: the achievement of per-
manence for children and the disposition of cases in a timely manner.3
Economic evaluation of reforms aimed at achieving these objectives,
however, is rare, and recent commentators have emphasized the need to ex-
pand such research.' The outcomes of timeliness and permanence are rela-
tively easy to calculate. With improvements in information technology that
permit tracking of cases, researchers in recent decades have engaged in in-
creasingly sophisticated analyses of service use and duration.5 The fiscal
impact of achieving permanence is also clear: Once children are reunited
with their families of origin, adopted, or placed in permanent guardianship,
2. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
3. See FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(h), .621(1)-(2) (2011).
4. See Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert et al., Economic Evaluation Research in the Con-
text of Child Welfare Policy: A Structured Literature Review and Recommendations, 35
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 722, 736-37 (2011).
5. See id. at 723-25, 735-38.
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their cases are essentially closed. While some cases may continue to receive
limited financial subsidies from dedicated revenue streams, court personnel,
case managers, and child welfare service providers end their involvement.
To the extent that permanence can be achieved quickly, the benefits of per-
manence are realized earlier and thus, reduce the overall fiscal impact of the
case.
Of course, achieving permanence and timeliness does not represent the
universe of benefits that may attach to enhanced legal representation or im-
proved child welfare outcomes. We address other benefits, how a study
might measure them, and the challenges involved in capturing and monetiz-
ing their value in the final section of this article.
III. IMPROVING CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES THROUGH COURT-BASED
REFORM
Since the inception of the juvenile court, it has played an integral role in
supervising child welfare cases. Although there is often tension between
child welfare professionals and juvenile court personnel,6 legislative reforms
have often targeted court practice in an effort to improve child welfare case
outcomes. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 made
explicit the court's role in overseeing all cases involving maltreated child-
ren.8 Courts identify which cases are subject to the jurisdiction of child wel-
fare agency intervention and monitor the progress of these cases. 9 The fed-
eral State Court Improvement Program provides resources to dependency
courts with an aim of improving how courts supervise child welfare cases.'o
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 mandated dependency case
timelines that emphasized the termination of parental rights-and adoption-
if reunification could not be achieved quickly."
6. Bruce A. Boyer, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child Welfare
Agencies: The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. L. REv. 377,
379 (1995).
7. See id. at 387.
8. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010); Boyer, supra note 6, at 388 n.24.
9. Mark Hardin, Role of the Legal and Judicial System for Children, Youth, and Fami-
lies in Foster Care, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 687, 687 (Gerald P.
Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005).
10. See Paul E. Knepper & Shannon M. Barton, The Effect of Courtroom Dynamics on
Child Maltreatment Proceedings, 71 Soc. SERv. REv. 288, 289 (1997).
11. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101, 111 Stat. 2115,
2116 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006)).
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Given the value placed on the speedy resolution of cases, one might ex-
pect that enhanced legal representation would necessarily reduce delay and
lead to quicker resolution of cases. However, zealous advocacy may require
additional legal motions and activity that may act to prolong a dependency
case. Moreover, there may be strategic reasons to slow the pace of a case;
speedier cases-while serving the developmental needs of children-may
reduce the opportunities of parents to demonstrate that they are fit to be reu-
nified.12 Indeed, research in other civil court contexts reveals that enhanced
legal representation does not lead inexorably to speedier proceedings, even
when timeliness is a primary concern.13
The past two decades have yielded a small number of studies that have
examined how different models of representing children's interests might be
effective in improving case outcomes. 4 Evaluations of Court Appointed
SpecialAdvocates, which assigns trained lay volunteers to advocate for the
"best interests" of children, have demonstrated some promising results.'5
Several other studies have examined guardian ad litem models for children. 6
Most, however, rely on descriptive, non-experimental methods that often
identify some evidence of improved outcomes, but without the benefit of
12. Mark E. Courtney et al., Discussion Paper, Evaluation of the Impact of Enhanced
Parental Legal Representation on the Timing of Permanency Outcomes for Children in Foster
Care, I PARTNERS FOR OUR CHILDREN 1, 1-3 (2011). One recent study, however, found im-
proved timely permanence from a program that provided enhanced legal representation to
parents; the Parent Representation Program in Washington State was associated with an I1 %
increase in the speed of reunification, a 102% increase in the speed of establishing guardian-
ship, and an 83% increase in the speed of adoption. Id. at 4.
13. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized
Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, Soc. Sa. ELECTRONIC
PUB. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1-2), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1948286 (re-
viewing recent methodologically impressive studies while examining enhanced legal represen-
tation programs in housing and unemployment hearings, and finding that such representation
was associated with prolonged cases).
14. For a catalog of studies, along with commentary on the nature of the studies, visit the
website of the Quality Improvement Center on the Representation of Children in the Child
Welfare System (a project based at the University of Michigan Law School, funded by the
U.S. Children's Bureau). Identified Child Representation Evaluations, QIC-CHILDREP,
http://improvechildrep.org/childrep20l0/evaluationsofchildrepresentation.aspx (last visited
Feb. 26, 2012). Only two other studies, neither focusing on representation, have examined
specific efforts to improve timely permanence. ANDREW W. ZINN & JACK SLOWRIVER, CHAPIN
HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., EXPEDITING PERMANENCY: LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FOR FOSTER CHILDREN IN PALM BEACH COUNTY 3 (2008) [hereinafter PALM
BEACH STUDY], available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/old-reports/428.pdf.
15. QIC-CHILDREP, NEEDS ASSESSMENT REVIEW OF EXISTING EVALUATIONS 2, 10 (2010),
available at http://www.improvechildrep.org/Portals/0/QIC%2Child%2ORep%2OExisting%2
OEvaluations.pdf.
16. Id. at 4.
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adequate comparison groups that would give confidence that the reforms-
and no other factors-occasioned the improvements identified."
Only one study has examined the effect of a program featuring client-
centered children's representation akin to the Model Act.'8 Chapin Hall's
study of the Foster Children's Project of Palm Beach County, Florida (Palm
Beach Study) calculated the effect of the program in improving the propor-
tion of cases that achieve permanency in a timely fashion.' 9 In the next sec-
tion, we examine the Foster Children's Project (FCP) and the Palm Beach
Study in greater depth, drawing on the experience of co-author, John Walsh,
the supervising attorney of the program.
IV. THE FOSTER CHILDREN'S PROJECT OF PALM BEACH COUNTY
FCP is an office within the Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County,
Florida that provides attorneys for dependent children in Palm Beach Coun-
ty, specifically children ages zero to twelve and their siblings, placed in li-
censed care with the state. 20 The representation model is a stark contrast to
the alternative. Most children in Florida dependency courts do not receive
legal representation at all, 21 and children as a rule are unrepresented parties to
their own cases.22 A volunteer or staff guardian ad litem is appointed to
represent the child's best interests, as determined by the appointee, with
some consideration given to the child's wishes in making recommendations
to the court.23 In implementing FCP, this legal environment was a mixed
blessing. On one hand, FCP entered a context that was unfamiliar, if not
hostile, towards counsel for children. On the other hand, the program had
the benefit of having a "clean slate" on which to design and implement
client-based legal representation in dependency court.
FCP draws its funding from the Children's Services Council of Palm
Beach County, a county taxing district, which had viewed with alarm the
17. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in
Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/p
apers.cfm?abstract id=1708664. A thorough critique of these studies is beyond the scope of
this article.
18. See, e.g., PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id. at 1, 4 n.3.
21. See FIRST STAR & CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INST., A CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN
9,47 (2d ed. 2009), available at http://caichildlaw.org/Misc/FinalRTC_2ndEditionir.pdf.
22. See id.
23. PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 2.
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protracted stays of children in foster care in the jurisdiction.24 FCP was de-
signed with the express purpose of providing attorneys for children with the
intent of affecting outcomes, especially reducing the time children spent in
care through achieving more timely permanent placements.25
In creating FCP, the attorneys made two key strategic decisions that
likely impact their ability to affect client outcomes. First, the Legal Aid So-
ciety identified its target client population.26 Representing all the children in
dependency court would have led to a caseload size of approximately 250
children per attorney, likely too high to provide effective advocacy for each
client. Rather, the Legal Aid Society decided to focus on those clients most
in need of intervention and whose outcomes might best be improved through
representati6n. 27 After deliberation, FCP determined that children aged five
and younger in the licensed care population were the most vulnerable client
population. 28 These youngest clients had the most immediate need to have a
primary caregiver and permanent home, and lacked relatives who could act
as caregivers. 29 These children also tended to exhibit more severe abuse than
those children left with parents or placed with relatives.30 Second, based on
the Legal Aid Society's experience with representing children in other capac-
ities, attorneys agreed to limit the FCP caseload size to thirty-five children
per attorney.3'
Once operational, the FCP attorneys were charged with performing their
advocacy with a focus on achieving timely permanency.32 FCP attorneys
were trained from the outset that their clients, while each unique and present-
ing multiple issues, all essentially had the same legal problem: They were
"in the custody of the [S]tate [and] they need[ed] to be in the custody of a
family," within the time mandated by law. Under Florida law, the time
frames in the statute "are a right of the child,"3" and attorneys have the duty
24. See id. at 1.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id.; see FOSTER CHILDREN'S PROJECT, LEGAL AID Soc'Y OF PALM BEACH CNTY.,
available at http://www.legalaidpbc.org/downloads/brochures/Foster-Childrens-Project.pdf.
28. See PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 4 n.2.
29. See id. at 4.
30. See generally FIRST STAR & CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INST., supra note 21. FCP
would later expand to represent zero to twelve year olds. PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14,
at 4 n.2. Older clients also could be represented if they were a sibling of a client meeting
eligibility criteria. Id. at 4 n.3.
31. Id. at 22; Elizabeth Dewey et al., Message from the Chairs, II A.B.A. CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS LITIG. COMM. 1, 3 (2009).
32. PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 1.
33. FOSTER CHILDREN'S PROJECT, supra note 27.
34. FLA. STAT. § 39.0136(1) (2011).
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of zealously protecting clients' rights under the statute.35 The focus of repre-
sentation is more than a mission statement for FCP; the quest for permanent
homes for its clients infuses every task it undertakes.36
Negotiating the case plan with an eye on the eventual outcome of the
case is a critical aspect of representation of FCP clients. Typically, the
child's expressed desire is to be reunified with his or her parent or parents, a
preference echoed in child welfare law.37 In negotiating the case plan, the
child's attorney views this document as a roadmap that identifies a path to a
permanent home for his or her client. The complete case plan should be
clear and identify the specific reasons for removing the child from his or her
home, and the tasks required of the parents to regain custody. Such tasks
should be materially related to the reasons for removal. Each task should
identify service provider information, expected completion dates, and if ap-
propriate, interim time frames. The document should leave little doubt what
is expected of a parent and other parties. Attorneys should also work to ex-
clude certain tasks that are unrelated to the reasons for removal and may im-
pede the parent's progress toward reunification; these extraneous tasks often
work against the client's desire to be returned home quickly.
Expert evaluations are essential in some FCP cases for two reasons.
First, such evaluations may identify the root cause of a family's dysfunction.
Without clarity, a case plan risks treating symptoms rather than the central
problem or problems that led to removal. For example, if a child is neglected
and failing to thrive, a parenting class may provide parents important guid-
ance. However, if the underlying problem is maternal depression, then the
behaviors that led to neglect are likely to reoccur if that depression remains
untreated. Second, as the ultimate goal of the child's attorney is a permanent
home for the client, regardless of what the parent decides to do or not do, it is
important that parental deficits are identified early, in the event that adoption
becomes the case plan's goal. Undetected and untreated underlying condi-
tions that led to the initial abuse or neglect may prolong a case as additional
sets of services are identified and provided. The child's attorney should an-
ticipate and address any defenses that the parent could use at a trial seeking
to terminate parental rights. In any case, evaluators become valuable wit-
nesses in the event of compliance and reunification, or in the event of non-
compliance and termination.
The realities of child welfare agencies often present additional chal-
lenges to effective legal representation. Inadequate staffing, high turnover,
35. See generally PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14.
36. See id. at 11.
37. FLA. STAT. § 39.621(2)(a).
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and conflicting agendas with agencies sometimes make it difficult to move
forward with advocacy, case planning, and services. The State is sometimes
reluctant to spend scarce resources on needed evaluations or particular ser-
vices. Advocacy to particularize services, when tied to the individual needs
of cases, may indeed incur additional costs, but also effectively avoid the
costs associated with unneeded services and tasks that courts may routinely
order. More importantly, thorough case planning efforts tend to make timely
permanent resolutions more likely.
A. Chapin Hall's Palm Beach Study
The Children's Services Council of Palm Beach County sought to ex-
amine the impact of FCP, and contracted Chapin Hall at the University of
Chicago, a policy research center, to evaluate the program. The results of
that study demonstrate that representation by attorneys from FCP was asso-
ciated with positive outcomes on the length of stay of foster children, when
compared to a cohort of unrepresented children.39
The study employed a quasi-experimental design, comparing those re-
ceiving FCP representation with those otherwise eligible but excluded due to
conflict arising from representation by the Legal Aid Society in the past.40
Researchers examined administrative data from the child welfare agency and
court case records.4 1 The key findings in brief indicate:
Children represented by FCP were found to have a significantly
higher rate of exit to permanency than children not served by FCP.
In the main, this difference appears to be a function of much high-
er rates of adoption and long-term custody among FCP children.
The higher rates of adoption and long-term custody experienced by
FCP children were not found to be offset by significantly lower
rates of reunification.42
Consequently, the pre-permanency costs of substitute care for children
in FCP are less than those without this legal representation.4 3 Based on these
38. PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 1.
39. Id. The study is discussed in brief here, and readers are encouraged to review the
study itself.
40. Id. at 4-5.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. at 1.
43. See PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 22.
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findings, the authors go on to estimate the overall fiscal impact of FCP.4
They estimated the costs associated with out-of-home care by considering
the average board rate, case management costs, and adoption subsidies, find-
ing that substitute care costs of children in FCP were just an approximate
eighty-four percent of those in the comparison group.45 They derived the
daily cost of legal representation under FCP by dividing the annual budget
by 365 and the target caseload for the program. 46 Using three-year projec-
tions, they found that the savings associated with reduced substitute care
considerably offset the costs of the FCP program.47 That is, they estimated
that FCP enhanced permanency in a case at the cost of about sixty-eight dol-
lars per day, but that cost was reduced more than half by the savings realized
from reduced substitute care costs. 4 8 Ultimately, they estimated that the net
cost of each additional day in a permanent home was about thirty-two dol-
lars.49
The authors of the Palm Beach Study identify several limitations in
their inventory of costs and benefits.50 Non-placement services and addition-
al costs of case management associated with FCP cases were outside their
calculations." Also, due to limitations of available data, the study extends
estimates of benefits to only three years into the future; additional benefits
may be evident in ensuing years.52 In any case, the study is an important step
forward in providing guidance as to how the field might collect additional
evidence regarding the effects of enhanced child representation.
V. NEXT STEPS IN ASSESSING THE FISCAL IMPACT OF JUVENILE
REPRESENTATION REFORMS IN DEPENDENCY COURT
While timeliness and permanence are critical areas for identifying any
returns on investment associated with implementing the Model Act, jurisdic-
tions should consider expanding their measures to other outcomes in order to
capture additional benefits that may emerge. In recent years, scholars have
increasingly called for the child welfare system to focus more broadly on the
well-being of children, a concept that includes timeliness and permanency,
44. Id. at 22-25.
45. Id. at 22, 24.
46. Id. at 22. Ten attorneys had a caseload target of thirty-five each. Id.
47. PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 24-25.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 25.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Id.
52. See PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 23-24.
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but also includes physical health, mental health, and education.53 To the ex-
tent that the Model Act demonstrates empirical improvements in these other
realms, advocates can employ research that monetizes such benefits. For
example, economists have estimated the enhanced income that is associated
with increases in educational attainment.54 It is also conceivable that child-
ren placed in stable, permanent homes may exhibit lower levels of offending
than those who do not achieve timely permanence. To the extent that im-
proved outcomes yield measurable reductions in criminality, the monetary
returns would be considerable.
Measuring the variables that would demonstrate such benefits, however,
would require careful tracking of a longitudinal sample of foster children and
identifying those represented by attorneys adhering to the Model Act. While
such research tends to be costly, one opportunity for such tracking of older
youths is found in the nascent National Youth in Transition Database
(NYTD), which is a federal mandate on state child welfare agencies.56
NYTD mandates that states survey a sample of foster youth at age seventeen
before they exit care and then every two years.5 ' Local agencies may consid-
er working with state authorities charged with implementing NYTD to iden-
tify ways to track clients in jurisdictions where the Model Act is imple-
mented into adulthood.
In calculating the local fiscal impact, jurisdictions must endeavor to be
thorough in identifying all associated costs and benefits and transparent in
the assumptions on fiscal impact. Given the importance that policymakers
place on the overall costs of new reforms, it is not surprising that assess-
ments of implementation in human services increasingly address overall fis-
53. See FRED WULCZYN ET AL., BEYOND COMMON SENSE: CHILD WELFARE, CHILD WELL-
BEING, AND THE EVIDENCE FOR POLICY REFORM 145-47, 150 (2005).
54. JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY & ERIC C. NEWBURGER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BIG
PAYOFF: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SYNTHETIC ESTIMATES OF WORK-LIFE EARNINGS 2-
3 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf. The U.S. Census
Bureau report used current population survey data to estimate, for example, that an individual
with a bachelor's degree could expect to earn $2,100,000-in 1999 dollars-which is far
higher than the expected earnings-$1,200,000-of someone with only a high school diplo-
ma. Id. at 3-4.
55. See, e.g., Anirban Basu et al., Social Costs of Robbery and the Cost-Effectiveness of
Substance Abuse Treatment, 17 HEALTH EcON. 927, 928, 942 (2008).
56. AMY DWORSKY & CHRISTINA CRAYTON, AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. Ass'N, NATIONAL
YOUTH IN TRANSITION DATABASE: INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDEBOOK AND ARCHITECTURAL
BLUEPRINT 3-6 (2009), available at http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/docs/nytd-summary.pdf.
57. See id. at 7. Public Law section 106-169 established the John H. Chafee Foster Care
Independence Program in 1999, but the final rule for the NYTD was not issued until February
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cal impact of changes in policy and practice. Economists have provided
guidance for undertaking comprehensive cost-benefit analyses which have so
far found limited application in dependency courts. In brief, the key steps
involve identifying: 1) existing costs of baseline services provided; 2) the
additional costs arising from new standards; and 3) the present value of fu-
ture costs and benefits attached to the baseline and innovation.5 8 In the con-
text of reforms of representation in dependency court, costs include those of
the competing practice modalities and the costs associated with services pro-
vided by the state.59 The most evident benefits include any reductions in
court and service costs. For a comprehensive assessment, however, costs
should include not just those associated with implementation and those inter-
nal to the child welfare system and dependency court. The study, in calculat-
ing costs, also accounted for the cost savings resulting from the public aid
benefits that some youth did not receive as they remained in care 60 Moreo-
ver, so far studies have not attempted to monetize benefits associated with
the outcome with the highest value: permanency itself. The benefit of a
stable family, beyond the benefits that spring from such a positive outcome,
is the justification itself for making it the primary goal for most dependency
cases. The next section identifies one way that the field might be able to
monetize such benefits.
A. Identifying Willingness-to-Pay Estimates
One way to more globally capture any benefits associated with the
Model Act would be to directly estimate the "contingent value" of the bene-
fits of enhanced representation under the new standards. Contingent valua-
tion methods seek to identify how much members of broader society would
be willing to pay with their own money to improve a particular outcome.6'
The approach has been employed extensively in the field of environmental
economics and, more recently, to examine crime reduction programs. One
58. For an excellent explanation of this method and a discussion of possibilities in the
field of child welfare, see generally STEPHANIE LEE ET AL., WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. PoLIcY,
EVIDENCE-BASED PROGRAMS TO PREVENT CHILDREN FROM ENTERING AND REMAINING IN THE
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM: BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR WASHINGTON (2008), available at http://
www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/08-07-3901.pdf.
59. See PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 22.
60. Id. at 22.
61. Mark A. Cohen et al., Willingness-to-Pay for Crime Control Programs, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 89, 89 (2004).
62. Id. at 91; see Michael T. French et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis ofAddiction Treatment:
Methodological Guidelines and Empirical Application Using the DATCAP and ASI, 37
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 433, 435 (2002).
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very recent study applied the method to examine the cost of death resulting
from child maltreatment. The authors found that respondents on average
were willing to pay about $150 each to reduce the annual child maltreatment
mortality rate from two to one per 100,000.63 The authors note that the con-
tingent value placed on the "saved" life-$15,000,000-is far higher than
the $1,000,000 estimate drawn from the human capital method, which em-
ploys estimates of decedents' lost wages. This methodology involves using
random-digit-dialing techniques in identifying respondents whom are queried
on their own preferences to pay for programs.65 In one study, for example,
respondents were given an explanation of the research project and asked
questions such as the following: "Last year, a new crime prevention program
supported by your community successfully prevented one in every ten [bur-
glaries] from occurring in your community. Would you be willing to pay
[fifty dollars] per year to continue this program?" 66 In this particular study,
crimes and payment amounts were randomized, with differing alternatives
and amounts, within a specific range, queried of each respondent.67
Taking the lead from the Palm Beach Study and assuming that the
Model Act consistently yields improvements in overall timeliness and per-
manency, research could poll individuals to have them place a monetary val-
ue of having maltreated children placed in homes more quickly.68 Such con-
tingent value research would provide several advantages.69 It would seek to
capture all benefits associated with a particular program, including intangible
benefits, such as the psychological stress of family separation, and thus pro-
vide better normative guidance than alternative means of calculating bene-
fits. 70 Such studies are also relatively inexpensive, at least compared to lon-
gitudinal survey studies." Such research, however, could face some chal-
lenges in the context of child welfare; the population of interest is small and
63. Phaedra S. Corso et al., Benefits of Preventing a Death Associated with Child Mal-
treatment: Evidence from Willingness-to-Pay Survey Data, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 487,
487-88 (2011).
64. Id.
65. Cohen et al., supra note 61, at 93-95.
66. Id. at 94.
67. Id. at 93-94.
68. See PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 22; Andrew Healey & Daniel Chisholm,
Willingness to Pay as a Measure of the Benefits of Mental Health Care, 2 J. MENTAL HEALTH
POLICY EcoN. 55, 57 (1999). See generally MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF
CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, & DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS § 1 (2011) [hereinafter MODEL
ACT 2011].
69. See Healey & Chisholm, supra note 68, at 55, 57-58.
70. Id. at 55.
71. See Elisabetta Ruspini, Longitudinal Research in the Social Sciences, 20 Soc. RES.
UPDATE (2000) available at http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU28.html.
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for many, foster care and permanency for children may be obscure topics.
Consequently, identifying reliable estimates could be difficult.7 2 However, if
a study could establish "willingness-to-pay" or contingent value for timely
permanency, then the value could be paired with the Palm Beach Study and
similar research to identify more thoroughly the monetary returns of the new
representation model.
B. Additional Challenges in Improving Estimates of Fiscal Returns from
Model Act Implementation
Improving estimates of the benefits associated with implementing the
Model Act will require more studies that employ rigorous quasi-experimental
or-better yet-experimental design, the "gold standard" of evaluation in-
volved random assignment.73 Such studies are rare in examining programs
seeking to improve legal representation in civil proceedings, with none so far
in dependency court.74 In recent years, James Greiner and colleagues have
demonstrated the intriguing possibilities of such research in examining em-
ployment and housing court.75 However, such studies require the randomiza-
tion of cases to achieve true experimental design. Beyond logistical, infor-
mational, and administrative hurdles,76 random assignment may be resisted
as unfair to those in the control group, if services provided to the treatment
group are perceived as superior.
A second challenge involves capturing the broader context of the local
child welfare system and dependency court when implementing the Model
72. Martin Shanahan & Ron Donato, Counting the Cost: Estimating the Economic Bene-
fit of Pedophile Treatment Programs, 25 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 541, 548 (2001) (speculat-
ing that child sexual abuse may be inapt for contingent valuation, given the rare and hidden
nature of the offense and that child maltreatment and court outcomes likely suffer from the
same limitation in this context).
73. See Greiner et al., supra note 13 (manuscript at 5).
74. So far, only five randomized evaluations of civil legal assistance are evident. Id.
Greiner and colleagues identify two studies examining representation in delinquency court,
two in housing court, and one in unemployment benefit proceedings. Id. (manuscript at 5
n.13).
75. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 6, 8).
76. These hurdles may present considerable challenges. In the Palm Beach Study, for
example, different data sources suggested distinct findings regarding key outcomes: While
agency administrative data identified that sixty-two percent of the sample exited to permanen-
cy, court records indicated that eighty-four percent exited to permanency. PALM BEACH
STUDY, supra note 14, at 13-14. The authors note that these data discrepancies were due in
part to the distinct sampling procedures used to identify cases in the respective samples, but
likely reflect distinct methods that explain the divergence. Id. at 6 n.6, 13-14.
77. Such a concern is discussed in the context of evaluation of CASA representation. See
CALIBER Assocs., EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION: FINAL REPORT 4-5 (2004).
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Act. Other ongoing initiatives, such as programs under the State Court Im-
provement Program or other broad-based court reform efforts, seek to im-
prove the same child welfare outcomes that evaluations of programs imple-
menting the Model Act will target." Other activities, including family group
conference programs, IV-E waiver demonstrations, and family drug courts,
may also affect these outcomes, as well as the expectations and duties of
legal representatives of children.79 Finally, the structure of representation of
other parties to dependency proceedings is an important component of the
court's context; improved representation of parents, for example, has been
shown to achieve some of the same improvements in timely permanency
found in the Palm Beach Study. Indeed, optimal results in dependency
court may be a function of the degree to which all parties receive adequate
representation.'
Third, not all efforts to implement the Model Act will be identical, and
evaluators may want to consider representation that clients receive in terms
of "dosage," quantifying the legal service provided. Dosage here would be a
function of two characteristics of the representation. First, the caseload of
children's attorneys will dictate the time and attention each lawyer can de-
vote to each case. Indeed, in the Palm Beach Study, the resulting improve-
ments in timely permanency exhibited by FCP may, in large measure, be a
function of the relatively low caseload of each attorney. 82 Second, the ex-
pected scope of representation will determine the set of responsibilities in
each case, and may have important effects on outcomes. The Model Act
explicitly provides latitude, for example, in the degree to which children's
attorneys are expected to represent clients in ancillary matters.
78. Examples of national, multi-site initiatives include the Fostering Court Improvement
Program and the Model Court Program of the National Council for Juvenile and Family Court
Judges Initiatives. FOSTERING CT. IMPROVEMENT, http://fosteringcourtimprovement.org/index
.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2012); NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, http://www.
ncjfcj.org/our-work/dependency-model-courts (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). For a discussion of
how contextual factors may be relevant in evaluation of civil court proceedings, see generally
Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 17.
79. See generally Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 17. While studies that randomly
assign subjects to treatment and control groups have some protection from the vagaries of
different contexts, it is critical to account for these contextual factors in quasi-experimental
and other non-experimental research work. See generally id.
80. See Courtney et al., supra note 12, at 3-4; see also supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
81. See Greiner et al., supra note 13 (manuscript at 4-5); PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note
14, at 1.
82. See PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 13-15, 22.
83. MODEL ACT 2011, supra note 68, § 7, 7(b) cmt.
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Finally, the Palm Beach Study found significantly improved outcomes
among clients represented by FCP." However, what if the subsequent stu-
dies provide less impressive or ambiguous results? Such findings are not a
remote possibility; one randomized evaluation of a program providing en-
hanced representation of claimants seeking unemployment benefits found
that representation showed no discernible improvement in outcomes over pro
se representation.85 More importantly, such representation measurably de-
layed the proceedings, even though timeliness is-as in dependency proceed-
ings-a primary concern.86  If future research yields similarly impressive
results, advocates of the Model Act may need to seek other ways to justify
implementation, such as identifying improvements in due process or perhaps
in elevated client satisfaction.87
VI. CONCLUSION
Chapin Hall's Study of the Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County
Foster Children's Project provides both evidence of client benefits who are
represented by attorneys acting in concordance with the Model Act, and a
blueprint for future research to examine additional benefits that clients may
receive. As jurisdictions begin to put the Model Act into practice, they
should be sure to put in place ways to measure the outcomes of timeliness
and permanence, as well as other benefits that may be associated with en-
hanced representation. Advances in information technology and research
methodologies offer the possibility of providing justification for the Model
Act on fiscal grounds. That is, while due process may dictate that an em-
brace of the Model Act is the right thing to do, additional research may pro-
vide more evidence that it is the fiscally prudent thing to do as well.
84. PALM BEACH STUDY, supra note 14, at 14-15.
85. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 17 (manuscript at 26, 30).
86. Id. (manuscript at 6, 16).
87. Evaluation of the promising National Quality Improvement Center on the Represen-
tation of Children in the Child Welfare System Best Practice Model (QIC-ChildRep), dis-
cussed in Duquette supra note 1, will likely also further illuminate how improved representa-
tion affect outcomes of young people involved in dependency courts.
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